• 디지털융복합연구
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• 제12권6호
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• pp.35-42
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• 2014

우리나라에서 해상에서 발생하는 살인, 강도, 마약밀매, 불법조업 등 해양범죄에 관한 일반적 수사관할권은 해양경찰에게 있다. 해양범죄는 육지에서 발생하는 일반범죄에 비해 희소성, 피해의 대형화, 증거물의 오염가능성을 띄고 있기 때문에 이러한 범죄를 다루는 수사관들이 평소 담당사건에 대한 고도의 전문성을 보유하고 있어야 한다. 그런데 현재 해양경찰은 범죄수사전문가가 부족하고, 경찰수사연수원 등 일반경찰의 교육기관에 수사교육을 위탁하는 등 자체적인 수사교육 역량이 부족한 실정이다. 이에 해양범죄에 관한 정보와 자료를 축적하고 수사전문가를 양성한 후, 해양범죄에 관한 전문교육기관을 설치하여 해양범죄 특유의 교육과정을 통해 해양범죄 수사역량을 강화할 것을 제안한다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.27-56
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• 2013

The United Nations Command (UNC) and the communist North failed to reach an agreement on where the maritime demarcation line should be drawn in the process of signing a truce after the Korean War because of the starkly different positions on the boundary of their territorial waters. As a result, the Armistice Treaty was signed on July 1953 without clarification about the maritime border. In the following month, Commander of the UNC unilaterally declared the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a complementing measure to the Armistice. Referring to this, North Korea and its followers in South Korea wrongfully argue that the NLL is a "ghost line" that was established not based on the international law. However, one should note that the waters south of the NLL has always been under South Korea's jurisdiction since Korea's independence from Japan on August 15, 1945. There is no need to ask North Korea's approval for declaring the territorial waters that had already been under our sovereign jurisdiction. We do not need North Korea's approval just as we do not need Japan's approval with regard to our sovereign right over Dokdo. The legal status of the NLL may be explained with the following three characteristics. First, the NLL is a de facto maritime borderline that defines the territorial waters under the respective jurisdiction of the two divided countries. Second, the NLL in the West Sea also serves as a de facto military demarcation line at sea that can be likened to the border on the ground. Third, as a contacting line where the sea areas controlled by the two Koreas meet, the NLL is a maritime non-aggression line that was established on the legal basis of the 'acquiescence' element stipulated by the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement (article 11) and the Supplement on the Non-aggression principle (article 10). Particularly from the perspective of the domestic law, the NLL should be understood as a boundary defining areas controlled by temporarily divided states (not two different states) because the problem exists between a legitimate central government (South Korea) and an anti-government group (North Korea). In this sense, the NLL problem should be viewed not in terms of territorial preservation or expansion. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of national identity related to territorial sovereignty and national pride. North Korea's continuous efforts to problematize the NLL may be part of its strategy to nullify the Armistice Treaty. In other words, North Korea tries to take away the basis of the NLL by abrogating the Armistice Treaty and creating a condition in which the United Nations Command can be dissolved. By doing so, North Korea may be able to start the process for the peace treaty with the United States and reestablish a maritime line of its interest. So, North Korea's rationale behind making the NLL a disputed line is to deny the effectiveness of the NLL and ask for the establishment of a new legal boundary. Such an effort should be understood as part of a strategy to make the NLL question a political and military dispute (the similar motivation can be found in Japan's effort to make Dokdo a disputed Island). Therefore, the South Korean government should not accommodate such hidden intentions and strategy of North Korea. The NLL has been the de facto maritime border (that defines our territorial waters) and military demarcation line at sea that we have defended with a lot of sacrifice for the last sixty years. This is the line that our government and the military must defend in the future as we have done so far. Our commitment to the defense of the NLL is not only a matter of national policy protecting territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; it is also our responsibility for those who were fallen while defending the North-Western Islands and the NLL.

• 해양환경안전학회지
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• 제16권4호
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• pp.387-391
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• 2010

유엔해양법협약과 의제21의 17장에서 해양의 통합관리를 권고한 이후 미국, 캐나다, 호주 등 선진 해양국가들은 해양법 제정과 해양정책의 수립을 통해 통합적인 해양관리를 지향하고 있다. 그러나 이들 국가는 연방정부의 체제로서 해양관련 조직의 통합과 정책의 통합에 있어 일정한 한계를 보이고 있다. 즉, 이들 국가에서는 해양관련 주관부서가 없으며, 지방정부 관할해역을 연방정부의 해양정책에 포함하지 못하고, 민간부문 관련 산업의 육성을 직접적으로 언급하지 않고 있다. 이들 연방국가의 해양정책은 범부처 및 산업계를 포함한 위원회 등을 설립하여 관련 부처 및 지방정부의 다양한 이해관계를 조정하고 있다.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제24권4호
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• pp.501-524
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• 2002

