• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.41-61
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• 2001

Many markets are forecast to see significant changes due to the growth of electronic commerce made possible by the internet. The way of doing business with internet affects the market mechanism. It is now over 10 years since Malone et al(1987) set out their hypothesis on electronic markets, and electronic hierarchies. An electronic market is an interorganizational information system through which multiple buyers and sellers interact to accomplish one or more of the following market-making activities. And they predicted that markets evolve toward electronic markets, by reducing search cost, which may result in significantly. higher price competition among sellers and therefore lower prices for buyers. And the degree of two factors; asset specificity and uncertainty, affect the market mechanism. Products with low asset specificity and low uncertainty are compatible with a market relationship while the greater the asset specificity and uncertainty, the more likely it is to favour a hierarchical structure. Based on the these researches, we observed and analyzed a case study of market mechanism in Internet business. We found the fact that even though Internet could make the business environment in which lots of buyers and suppliers participate, electronic market will evolve market mechanism. 1 analyzed two factors, which affected market evolution. First, When Asset specificity is low in electronic commerce, market structure should be preferred to hierarchical structure. Second, When transaction uncertainty is low in electronic commerce, market structure should be preferred In hierarchical structure. This research covers conceptual and empirical aspects on electronic market structure. Future research should be variously done about the influential factors of electronic market mechanism.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers P
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• v.59 no.3
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• pp.263-267
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• 2010

Although electricity market structures may be different from each country, they have a long-term forward market and a short-term spot market in general. Particularly, a bilateral contract transacted at a long-term forward market fixes the electricity price between a genco and a customer so that the customer can avoid risk due to price-spike in the spot market. The genco also can make an efficient risk-hedging strategy through the bilateral contract. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for deriving the optimal bilateral contract price using game theory. This mechanism can make the customer reveal his true willingness to purchase so that an adequate bilateral contract price is derived.

• Advances in robotics research
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.171-183
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• 2014

Distributed planning and decision making can be beneficial from the robustness, adaptability and fault tolerance in multi-robot systems. Distributed mechanisms have not been employed in three dimensional transportation systems namely aerial and underwater environments. This paper presents a distributed cooperation mechanism on multi robot transportation problem in three dimensional environments. The cooperation mechanism is based on artificial capital market, a newly introduced market based negotiation protocol. In the proposed mechanism contributing in transportation task is defined as asset. Each robot is considered as an investor who decides if he is going to invest on some assets. The decision is made based on environmental constraint including fuel limitation and distances those are modeled as capital and cost. Simulations show effectiveness of the algorithm in terms of robustness, speed and adaptability.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.19-33
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• 2008

In the previous double auction research for the market optimization, two basic assumptions are usually applied - (1) each trader has a linear or quasi-linear utility function of price and quantity, and (2) buyers as well as sellers have identical utility functions. However, in practice, each buyer and seller in a double auction market may have diverse utility functions for trading goods. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. In particular, the flexible mechanism is more useful in a synchronous double auction because traders can properly change utilities in each round. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a flexible synchronous double auction mechanism in which traders can express diverse utility functions for the price and quantity of the goods, and optimal total market utility is guaranteed. In order to optimize the total market utility which consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders. We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through a several simulation experiments.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.93-124
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• 2011

The introduction of competition in the generation of electricity has raised the fundamental question of whether markets provide the right incentives for the provision of the capacity needed to maintain system reliability. Capacity mechanisms are adopted around the world to guarantee appropriate level of investment in electricity generation capacity. In this study, we discuss these approaches and analyze the capacity pricing mechanisms from the adequacy perspective. We conclude that the design of capacity mechanism is very important to decrease electricity spot price and increase total electric capacity. Specifically, the constant of capacity pricing mechanism made a difference to the performance of electricity market. However, the slope of capacity price mechanism is better than the constant of that in improving performance of electricity market.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.58 no.3
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• pp.455-461
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• 2009

