• Strategy21
• /
• s.34
• /
• pp.58-92
• /
• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
• /
• v.16 no.1
• /
• pp.252-278
• /
• 2013

Many countries implement an offset program as a method of the acquisition of modern military technology for enhancement of the domestic military strength. Offset agreements are made based on the value, not a monetary unit. The value should be above minimum threshold fixed by the related regulation. Hence, technology valuation model which is objective and reasonable is required vitally. At present, some defense related organizations such as DTaQ, ADD valuate the proposed technology by using their own method. However, due to the lack of differentiation of valuation analysis indicators for various technologies, existing offset valuation models are inadequate to consider whole characteristics of such technologies. In this paper, we developed four sets of offset valuation analysis indicators considering the characteristics of each technology, parts production, depot maintenance, military equipment performance upgrade, and R&D related technology, by using the Delphi method. Also, we structurized those indicators in each technology by using the factor analysis. Through applying developed indicators, it is expected that technology valuation in the offset program would be more credible and accurate. Ultimately, it gives greater bargaining power to negotiators in the procedure of the offset negotiation.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
• /
• s.8
• /
• pp.1-48
• /
• 2010

The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the Untied Nations' efforts for peace on Korean peninsular after CCF's participation in Korean War. The Untied Nation tried to negotiate th peace plan between two sides from the end of 1950. Once the CCF's entry into the war had been confirmed, the war situation moved to a new phase, and the UN forces, which had guided the war in an effort to destroy the NKP A forces, and to punish North Korea, had to set up new guidelines to cope with the new situation. Accordingly, in late November, 1950, the UN forces camp, mainly the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United Nations Command, discussed various options, such as an expansion of the war up to the Chinese territory, a cease fire along the 38th Parallel, or a forced and inevitable evacuation. The Korean delegation to the UN insisted that "the unification of Korea should be achieved only by victory in the war. The Chinese intervention in the war is a Challenge to the UN in the same way as the North Korean invasion. The UN participation in the war was to repulse the invasion. With the same spirit we should drive back the Chinese Communists." The Korean delegation also emphasized to the friendly nations the political objective and will of unification, and that a cease fire at a threshold of unification might return us to the status quo ante bellum, and would be contrary to the Korean nation's desire. At that time, particularly, the US strongly considered the employment of nuclear weapons as one of the new strategies to cope with the Chinese invasion. The international effects of these casual remarks were realized almost at once. The British Prime Minister who had not wanted the expansion of war in the Far East, especially from the view point of the interest of NATO's security, visited Washington. so the conference had a very important meaning for the UN forces' new strategy. On the other hand, at the UN, on the 5th of December, the very day Truman and Attlee agreed to seek a cease-fire under UN auspices, a group of thirteen Asian and Arab states proposed to ask China and North Korea not to cross the 38th Parallel, and sounded out both sides about a cease fire along the 38th Parallel. The United States and the United Kingdom gave their assent, but China and North Korea gave no direct response. The CCF, who were securing the initiative of operation, were not agreeable with the proposal of the UN forces. The Untied Nation has tried to negotiate th peace plan between two sides from the December of 1950 and January of 1951. The Untied Nations' has achieved great results to negotiate for the peace plan on Korean peninsular after CCF's participation in Korean War. It's the results considering both the operation situation and political opinions.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
• /
• no.73
• /
• pp.91-117
• /
• 2018

In the tribute system controlling international relations of pre-modern East Asia, conciliation diplomacy between royal authorities was a principle of diplomatic relations among each nation. Therefore, capitals where royal authorities really existed were political centers and diplomatic stages at the same time. Notably, diplomatic relations between United Silla and Japan were maintained dually by conciliation diplomacy between royal authorities and practical diplomacy through Dazaihu located in Tsukushi. Tsukushi located at the northwestern tip of Kyushu was a gateway to foreign nations and stronghold in terms of national defense. Amidst an East Asian war named Baek River Battle in 663, the royal court of Daehwa established Dazaihu here because it was necessary for diplomatic and military responses. Dazaihu established as part of diplomatic negotiation not only took diplomatic functions as an official residence since the latter half of the 7thcentury. and but also was used as a stage of official diplomacy between Silla and Japan. Diplomatic negotiation between Silla and Japan through Dazaihu was made in practical methods and such a situation could be confirmed through diplomatic documents exchanged between Silla and Dazaihu in the middle of the 8thcentury. At that time, protocols became an importan tissue.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
• /
• v.32 no.2
• /
• pp.189-217
• /
• 2017

