• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.35-69
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• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.17 no.11
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• pp.588-599
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• 2017

This paper analyzes internet access model between ISP, CP and end users where CP uses various technologies to provide direct access to ISP owning subscribers to consume its own contents in low cost and high quality. The level of access charge depends on the competitiveness of CP market. When CP market is perfect competitive, the level of access charge is identical to that of social optimum while when CP market is monopoly, the level of access charge is influenced by the sensitivity of the contents price to access charge for CP. The dead weight loss due to monopoly market in CP can be removed by the regulation of access charge. Socially optimal access charge in monopoly market of CP is lower than that in competitive market. This is because the regulator wants to set access price to lower level to reduce welfare loss from monopoly in CP market where CP determines the price to over marginal cost.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.20 no.3_spc
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• pp.201-217
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• 2013

This paper analyzes the effect of network neutrality regulation on social welfare using the two-sided market under the network congestion. This paper deals with zero price rule regulation which means the price regulation on the side of content. The results are as follows : First, under the monopoly platform, internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all decreasing as the network congestion increases. Second, under the monopoly platform internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all increasing as the network capacity increases. Third, the price of internet use and contents internet use which maximize social welfare are increasing and the number of internet user and content provider are decreasing as the network congestion increases. Fourth, optimal network capacity for monopoly platform provider is less than socially optimal network capacity. Fifth, if network neutrality regulation is enforced, the price of internet use is higher than monopoly platform provider and the price of contents is lower than monopoly platform provider. Also, the number of internet user is less than monopoly platform provider and the number of content provider is more than that. By the way, when network congestion increases, internet use price, the number of internet user, and the number of content provider are decreasing. Sixth, network neutrality regulation is more effective for internet user side than contents provider when network congestion is considered. This means that network neutrality regulation is not effective for contents market side when network congestion is seriously large.

• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.44
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• pp.180-222
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• 2008

This study briefly examines the regulation of market-dominating enterprises in terms of market definition, judgement about market dominance, judgement about abuse of market-dominant position, and types of abuse of market-dominant position. This study explores Korea Fair Trade Commission's judgemental cases regarding the prohibition of abuse of market-dominant positions under 'Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act' and focuses on 21 cases related with Korean media industry. Based on this case analysis and literature review, this study derives major issues, problems, and possible alternatives in the regulation of market-dominating enterprises in media markets. And this study suggests implications about monopoly regulation and fair competition policy of Korean media industry.

• The Journal of the Institute of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
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• v.18 no.6
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• pp.213-220
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• 2018

This paper deals with survival facility location problem(SFLP) that the store with less of demand threshold level is closed result from another new establishment of store in the same kind of comparative firms have a monopoly market. We will be faced with a difficult problem when a new establishment stores in market saturation that the closed stores more than opening stores. Serra et al. proposes recursive heuristic concentration algorithm, and Han et al. suggests maximum insurance of customer location. But the drawback of these algorithms is a recursively computation for many locations. This paper get the solution from only neighborhood search of comparative firm's stores that can be maximum customers and closed comparative firm's store, and the location with minimum customer exchange to the location that can be closed the comparative firm's store with maximum customer. The advantage of this algorithm is to get the solution using a MS-Excel.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.15 no.11
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• pp.73-82
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• 2017

