• Journal of the Korean Society of Fisheries and Ocean Technology
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• v.57 no.4
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• pp.316-333
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• 2021

In order to understand basic data for improving the fishing system and fishing vessel structure in coastal improved stow net fishery, a questionnaire survey and on-site hearing were conducted from May 10 to June 11, 2019 to analyze opinions on the improvement of operation status and fishing vessel structure. The questionnaire survey consisted of ten questions on the operation status of coastal improved stow net fishery and six questions on the improvement of fishing vessel structure, and the results of each question were analyzed by the region, the captain's age, the captain's career and the age of fishing vessel. As a result of analyzing opinions on the operation status of the coastal improved stow net fishery, it was found that the average time required for casting net was 32.8 to 33.0 minutes and that the average time required for hauling net was 41.0 to 42.2 minutes which took 10 to 12 minutes more than for casting net. The most important work requiring improvement during fishing operation (the first priority) were 'hauling net operation,' 'readjustment and storage of fishing gear,' and 'fish handling' and the hardest factor in fishing management were in the order of 'reduction of catch,' 'labor shortage' and 'rising labor costs.' The most institutional improvement that is most needed in coastal improved stow net fishery was an 'using fine mesh nets.' Most of the respondent to the questions on the experience in hiring foreign crews was 'either hiring or willing to hire foreign crews,' and the average number of foreign crews employed was found to be 2.3 to 2.4 persons. The most important reason for hiring (or considering employment) foreign crews was 'high labor costs.' The degree of communication with foreign crews during fishing operation were 'moderate' or 'difficult to direct work.' The most important problem in hiring foreign crews (the first priority) was an 'illegal departure.' As the survey results on the opinion of structural improvement of coastal improved stow net fishing vessel, the degree of satisfaction with fishing vessel structure related to fishing operation was found to be somewhat unsatisfactory, with an average of 3.3 points on a five-point scale. The inconvenient structure of fishing vessel in possession (the first priority), the space needed most for the construction of new fishing vessel (the first priority) and the space considered important for the construction of new fishing vessel (the first prioprity) was a 'fish warehouse.' The most preferred equipment for the construction of new fishing vessel were 'engine operation monitoring' and 'navigation safety devices.' The average size (tonnage class), the average horse power and the average total length of fishing vessel for proper profit and safety fishing operation was between 13.8 and 14.0 tonnes, 808.3 to 819.5 H.P. and 23.4 to 23.5 meters, respectively. The results of the operation status of coastal improved stow net fishery and the requirement for improving the fishing vessel structure are expected to be provided as basic data for reference when we build or improve the fishing vessel.

• Korean Journal of Environment and Ecology
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• v.37 no.5
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• pp.327-336
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• 2023

This study aimed to propose an effective method for surveying wild birds by comparing the results of bioacoustic detection with those obtained through a field survey. The study sites were located at Dongbaek-dongsan and a 1100-altitude wetland in Jeju-do, South Korea. The bioacoustic detection was conducted over the course of 12 months in 2020. For the bioacoustic detection, a Song-meter SM4 device was installed at each study site, recording bird songs in 1-min per hour, .wav, and 44,100 Hz format. The findings of the field survey were taken from the 「Long-term trends of Bird Community at Dongbaekdongsan and 1100-Highland Wetland of Jeju Island, South Korea.」 by Banjade et al. (2019). The results of this study are as follows. First, the avifauna identified using bioacoustic detection comprised 29 families and 46 species in Dongbaek-dongsan, and 16 families and 25 species in the 1100-altitude wetland. Second, based on the song frequency, the dominant species in Dongbaek-dongsan were Hypsipetes amaurotis (Brown-eared Bulbul, 33.62%), Horornis diphone (Japanese Bush Warbler, 12.13%), and Zosterops japonicus (Warbling White-eye, 9.77%). In the 1100-altitude wetland the dominant species were Corvus macrorhynchos (Large-billed Crow, 27.34%), H. diphone (19.43%), and H. amaurotis (16.56%). Third, in the field survey conducted at Dongbaek-dongsan, the number of detected bird species was 39 in 2009, 51 in 2012, 35 in 2015, and 45 in 2018, while the bioacoustic detection identified 46 species. In the field survey conducted in the 1100-altitude wetland, the number of detected bird species was 37 in 2009, 42 in 2012, 34 in 2015, and 38 in 2018, while the bioacoustics detection identified 25 species. Overall, 43.6% of the 78 species detected in the field survey in Dongbaek-dongsan (34 species) were identified using bioacoustic detection, and 38.3% of the 47 species detected in the field survey in the 1100-altitude wetland (18 species) were identified using bioacoustic detection. Fourth, the bioacoustic detection identified 9 families and 12 species of birds in Dongbaek-dongsan, and 3 families and 7 species of birds in the 1100-altitude wetland. No results from field survey were available for these species. The identified birds were predominantly nocturnal, including Otus sunia (Oriental Scops Owl) and Ninox japonica (Northern Boobook), passage migrants, including Larvivora cyane (Siberian Blue Robin), L. sibilans (Rufous-tailed Robin), and winter visitors with a relatively small number of visiting individuals, such as Bombycilla garrulus (Bohemian Waxwing) and Loxia curvirostra (Red Crossbill). Fifth, the birds detected in the field survey but not through bioacoustic detection included 18 families and 48 species in Dongbaek-dongsan and 14 families and 27 species in the 1100-altitude wetland; the most representative families were Ardeidae, Accipitridae, and Muscicapidae. This study is significant as it provides essential data supporting the possibility of an effective survey combining bioacoustic detection with field studies, given the increasing use of bioacoustic devices in ornithological studies in South Korea.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.