Declaration of Air Defense and Identification Zones started with the United States in 1950, which was followed by declaration of KADIZ by the Republic of Korea in 1951. Initial ADIZ were solely linked with air defense missions, but their roles have changed as nations around the globe manifested a tendency to expand their influence over maritime resources and rights. In particular, China declared ADIZ over the East China Sea in October 2013 and forced all passing aircraft to submit flight plan to ATC or military authority, saying failure of submission will be followed by armed engagement. China announced it would declare another zone over the South China Sea despite the ongoing conflict in the area, clearly showing ADIZ's direct connection with territorial claim and EEZ and that it serves as a zone within which a nation can execute its rights. The expanded KADIZ, which was expanded in Dec 15, 2013 in response to Chinese actions, overlaps with the Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea and the Japanese ADIZ. The overlapping zone is an airspace over waters where not only the Republic of Korea but also of China and Japan argue to be covering their continental shelf and EEZ. Military conventions were signed to prevent contingencies among the neighboring nations while conducting identifications in KADIZ, including the overlapping zone. If such military conventions and practice of air defense identification continue to be respected among states, it is under the process of turning into a regional customary law, although ADIZ is not yet recognized by international law or customary law. Moreover, identification within ADIZ is carried out by military authorities of states, and misguided customary procedures may cause serious negative consequences for national security since it may negatively impact neighboring countries in marking the maritime border, which calls for formulation of operation rules that account for other state activities and military talks among regional stake holders. Legal frameworks need to be in place to guarantee freedom of flights over international seas which UN Maritime Law protects, and laws regarding military aircraft operation need to be supplemented to not make it a requirement to submit flight plan if the aircraft does not invade sovereign airspace. Organizational instructions that require approval of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrance and exit of ADIZ for military aircraft need to be amended to change the authority to Minister of National Defense or be promoted to a law to be applicable for commercial aircraft. Moreover, in regards to operation and management of ADIZ, transfer of authority should be prohibited to account for its evolution into a regional customary law in South East Asia. In particular, since ADIZ is set over EEZ, military conventions that yield authority related to national security should never be condoned. Among Korea, China, Japan and Russia, there are military conventions that discuss operation and management of ADIZ in place or under negotiation, meaning that ADIZ is becoming a regional customary law in North East Asia region.

• Convergence Security Journal
• /
• v.15 no.6_1
• /
• pp.79-92
• /
• 2015

It is required to expand area of inter-Korean economic cooperation, being limited to non-military field, to military field and then, to positively promote arms control in order to establish foundation for peaceful reunification in Korean peninsula. Reasons why arms control has not been promoted between South and North Korea in the meantime were such original factors as follows; (1) limit of confidence building between the South and the North, (2) functional limit of arms control itself, (3) institutional structural limit between the South and the North, (4) environmental limit at home and abroad. It is necessary to get out from existing frame and to seek a new paradigm in order to overcome above factors and to realize arms control between the South and the North. First, it is required to have prior political dialog at the South-North high-level talks in order to promote arms control and to exercise 'strategic flexibility' during negotiation and promotion process. For this, 'flexible reciprocity' has to be adopted in compliance with situation and conditions. Second, it is necessary to get out from existing principle of 'confidence building in advance and arms reduction later' but to seek the 'simultaneous driving principle of confidence building and arms reduction' as an eclectic approach. Namely, based on reasonable sufficiency, it is required to promote military confidence building and limited arms reduction in parallel, which is a lower level of arms control. Third, as an advisory body of Prime Minister's Office, it is necessary to install an organization exclusively responsible for arms control and to positively handle arms control issue from the standpoint of national policy strategy. If the South-North high-level talks take place, it is necessary to organize and operate 'South-North Joint Arms Control Promotion Board (tentative name)'. Fourth, it is required to exercise more active diplomatic competence in order to create national consensus on necessity of arms control for peaceful reunification and to form more favorable international environment. Especially, it is necessary to think about how to solve nuclear issue of North Korea together in collaboration with international society and how to maintain balance between ROK-US alliance and Sino-Korean cooperation relations.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
• /
• v.33 no.2
• /
• pp.443-469
• /
• 2018

