• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.221-244
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• 2024

This study examines how the independence of monetary policy changes in situations where the interest rate differential between domestic and foreign rates inverts, utilizing the trilemma indices. For analysis, this paper uses the trilemma indices developed by Kim et al. (2017) to analyze the relationship between the monetary policy independence index and the other two trilemma indices, namely the capital account openness index and the exchange rate stability index, across 45 countries from 2002 to 2018. The analysis reveals that the trilemma's validity is contingent. In particular, no statistically significant negative correlation was found between the monetary policy independence index and exchange rate stability index during periods of interest rate differential inversion. A positive correlation emerges between exchange rate stability and the independence of monetary policy, particularly when the inverted interest rate differential exceeds a certain threshold. This situation, where the exchange rate remains stable despite low domestic interest rates, implies that the central bank is effectively managing monetary policy to appropriately respond to economic conditions, which is reflected in the monetary policy independence index.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.791-800
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• 2021

Along with the trend of financial globalization, Vietnam has undergone a process of increasing financial integration. The great capital inflow poses a problem for the monetary policy's ability to follow a planned target during the changes in the global financial markets. This paper aims to examine the impact of financial integration on monetary policy independence in Vietnam and investigate the role of foreign exchange reserves on this relationship. The research borrows from Mundell-Fleming's Trilemma theory. The results show that increasing financial integration reduces the independence of monetary policy in the short term, and foreign exchange reserves have not shown an apparent role in Vietnam. In addition, increasing exchange rate stability has a negative impact on the independence of monetary policy, but it has an impact on growing market confidence and partly supporting the management process of monetary policy in the short term. Therefore, in the long run, Vietnam needs to allow exchange rate flexibility more, but there should not be sudden changes; the size of foreign exchange reserves should be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of an independent monetary policy with an obvious impact in the context of an increasing scale of international capital flows in the future.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.11
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• pp.23-31
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• 2020

This paper investigates the impact of monetary policy independence shock on bond yield by allowing for heterogeneous coefficients in the model based on panel data for 19 developing countries using quarterly data from 1991 to 2016. First, we estimate the model using conventional panel VAR estimation with the assumption of homogeneous coefficients across countries. Second, by performing Chow and Roy-Zellner tests to check the homogeneity assumption, we find that the assumption does not hold in the model. Third, we apply a mean-group estimation for panel VAR as a solution for heterogeneity panel model. The results reveal that central bank independence is effective in reducing bond yield with the maximum at period 6 after the shock. Shock one standard deviation bond yield has a negative effect on consumption and investment. We determine that central bank independence has a contradictory effect on real activity; a negative effect on consumption but a positive influence on investment for the first two years after the shock. Additionally, we split our sample into three groups to make the subgroups pool. Our empirical result shows that monetary policy independence shock reduces bond yield. Meanwhile, the response of economic activity to bond yield varies for all three groups.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.1-26
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• 2010

This paper empirically examines whether Korean monetary policy is independent of U.S. monetary policy during the post-crisis period in which capital account is liberalized and floating exchange rate regime is adopted and during the pre-crisis period in which capital mobility is restricted and tightly managed exchange rate regime is adopted. Before capital account liberalization, monetary autonomy can be achieved in view of the trillema, even under tightly managed exchange rate regime, as capital mobility is restricted. On the other hand, for the period after capital account liberalization, monetary autonomy can be also achieved in view of the trillema, as exchange rate stability is given up. Securing monetary autonomy, however, may not be easy under liberalized capital account for a small open economy like Korea. Huge capital movements can generate excessive instability in foreign exchange and asset markets. Strengthened international economic linkages may also be another factor to prevent monetary policy from being independent. Using block-exogenous structural VAR model, the effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks on Korean economy are examined. Empirical results show that Korean monetary policy is not independent of U.S. monetary policy for both periods before and after capital account liberalization. For the period after capital account liberalization, Korea does not seem to have implemented floating exchange rate policy in practice, which may lead Korean monetary policy to be dependent on U.S. monetary policy. For the period after capital account liberalization, portfolio flows respond dramatically to the U.S. monetary policy, which may also keep Korean monetary policy from being independent.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.499-524
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• 2010

The purpose of this study is to based on review of theoretical and empirical studies to assess the independence of central banks - the former Socialist republics, including the Russian Federation and Czech, Poland. In addition, the work is expected to clarify whether a link exists between independence and the most important economic indicators such as inflation, economic activity, the budget deficit. And The subject of this study are the formal and actual independence of national banks, as well as limiting factors: political and economic. Background investigation of the problem of independence of central banks from the fact that, according to many economists, it is essential to the successful development of a market economy. The effectiveness of any country's economy due to currency volatility, low inflation, high reliability of the banking system, etc. As far as the independence of monetary regulation contributes to these goals - one of the most actively debated issues in the world of economic theory and practice for a long time. The issue of central bank independence is extremely important for Russia, Czech, Poland. In the near future to the central bank has important tasks, among which are the transition to inflation targeting in the rejection of significant intervention in the foreign exchange market, as well as improving the sustainability of the national banking system. Transparency and independence of the Bank of Russia, Czech Republic, Poland, in my view, should be an important factor in achieving these goals. The countries of Czech Republic, Poland have already made a number of steps to bring the status of their banks to the European standards. Many other developing countries are also in the process of reforming their central banks and the improving conditions of their functioning. However, despite the fact that as a model for reform used by the central banks of countries with developed market economies, central banks in developing countries are still yet deprived of the legal, economic and political independence. A different situation exists in transition space. Because of significant differences in the views of the authorities in transition republics at the necessary level of independence of central banks and the exchange rate and monetary policy reform of monetary management in these countries led to different results.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.209-247
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• 2004

Although various publicly reserved funds have recently come to the fore of academic and policy-making attention in Korea, researchers rarely take up the issue of the reserve fund retained from annual profits by the central bank (i.e., the Bank of Korea). Starting with the general public choice premise that bureaucrats seek to maximize their discretionary budget, this paper first provides a theoretical reasoning why central bank's bureaucrats would prefer retaining annual profits to turning them to the Treasury. The major tenet to be emphasized is that retained profits as a reserve fund can give the central bankers discretionary power in their disposition. In particular, we focus on the close relationship between the reserve fund and the discount windows. The latter, as a monetary instrument, has traditionally been demonstrated to cause secrecy, arbitrariness, and other bureaucratic amenities in the previous literature. Subsequently, this paper, based on 61 countries data, empirically verifies that the central bank's reserve fund is at least partially used to additionally increase the discount windows. Since an excessive use of discount windows results in inflationary bias, we conclude the paper with some policy suggestions to have such bureaucratic power of discretion in check. This paper, if in its experimental nature yet, is expected to shed a critical implication for establishing the meaningful independence of the central bank to a host of countries.