• Title/Summary/Keyword: Military security

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The Impact of Japan's Pursuit of Constitutional Amendment on Marine Security and Countermeasures (일본의 개헌(改憲) 추진이 우리 해양안보에 미치는 영향과 대응방안)

  • Heo, Song
    • Strategy21
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    • s.44
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    • pp.54-78
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    • 2018
  • The core of the current constitutional amendment pursued by the Abe administration depends on the status of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, which include the right to engage in war, in the legal and regular military positions. This is an important turning point for the Abe administration, which aims to become a normal country for Japan, and it is a series of steps that followed in the revision of the U.S. and Japan guidelines in 2015 and the overhaul of the security law in 2016. In this paper, we propose building "A navy Attractive to Alliances" as a way to secure Korea's maritime security under the current security environment. The term "attraction" refers to the alliance "first priority" especially in the United States. The way to do this is to transform the paradigm of the ROK-U.S. alliance into a naval hub in the vast seas, which will allow us to strengthen our national defense and even deter threats from neighboring countries. To this end, our navy needs to have a more active approach to U.S. East Asian strategy. If we can convince the United States to be a nation that contributes more to its East Asian strategy, it will only lead to a strengthening of the status of its alliance and expansion of its unilateral support and military capability against Japan, thus minimizing Japan's influence.

Ransomware Threat Countermeasures for the Defense Information System: In terms of Information Security Risk Management (국방정보시스템에서의 랜섬웨어 위협 대응방안: 정보보안 위험관리 관점에서)

  • Yoo, Jincheol;Moon, Sangwoo;Kim, Jong-hwa
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.20 no.5
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    • pp.75-80
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    • 2020
  • Damage caused by ransomware has continued to increase since last year, but cyber operations are managed without any separate classification of ransomware types in the military's guidelines for carrying out cyber operations. However, unlike other malware, ransomware is a threat that could paralyze all defense operations in one moment, and the military should reevaluate ransomware and take countermeasures. Accordingly, this paper aims to analyze the assets, vulnerabilities, and threats related to defense information service based on information security risk management, and propose alternatives to ensure continuity of defense work from ransomware threats.

A Dilemma of Kyrgyzstan Goes Through the Process of Nation-Building: National Security Problems and Independent National Defense Capability (국가건설과정에서 키르기스스탄의 국가안보와 자주국방의 딜레마)

  • Kim, Seun Rae
    • Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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    • v.14 no.4
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    • pp.27-52
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    • 2011
  • The regions of Central Asia have each acquired an elevated strategic importance in the new security paradigm of post-September 1lth. Comprised of five states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Central Asia's newly enhanced strategic importance stems from several other factors, ranging from trans-national threats posed by Islamic extremism, drug production and trafficking, to the geopolitical threats inherent in the region's location as a crossroads between Russia, Southwest Asia and China. Although the U.S. military presence in the region began before September 11th, the region became an important platform for the projection of U.S. military power against the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan. The analysis goes on to warn that 'with US troops already in place to varying extents in Central Asian states, it becomes particularly important to understand the faultlines, geography, and other challenges this part of the world presents'. The Kyrgyz military remains an embryonic force with a weak chain of command, the ground force built to Cold War standards, and an almost total lack of air capabilities. Training, discipline and desertion - at over 10 per cent, the highest among the Central Asian republics - continue to present major problems for the creation of combat-effective armed forces. Kyrgyzstan has a declared policy of national defence and independence without the use of non-conventional weapons. Kyrgyzstan participates in the regional security structures, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) but, in security matters at least, it is dependent upon Russian support. The armed forces are poorly trained and ill-equipped to fulfil an effective counter-insurgency or counter-terrorist role. The task of rebuilding is much bigger, and so are the stakes - the integrity and sovereignty of the Kyrgyz state. Only democratization, the fight against corruption, reforms in the military and educational sectors and strategic initiatives promoting internal economic integration and national cohesion hold the key to Kyrgyzstan's lasting future

A Study on the Change Trends and Implications of North Korea-Russia Relations: Focusing on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement (북·러 관계의 변화 동향과 시사점 고찰 - 포괄적 전략 동반자 협정을 중심으로 -)

