• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.39-47
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• 2020

Purpose: This study investigated the effects of valuation errors on the capital market through the earnings forecasting errors of financial analysts. As a follow-up to Jensen (2005)'s study, which argued of agency cost of overvaluation, it was intended to analyze the effect of valuation errors on the earnings forecasting behavior of financial analysts. We hypothesized that if the manager tried to explain to the market that their firms are overvalued, the analysts' earnings forecasting errors would decrease. Research design, data and methodology: To this end, the analysis period was set from 2011 to 2018 of KOSPI and KOSDAQ-listed markets. For overvaluation, the study methodology of Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) was measured. The earnings forecasting errors of the financial analyst was measured by the accuracy and bias. Results: Empirical analysis shows that the accuracy and bias of analysts' forecasting errors decrease as overvaluation increase. Second, the negative relationship showed no difference, depending on the size of the auditor. Third, the results have not changed sensitively according to the listed market. Conclusions: Our results indicated that the valuation error lowered the financial analyst earnings forecasting errors. Considering that the greater overvaluation, the higher the compensation and reputation of the manager, it can be interpreted that an active explanation of the market can promote the accuracy of the financial analyst's earnings forecasts. This study has the following contributions when compared to prior research. First, the impact of valuation errors on the capital market was analyzed for the domestic capital market. Second, while there has been no research between valuation error and earnings forecasting by financial analysts, the results of the study suggested that valuation errors reduce financial analyst's earnings forecasting errors. Third, valuation error induced lower the earnings forecasting error of the financial analyst. The greater the valuation error, the greater the management's effort to explain the market more actively. Considering that the greater the error in valuation, the higher the compensation and reputation of the manager, it can be interpreted that an active explanation of the market can promote the accuracy of the financial analyst's earnings forecasts.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.33-68
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• 2008

The purpose of this paper is to test the market timing hypothesis and impact of macro economic variables on capital structure choice as well as the traditional static trade-off and pecking order theories of capital structure in a integrated framework. Through a two stage test of target capital structure and capital structure choice, none of theories was consistently supported, but most of them were partly supported. In the first stage analysis of target ratio, coefficients of firm-specific variables generally supported the predictions of pecking order theory rather than those of the static trade-off theory. However, the result of the second stage test on capital structure choice supported the hypothesis of the static trade-off theory, which claims that firms usually set and pursue the target leverage ratio. Further, the result of the seconde stage shows that a simple pecking oder theory does not hold because firms with deficit of internal fund tend to issue bonds rather than stocks to raise outside fund. Also, the result indicates that the market timing hypothesis holds because firms with over-valued stocks tend to issue stocks rather than bonds. However, contrary to Korajczyk and Levy(2003), the impact of macro economic variables such as term or credit spreads on capital structure choice was negligible, and the impact of macro economic and market timing hypothesis variables were not greater in financially unconstrained firms as Korajczyk and Levy(2003) suggested.