• 아태비즈니스연구
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• 제10권1호
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• pp.117-133
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• 2019

This paper examines the most-favored-nation treatment clause on the BITs concluded by China and examines the attitudes of China on the application of the most-favored-nation treatment clause to the ISDs by period as the scope of arbitration increases. Moreover, this study pointed out the problems that would be exposed if the most-favored-nation treatment clause applies to ISDs and then also suggested solutions. The conclusions of this study are as follows; if the Chinese government strictly restricts the applicable expansion of the most-favored-nation treatment clause to the dispute settlement procedure by considering only the position of the capital importing country, it implies a contradiction against the development trend of the arbitration system related to international investment disputes. Of course, in order to protect the rights of Chinese investors investing abroad, expanding the applicability of the most-favored-nation treatment clause to the ISDs procedure unconditionally may have a negative impact under China's dual status of being a capital-importing country and a capital-exporting country. Therefore, China should clearly define the scope of application of the most-favored-nation treatment clause, the completion of the local remedy for the host country in cases of BIT to be concluded in the future or amended, and also clearly define that the most-favored-nation treatment clause should not be retroactively applied into BITs already concluded as an exception of applicability of the most-favored-nation treatment.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제58권
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• pp.313-328
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• 2013

Today FTA extends over the world and Korea as a main member of international trade is no exception. In the past Korea, as the developing countries, has made endlessly effort to induce foreign investment from foreign enterprise and/or government to be a truly OECD countries today and made it. Korea's trade economy was reached 1 trillion dollars in 2012. Now we have to find a new way to produce, process, procure goods from foreign investment and also need to protect our profit and/or rights within foreign judicial territory. There are two method to protect foreign enterprise or government. First they rely on general principles in WTO or Bilateral Investment Treaty that the principle of equality, national treatment, and most-favored-nation treatment, you can create a predictable environment to protect foreign enterprise and/or government. Second they need to incorporate contractual clauses in their agreement such as stabilization clause, force majeure, arbitration, governing law or sovereign immunity. Of course there are many things left behind to consider I hope it will be helpful to those who prepare foreign investment contract.

• 무역학회지
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• 제44권1호
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• pp.177-191
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• 2019

Global trade protectionism has increased further and U.S. priorities and protectionism have strengthened since Trump took office in 2017. Trump administration is actively implementing tariff measures based on U.S. domestic trade laws rather than the WTO rules and regulations. In particular, the American government has recently been imposing high tariffs due to national security and imposing economic sanctions on other countries' imports. According to the U.S. Trade Expansion Act Section 232, the American government imposed additional tariffs on steel and aluminum imports to WTO member countries such as China, India, and EU etc. on march 15, 2018. Thus, this study aims to investigate whether the U.S. Trade Expansion Act Section 232 is consistent with GATT/WTO rules by comparing the legal basis of US / China / WTO regulations related to Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act, and gives some suggestions for responding to the Section 232 measure. As the Section 232 measure exceeded the scope of GATT's Security Exceptions regulation and is very likely to be understood as a safeguard measure. If so, the American government is deemed to be in breach of WTO's regulations, such as the most-favored-nation treatment obligations and the duty reduction obligations. In addition, American government is deemed to be failed to meet the conditions of initiation of safeguard measure and violated the procedural requirements such as notification and consultation. In order to respond to these U.S. protection trade measures, all affected countries should actively use the WTO multilateral system to prevent unfair measures. Also, it is necessary to revise the standard jurisdiction of the dispute settlement body and to explore the balance of the WTO Exception clause so that it can be applied strictly. Finally, it would be necessary for Chinese exporters to take a counter-strategy under such trade pressure.