  • Kang-Kyong Lee
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.24 no.3
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    • pp.209-218
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    • 2024
  • Relations between North Korea and Russia have recently reached an inflection point in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, and are expected to have a significant military and geopolitical impact on the Korean Peninsula and the security environment in East Asia in the future. The 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between North Korea and Russia' was signed on the occasion of Kim Jong-un's visit to Russia in September 2023 and Russian President Putin's visit to North Korea in June 2024. The security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia is anticipated to be significantly impacted by developmental changes in North Korea-Russia relations. As North Korea and Russia formed a paramilitary alliance, stipulating provisions that can be interpreted as automatic military intervention, North Korea's military support for the ongoing war in Ukraine was secured, and the basis for Russia's military intervention in future Korean Peninsula issues was laid. Additionally, the possibility of transferring Russian military technology to North Korea increased as an institutional mechanism was established to implement joint measures to strengthen the defense capabilities between the two countries. If Russia uses its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to neutralize international sanctions against North Korea and provide large-scale economic support, North Korea will break away from international isolation and strengthen its strategic autonomy. Therefore, this study examines the historical process of change in North Korea-Russia relations and examines the main contents and implications of the 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement' concluded after the North Korea-Russia summit in June 2024.

The Introduction and the Application of PMSCs System on Counter-terrorism (대테러활동에 있어서 민간군사보안업(PMSCs) 제도의 도입과 활용방안)

  • Kim, Sang-Jin;Kim, Jong-Kul
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.11 no.5
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    • pp.89-98
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    • 2011
  • The counter-terrorism in Korea should be approached practically divided both internally and externally. However, in reality it is impossible for the military and the police to control all the counter-terrorism. So there is a need of precaution using the partnership with private companies. But the military and the police have stressed the conservative and closed operation. Furthermore, the focus of counter-terrorism in Korea is more on expose facto treatment than prevention, so they are almost the defenseless. In order to solve this problem, we should form the private subcontractors of the counter-terrorism experts. That is the introduction and the application of PMSCs system. First, the military and the police need to change its mind set for the partnership with private companies to prepare appropriateness. Second, it should be built up infrastructure to let the hands-up workers on counter-terrorism out place. Third, it should be set up the institutions of learning to train regularly to applicate PMSCs system and to specialize. Fourth, the training of counter-terrorism should be made it mandatory about exit passengers to danger zone. Fifth, the selection of PMSCs suitable for counter-terrorism should be strict.

A study on the guidelines for the Military Continuity of Operations Plan (군 COOP전략 지침 수립을 위한 연구)

  • Park, Chanyoung;Park, Seongsu
    • The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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    • v.8 no.1
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    • pp.291-298
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    • 2022
  • Unexpected massive disasters have occurred around the world, causing enormous socio-economic damage. The military has long been enacting laws, organizing organizations and establishing systems for crisis and disaster management, but it did not consider the situation when military essential functions were suspended due to unpredictable and massive disasters. With the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. military has developed COOP strategy aimed at continuing military essential functions in all crisis, and is contributed to national continuity by ensuring uninterrupted national security functions. Korean military has established a crisis and disaster management system, but focuses on managing and controlling disasters and crisis situations. Korean military needs a system to guarantee military essential functions even in national crisis beyond its management capabilities. In this study, We compared and reviewed the U.S. administration and military COOP guidelines and directives, ISO22301 international standards., and developed planning guidelines suitable for the Korean military situation by responding to detailed items based on ISO22301. In particular, the U.S. military(DoD, Army, Navy, Air Force) COOP guidelines were drawn and incorporated into the guidelines(such as protection and succession of command authority, the fulfillment of essential functions and operational security, etc.). The planning guidelines are expected to be used as reference materials for the introduction of COOP systems in the military and the establishment of plans in the future.