This paper proposes Direct Load Control(DLC) operation scheme using a bidding system and the methodology to value proper quantity decided by the DLC program, which is a kind of resources for stabilization of electricity market price during peak times by managing consumer electricity demand. Since DLC program in Korea is based on the contract with the customers participating in this program, it is difficult to anticipate voluntary participation. That is, incentive for participants in DLC program is insufficient. To cope with this point, it is necessary to develop a new market mechanism and market compatible operation scheme for DLC programs. DLC market mechanism is deemed to be equipped with iterative bidding system, independent operation from energy market, and interactive with bidding information on energy market. With this market mechanism, it is important to find the optimal operation point of DLC allowing for the factors of stabilizing the electricity market price and compensating DLC implementation. This paper focuses on the mathematical approaches for the bid-based DLC operation scheme and examines several scenarios for the following technical justifications: 1) stabilization of electricity market price during peak times, 2) elasticity of demand.

• Proceedings of the Korean DIstribution Association Conference
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• 2005.11a
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• pp.385-416
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• 2005

The rapid growth of wide Korean Well-being Market in recent years. The purpose of this is to define the definition of 'Development Processes of Well-being Market and Mechanism of Well-being Marketing' and discover the main factorss of the Mechanism of Well-being Marketing in order for Korean Well-being Market to be Successful, it must have a Competitive Advantage. But as of yet, there virtually no such strategies. Hitting upon this situation, this study intends to discover the Mechanism of Well-being Marketing in Korean Well-being Market Consequently, the study results show that Market Advantage like Well-being, Real valuece, and Well-being Marketing product in Korean Well-being Market.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.4
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• pp.416-424
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• 2005

At present, the Korean electricity industry is undergoing restructuring and the Cost Based-generation Pool (CBP) market is being operated in preparation of a Two Way Bidding Pool (TWBP) market. In deregulated electricity industries, an integrated power market simulator is one of the tools that can be used by market participants and market operators analyzing market behaviors and studying market structures and market codes. In this regard, it is very important to develop an electricity market simulator that reflects market code providing a market operation mechanism. This paper presents the development of an integrated market simulator, called the Power Exchange Simulator (PEXSIM), which is designed to imitate the Korean electricity market considering the various features of the market operating mechanism such as uniform price and constrained on/off payment. The PEXSIM is developed in VB.NET and composed of five modules whose titles are M-SIM, P-SIM, O-SIM, T-SIM and G-SIM interfacing the Access database program. To verify the features and the performance of the PEXSIM, a small Two Way bidding market with a 12-bus system and a One Way bidding market for generator competition will be presented for the electricity market simulations using PEXSIM.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.7
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• pp.381-386
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• 2003

To provide a specified power quality under electric market system is becoming an important issue for customers and utility company. However, there is no realistic infra-structure to design a power system for the specified power quality. Present electric market is operating under the economic point of view. The low power price could be attractive, but the effect of low price could result the lower power quality for the long time and threat power system security. This paper presents a model which conceptualize the dynamic power quality control mechanism to minimize total cost of a society which is affected electric power quality. This model aims to produce a basic infra-structure to balance cost and quality under the electric market system.

• Knowledge Management Research
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.41-66
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• 2010

This research examines the effect of the relatedness and the gap between Resources and mechanisms on effectiveness of inter-organizational knowledge transfer. According to the literature, there has been a competing theory between two claims; one is that inter-organizational knowledge transfer will be more effective due to the reduction of the transaction cost as the relatedness increases. And the other is that the mutual complementarity of different organizational characteristics will increase synergy. In total, the relatedness and the gap of the Resource and mechanism makes the inverted U-shaped relationship with the inter-organizational knowledge transfer. As the result of empirical analysis about 109 Korean-based Joint Ventures entered country, it shows that the relatedness of parent company's production Resources, learning mechanisms, and coordination mechanisms made the inverted U-shaped relations with the inter-organizational knowledge transfer and the gap of production Resources and adjustment mechanism formed the same relationship. However, the U-shaped relationship has been established in the relatedness of market Resources, but the gap of market Resources and the learning mechanism was not statistically significant. Through this study, I can draw a best conclusion that the inter-organizational knowledge transfer will be more effective when the relatedness and the gap of management resources and mechanisms is in optimal level. However, when it comes to market Resources, it can be inferred that the result could be the opposite because the partner country's market environment would be different.