• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
• /
• v.16 no.9
• /
• pp.5829-5835
• /
• 2015

This paper investigates the impact of corporate governance structure on the firm's debt costs under different governance environments. We find that after the 2008 banking crisis, family firms with controlling shareholders benefit from lower debt cost through the strong control rights of dominating large shareholders, compared with the firms with diversified minority-shareholders. Foreign investors are related statistically to the higher cost of debt. Before the 2008 banking crisis, cash flows and growth potentials are positively associated with the firm's cost of debt.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
• /
• v.9 no.7
• /
• pp.53-59
• /
• 2018

Purpose - This study examines the effect of control-ownership wedge on stock crash risk. In Korea, controlling shareholders have exclusive control rights compared to their cash flow rights. With increasing disparity, controlling shareholders abuse their power and extract private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders. Managers who are controlling shareholders of the companies tend not to disclose critical information that would prevent them from pursuing private interests. They accumulate negative information in the firm. When the accumulated bad news crosses a tipping point, it will be suddenly released to the market at once, resulting in an abrupt decline in stock prices. We predict that stock price crash likelihood due to information opaqueness increases as the wedge increases. Research design, data, and methodology - 831 KOSPI-listed firm-year observations are from KisValue database from 2005 to 2011. Control-ownership wedge is measured as the ratio (UCO -UCF)/UCO where UCF(UCO) is the ultimate cash-flow(control) rights of the largest controlling shareholder. Dependent variable CRASH is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least 1 crash week during a year, and zero otherwise. Logistic regression is used to examine the relationship between control-ownership wedge and stock price crash risk. Results - Using a sample of KOSPI-listed firms in KisValue database for the period 2005-2011, we find that stock price crash risk increases as the disparity increases. Specifically, we find that the coefficient of WEDGE is significantly positive, supporting our prediction. The result implies that as controlling shareholders' ownership increases, controlling shareholders tend to withhold bad news. Conclusions - Our results show that agency problems arising from the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights increase the opaqueness of accounting information. Eventually, the accumulated bad news is released all at once, leading to stock price crashes. It could be seen that companies with high control-ownership wedge are likely to experience future stock price crashes. Our study is related to a broader literature that examined the effect of the control-ownership wedge on stock markets. Our findings suggest that the disparity is a meaningful predictor for future stock price crash risk. The results are expected to provide useful implications for firms, regulators, and investors.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
• /
• v.15 no.1
• /
• pp.209-216
• /
• 2017

The merits and demerits of the chaebol in Korea has been subjected to considerable debate in recent years. In accounting research, many papers have been concentrating on tunneling that be designated as expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders. Although majority previous paper suggested related-party transaction has a negative effect to firm value, some research on related-party transaction argued it has a positive effect, also. We assume that they can't consider compositive meaning of related-party transaction and result of prior studies are mixed. In this setting, we investigate the relation between earnings management and related-party transaction which be known as strategy for tunneling by considering controlling shareholder's ownership.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
• /
• v.9 no.6
• /
• pp.49-55
• /
• 2018

Purpose - This paper examines the effect of related party transactions on crash firm-specific stock price crash risk. Ownership of a typical Korean conglomerate is concentrated in a single family. In those entities, management and board positions are often filled by family members. Therefore, a dominant shareholder can benefit from related party transactions. In Korea, firms have to report related party transactions in financial statement footnotes. However, those are not disclosed in detail. The more related party transactions are the greater information risk. Thus, companies with related party transactions are likely to experience stock price crashes. Research design, data, and methodology - 2,598 firm-year observations are used for the main analysis. Those samples are from TS2000 database from 2009 to 2013, and the database covers KOSPI-listed firms in Korea. The proxy for related party transactions (RTP) is calculated by dividing total transactions to the related-party by total sales. A dummy variable is used as a dependent variable (CRASH) in the regression model. Logistic regression is used to explain the relationship between related party transactions and crash risk. Then, the sample was separated into two groups; tunneling firms and propping firms. The relation between related party transactions and crash risk variances with features of the transaction were investigated. Results - Using a sample of KOSPI-listed firms in TS2000 database for the period of 2009-2013, I find that stock price crash risk increases as the trade volume of related-party transactions increases. Specifically, I find that the coefficient of RPT is significantly positive, supporting the prediction. In addition, this relationship is strong and robust in tunneling firms. Conclusions - The results report that firms with related party transactions are more likely to experience stock price crashes. The results mean that related party transactions increase the possibility of future stock price crashes by enlarging information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In case of tunneling, it could be seen that related party transactions are positively associated with stock crash risk. The result implies that the characteristic of the transaction influences crash risk. This study is related to a literature that investigates the effect of related party transactions on the stock market.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
• /
• v.17 no.1
• /
• pp.11-33
• /
• 2010

The majority of graphs and visuals made publicly available by Thai listed companies tend to be disjointed and minimal. Only a little over fifty percent of the total 478 companies included graphic representations of their business operations and performance in the form of two or three dimensional spreadsheet based graphs in their annual reports, investor relations documents, websites and so on. For novice users, these visual representations are unlikely to give the big picture of what is the company's financial position and performance. Neither will they tell where the company stands in its own operating environment. The existing graphics and visuals, in very rare cases, can provide a sense of the company's future outlook. For boundary users such as audit committees whose duty is to promote good governance through transparency and disclosure, preliminary interview results show that there is some doubt as to whether the inclusion of big-picture visuals can really be of use to minority shareholders. These boundary users expect to see more insightful visuals beyond those produced by traditional spreadsheets which will enable them to learn to cope with the on-going turbulence in today's business environment more quickly. However, the debate is still going on as to where to draw the line between internal or external reporting visuals.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
• /
• v.20 no.2
• /
• pp.1-39
• /
• 2003

Using a comprehensive sample of convertible security offerings by Korean firms from 1981 to 1999, we examine the effect of convertible bond issues on firm value. We find that the announcement of convertible bond issues has a positive effect on firm value. However, the announcement of private convertible bond issues by chaebol firms has a significant negative effect on their market values. This result is different from that in Japan, suggesting that the efficiency of the financing decision by Korean chaebol is different from that by Japanese keiretsu. In addition, we find that the announcement effect of private convertible bond issues by chaebol firms has a significant relation with the corporate governance variables such as ownership structure, bank relationship. These results indicate that convertible bond issues can be used as a mechanism for chaebol owner-manager to give rise agency problems at the expense of the wealth of minority shareholders.