• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.341-368
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• 2016

Asserting a sentence of the form "p but I do not believe that p" sounds inappropriate, and even absurd or contradictory. The problem that Moore's paradox raises is to explain why asserting such a sentence is absurd despite the fact that there is apparently no logical contradiction in it. Many of the influential accounts of Moore's paradox try to locate its source in the nature of belief or in the nature of assertion. In this paper, I argue that these accounts are not satisfactory, and develop and defend a novel account. According to this account, the source of Moore's paradox should be located in self-reference. Self-reference is constituted by a certain disposition to form second-order beliefs. A subject who is ready to assert "p but I do not believe p" fails to conform to the disposition that is constitutive of self-reference, while at the same time referring to the relevant individual with "I."

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.287-322
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• 2014

We put forward a scheme of the theory of analysis, and G. E. Moore's theory of analysis is reconstructed. As C. H. Langford pointed out, Moore's theory commits to the paradox of analysis which says that if a analysis is correct then it is not informative, and if it is informative it is not correct. For, according to his theory, analysing statement is necessarily true identity statement and have some information. Moorean responses which is given by Max Black, Raymond Bradley and Norman Swartz, and Wilfrid Sellars rely on the distinction between the information about concepts and linguistic entity. These approaches are deficient in dealing properly with the difference in concepts as analysandum and analysans. Also, non-Moorean resolutions asserted by Myers, King, Black, and Earl are examined.

• Information Systems Review
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.19-47
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• 2009

Many products today tend to adopt a convergence approach by adding new features or functionalities to the existing products. The convergence, however, results in both positive and negative effects on usage of products, and thus demonstrates the characteristics called "paradox of technology." On the one hand, the added functionalities or features will increase the usefulness of the products. On the other hand, the convergence increases complexity of learning and usage of products and may decrease satisfaction or user evaluations. This study provides an empirical evidence of this paradox through investigation of telematics, one of the exemplary products of convergence services. Our research model is designed to test the existence of the "paradox of technology" and includes variables such as variety of functions, complexity of usage, perceived usefulness, service evaluation, and service fit. The proposed research model and subsequent hypotheses are empirically tested using 149 survey responses from telematics users. We have found that the variety of functions is positively associated with perceived usefulness, but is negatively associated with the complexity of usage. The data analysis reveals that the perceived usefulness has more significant impacts on service evaluation than the complexity of usage does. Furthermore, the strength of causal relationships among these variables is partially moderated by the degree of service fit. This study thus highlights the paradox of technology in explaining user attitudes and beliefs associated with convergence services.