Purpose - This paper aims to investigate a profit maximizing incentive of foreign traders in distributing the KOSPI 200 Futures. Such an incentive may induce unsophisticated retail traders to suffer loss from speculative trading. Since Korean government increased the entry barriers of the market to protect unsophisticated traders, the market size has been decreasing while the proportion of the contract held by foreign traders has been increasing. These on going changes make the market imperfectly competitive, where a profit maximization incentives of foreign traders are expected to grow. In this paper, we attempt to find any evidence of such behavior, thereby providing implications regarding market policy and market efficiency. Research design, data, and methodology - According to Kyle(1985), an informed trader exploits his/her monopoly power optimally in a dynamic context so that he/she makes positive profit, where he/she could conceal his/her trading utilizing noise trading as camouflage. We apply the KOSPI 200 Futures market to the Kyle's model: foreign traders who take into account the effect of his/her trading to maximize expected profits as an informed trader, retail investors as noise traders, and financial institutions as market makers. To find any evidence of monopolistic behavior, we test the variants of trading volume and price data of the KOSPI 200 Futures over the period of 2009 and 2017. Results - First, we find that the price of the KOSPI 200 Futures are more volatile than the price of underlying asset. Second, we find that monopolistic foreign trader's trading order flows are consistent with exploiting his/her monopoly power to maximize profit. Finally, we find that retail investors' trading order flows are inversely consistent with maximizing profit, that is, uninformed retail investors suffer loss continuously in speculative trading against informed traders. Conclusions - Our results show that the quantity of strategic order flows may have a large effect on the price, therefore, resulting the market inefficiency. The results also imply that, in implementing regulations, the depth of the market must be considered to maintain market liquidity, and suggesting interesting research topics regarding the market structure.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.259-277
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• 2008

This paper empirically analyzes the influence of export insurance on export promotion using panel data for the Korean case during the sample period from 2003 to 2006. We use the Korean export's share in trading partners' imports as a weight for the weighted least square (WLS) estimation to measure the effect of export insurance on the export promotion. Our main finding is that export insurance subsidy seems to enhance the export performance when the Korean export takes greater share in other countries' markets. On the other hand, under weaker monopoly power of the Korean export, export risk and trading partners' GDP growth rate has more influence on the export promotion rather than export insurance subsidy. Our finding implies that policy makers and practitioners should discern the Korean exports' monopoly power differential across trading countries for better performing export insuarnce policy.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.16 no.5
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• pp.3-25
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• 2014

The megatrends of the Korean distribution industry market in 2014 reflect opportunities in parallel import & overseas direct purchase. Korean government addressed that "Monopoly & Oligopoly consumer goods import improvement plan" to stabilizing importing goods prices and domestic consumers' burden relief through accelerating market competition. and moreover it is to improving distribution channel and promoting parallel import market business. The Korean market is very unique in that consumers' real sensory index of open up importation effect level is low, but nominal open up importation effect level is high. This is due to difficulties in creating a proper importing goods distribution market and alternative importing routes are very rare. Thus, the purpose of this study is to analyze the market situation and parallel import to improve Korean government's "Monopoly & Oligopoly consumer goods import improvement plan" policy for the revitalization of the domestic market economy and to boost up a new growth engine industry.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.5
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• pp.214-219
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• 2006

Oligopoly differs from perfect competition and monopoly in that a firm must consider rival firms' behavior to determine its own best policy. This interrelationship among firms is the issue examined in this paper. In the oligopoly market, the complete information market means that each producer has full information about itself, the market, and its rivals. That is, each producer knows the market demand function, its own cost function and the cost functions of rivals. On the other hand, the incomplete information market means that in general each producer lacks full information about the market or its rivals. Here, we assume that each firm doesn't know the cost functions and the strategic biddings of its rivals. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze firm' strategic behaviors and equilibrium in an electricity market with incomplete information. In the case study, the complete information market and the incomplete market are compared at the Nash Equilibrium from the viewpoints of market price, transaction quantities, consumer benefits, and Social Welfare.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.107-129
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• 2002

Expansion and enhancement of information and communication infrastructure can create a market closer to an ideal type for a perfect competition, utilizing a cyber space in the network (with the expanded usage of Internet and e-commerce) and it could be a market of a monopolistic form. The government can take one of the two approaches responding to this monopolization of the digital market. First, the government maintains laissez-faire policy since the monopoly cannot be maintained over a long period of time due to an increasing in the production, decrease in the price, profit resulting from this and rapid technology evolution. Second, the government can actively interrupt the monopolization of the digital market. Monopolization in a digital market can lead to a market failure. Unstable market structure and too much frequent merger and acquisition contribute to making the digital market very dynamic. Information goods exchanged in the digital market have the features of very low marginal cost required to copy the original product whereas its initial fixed cost is very high. This explains why the information products are not priced based on the existing marginal price determination principles and why companies producing them have various product sales strategies (price/product differentiation strategy, and other sales strategies).