Ocean Security and its Dilemma among the OAS countries in the 21st Century: Conflict between the Re-establishment of the 4th Fleet and Emerging of UNASUR in S. America (21세기 미주대륙과 대서양 해양안보의 딜레마: 미4함대의 등장과 남미지역과 갈등)

  • Ha, Sang-Sub
    • Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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    • v.14 no.2
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    • pp.449-476
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    • 2010
  • This paper focuses on the security problems in atlantic ocean involved in the USA and Latin America and the Caribbean. The ocean security matters in this region have mainly argued military concerns traditionally. However, the concept of ocean security has been changed in the 21st century and strongly debated with various dimensions: social, human and resource, environment as well. This paper traces these changed concepts currently with many empirical cases existed in many security conflicts in this ocean, especially between the USA and Latin(South) America region. Historically, security conflicts in the OAS(Organization of American States) countries have involved with many military matters, territory and oceans, and currently added up with terrorism and drug problems as well. However, the great and potential conflict emerged in the security issues is resource matter in this ocean and get a dilemma to be sorted out between military and social security matter. For example, the re-establishment of 'the 4th Fleet' in US Navy got a great conflict between the USA and the South American countries, both of them wants to achieve to resource security in this ocean to meet their energy security. Finally this paper addresses some implications and prospects in this conflict in near future and suggests a few solutions and advices for Korean's relation in this ocean.

The lesson From Korean War (한국전쟁의 교훈과 대비 -병력수(兵力數) 및 부대수(部隊數)를 중심으로-)

  • Yoon, Il-Young
    • Journal of National Security and Military Science
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    • s.8
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    • pp.49-168
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    • 2010
  • Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

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A Study on Military Symbology Standardization for Cyber Operations (사이버 작전 군대부호 표준화에 관한 연구)

  • Lee, Jongkwan;Lee, Minwoo;Kim, Jonghwa;Kim, Jongkwa;Lee, Jaeyeon;Oh, Haengrok
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.21 no.1
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    • pp.149-158
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    • 2021
  • In this paper, we propose military symbols for cyber operations to understand the situation in cyberspace intuitively. Currently, standardized military symbols are mainly for kinetic operations, and they do not consider cyber operations. Although, MIL-STD-2525D includes some symbols for cyber operations, only icons that are composed of three letters are standardized. So there is a limit to effectively expressing cyber operations. That is why we propose military symbols for cyber operations compatible with existing military symbol building rules. In addition to merely presenting the symbols, we present examples of expressing various cyber situations using the proposed symbols. It proves the usefulness of the proposed symbol. The small number of symbols proposed in this paper will not be able to represent all cyber situations. However, based on the proposed symbols, it is expected that more symbols will be standardized in the future to more clearly express the cyber situation.

Study on Changes in Military Negotiations under the Kim Jeong-eun Regime through Working-Level Talks for Gaeseong Industrial Complex (김정은시대 개성공단 실무회담 분석을 통한 군사협상 변화 연구)

  • Lee, Sung Choon
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.13 no.5
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    • pp.3-10
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    • 2013
  • This study is trying to suggest the continuity and changes that would be made in inter-Korean military negotiations in the future under the Kim Jeong-eun regime by analyzing the recent inter-Korean Working-Level Talks for Gaeseong Industrial Complex based on 'anti-Japanese guerilla style negotiation model, the military negotiation model under Kim Jeong-il era. Especially, through analysis of the inter-Korean Working-Level Talks for Gaeseong Industrial Complex, it is verified that behavior similar to that in the military talks in the past is found even in the economic negotiations. Such analysis leads to an assumption that negotiations under the Kim Jeong-eun regime would be made within the category of the military negotiations under the Kim Jeong-il era. Fundamentally North Korea will change but try to achieve its objectives in the military talks within the existing frame of strategic culture rather than changing it. Such phenomenon will continue for some time. In the future inter-Korean military talks, however, North Korea will try to change its behavior to cope with its financial difficulties. Accordingly, the South Korea's government will have to have paradigm shift toward inter-Korean military negotiations. Especially, Kim Jeong-eun's studying abroad in the past will make him change in the negotiations. At this moment, the South Korean government must make continuous efforts to induce dialogue and negotiation. In order to induce the North Korea to change, the development of economic norm logic with the united front applied in the strategic culture of military negotiation and the formation of a value system in the North Korea's military negotiation policy makers will lead to the creation of a new military negotiation framework.