In the sixty year since the first launch of Sputnik 1, it has become impossible to consider economic, political, or scientific human life in the communication field without reference to outer space. But, there is a growing groundswell of public opinion aimed at preventing arms race in space. Therefore it is necessary to establish some institution or mechanism such a code of conduct, international law. But every nation has a different posture on the grounds of national interest, or different levels of space development, the conditions required for the successful negotiation of a comprehensive treaty are not yet ripe. It is hoped that by beginning with soft measures (TCBM, Code of Conduct) for which it is easier to secure voluntary participation it may be possible to build up to a comprehensive treaty. The participation of the Space powers (US, Russia, China) in a dialogue of mutual exchange and shared information would contribute to international peace and give a long term benefit to humankind. It is also necessary to promote partnership through regional and bilateral cooperation. We should guide and shape opinion so that more nations ratify and sign existing international legal covenants in order to contribute to the efficency of Space law. International law needs to enforce PAROS and Space Security.

• The Southeast Asian review
• /
• v.28 no.4
• /
• pp.31-76
• /
• 2018

This article explores why the two Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam and the Philippines, choose different strategies to cope with the Chinese threat. Despite the evident Chinese threat in the South China Sea, Vietnam has not meaningfully expanded the military cooperation with the United States, whereas the Philippines, ironically, has distanced itself with its ally, the United States. Existing studies on the topic does not offer a satisfactory explanation. We assign that two cases are examples of "underbalancing" - the failure of balancing even though there is an evident threat. Furthermore, we demonstrate the difference between cases of the Philippines and Vietnam by arguing that the number of veto players affects the outcome of foreign policy, underbalancing of two countries. The Philippines has only one veto player, the president, hence its response to external threats is incoherent. On the other hand, the number of veto players in Vietnam is more than one and those players demand negotiation among them on the matter of foreign policy. Upon analyses on two cases we argue that the former is the case of underbalancing caused by a lack of policy stability, while the latter is the case of underbalancing caused by a lack of policy responsiveness.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
• /
• v.10 no.1
• /
• pp.183-192
• /
• 2024

The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the determining factors (economy, security, domestic politics, administration, and international politics) that affect the ROK-US defense cost sharing decision. Through this, we will gain a deeper understanding of the defense cost sharing decision process and improve the efficiency of defense cost sharing calculation and execution. The scope of the study is ROK-US defense cost sharing from 1991 to 2021. The data used in the empirical analysis were various secondary data such as Ministry of National Defense, government statistical data, SIPRI, and media reports. As an empirical analysis method, multiple regression analysis using time series was used and the data was analyzed using an autoregressive model. As a result of empirical research through multiple regression analysis, we derived the following results. It was analyzed that the size of Korea's economy, that is, GDP, the previous year's defense cost share, and the number of U.S. troops stationed in Korea had a positive influence on the decision on defense cost sharing. This indicates that Korea's economic growth is a major factor influencing the increase in defense cost sharing, and that the gradual increase in the budget and the negotiation method of the Special Agreement (SMA) for cost sharing of stationing US troops in Korea play an important role. On the other hand, the political tendencies of the ruling party, North Korea's military threats, and China's defense budget were found to have no statistically significant influence on the decision to share defense costs.

• Korea and Global Affairs
• /
• v.2 no.1
• /
• pp.69-92
• /
• 2018

North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.