Article 121 of the UNCLOS stipulates the regime of islands and grants different jurisdictions to islands and rocks. Especially, paragraph 3 gives different definitions and distinguishes the legal status of between islands and rocks. That is, rocks, which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life cannot have their own EEZ, continental shelf or the great-sphere maritime jurisdiction. In this paper various theories and state practicess on islands and rocks are examined with reference to Article 121 of UNCLOS. Also, the status of Dokdo as a rock or an island is examined in accordance with the interpretation of Article 121 of UNCLOS. National legislations, practices, and many scientific opinions are often contradictory and controversial with respect to the interpretation of Article 121 of the UNCLOS. However, it is believed that Article 121 of UNCLOS, particularly paragraph 3 has to be interpreted more strictly. That is because the highly developed modem scientific technology can be meaningless when the criteria of Article 121 of UNCLOS are to be inappropriately applied. Insular figures like ${\ulcorner}rocks{\lrcorner}$ could bring the inequitable effects disadvantageous toward the other party when the maritime delimitation is applied. Claiming and Intentionally extending maritime zone of a coastal states by assigning EEZ for small insular figures like ${\ulcorner}rocks{\lrcorner}$ is over-zealous nationalism which is illegal, and such practices must be recognized as actions bringing great harm to the neighboring nations and demise of the sprit of all mankind.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제14권3_2호
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• pp.13-21
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• 2014

국토의 3면이 바다인 반도의 지형을 갖고 있는 우리나라는 자원의 보고인 바다의 중요성을 인식하고, 해양영토 확장 및 권익보호를 위한 해양정책을 추진하는 등 국가해양력 강화를 위해 노력하고 있다. 그러나 해양활동의 무대가 200해리 배타적 경제수역(EEZ)과 대륙붕까지 확장됨에 따라, EEZ가 중첩되는 해역에서의 관할권, 도서영유권, 해양과학조사 및 대륙붕 개발 등을 둘러싸고 인접국과 복잡한 이해관계가 심화되는 등 국제적 협력과 국가간 경쟁이 공존하고 있다. 이러한 때에 해양경찰은 기존의 해양주권수호에서부터 사고예방 중심의 안전관리체계 구축에 이르기까지 우리 바다를 굳건히 지켜왔다. 특히 해상안보, 해양사고, 해상범죄, 해양오염에 있어 날로 증가하는 경비수요에 효율적으로 대응하기 위하여 최선의 노력을 다하고 있다.

• 항공우주시스템공학회지
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• 제8권4호
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• pp.44-51
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• 2014

This thesis analyzes the latest operating concept and status for Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) researching overseas ADIZ CONOPS, international legal basis for ADIZ, the intention & background of proclamation for China Air Defense Identification Zone(CADIZ). Firstly, ADIZ is lawful concerning international connivance for ADIZ where around 20 countries have operated, Article 56 "Rights, jurisdiction & duties of the coastal State" and Article 301 "Peaceful uses of the seas" on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLS). Secondly, ADIZ has been regarded as a support means for national interest & policy as well as military air defense one. Thirdly, Based on legal re-interpretation for UNCLS relating to ADIZ, China proclaimed CADIZ where can ensure national maritime policy and strategy including A2/AD(Anti-Access & Area Defence), inroad into the ocean, claim for Senkaku Islands possession, etc..

• 해양정책연구
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• 제33권2호
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• pp.147-181
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• 2018

Currently, we are living in the era of the 4th industrial revolution. In the field of shipping industry, the MASS is a revolutionary game changer in the making arising out of such an industrial and technical innovation in the pursuit of radically challenging the pre-existing system of a human-operated vessel. Given this trend, the entire maritime regulatory regime, which has been designed by, and intertwined with, human seaworthiness, abruptly faces the most unprecedented normative confrontations now and increasingly in the coming days. As the constitution of ocean, UNCLOS, provides, every flag state is obliged to effectively exercise its jurisdiction to secure technical and human seaworthiness. Moreover, the coastal state may institute protective proceedings against vessels in respect of any violations of its laws to protect its marine environment in maritime zones of the coastal state. Further, UNCLOS acknowledges that the port state's authority extends to take administrative measures to prevent sub-standard ships from sailing within the ports or offshore-terminals of the state. These three jurisdictional functions will be required to more closely interface with each other than ever over the legal and political implications created by MASS. Although states' jurisdictional nuances are significant in this present world tilting back to protectionism, there are few articles to present jurisdictional issues of states and conceivable normative discourse with regard to MASS. This articles visits potential jurisdictional conflicts underlying MASS and tries to strike balance between contradictory interpretive approaches under UNCLOS while it is undeniable that this doctrinal research tends to strive to find justifications within the current framework of international law.

• 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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• 제24권1호
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• pp.59-89
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• 2009

본 논문은 5대 국제항공테러범죄협약, 다시 말해서 UN의 전문기구인 국제민간항공기구(ICAO)에서 제정된 1963년 도쿄협약, 1970 헤이그협약, 1971 몬트리올협약, 1988년 몬트리올 의정서 그리고 1991년 가소성폭약협약에 규정된 관할권조항의 내용과 그 문제점을 연구하였는데 국제항공테러 협약의 관할권을 연구하면서 얻은 결론을 다음과 같다. 첫째, 항공테러협약의 관할권규정에서 공통으로 발견되는 것은 어느 협약도 관할권의 우선순위를 명시하지 않고 있다는 점이다. 결국 하이재킹 된 항공기가 착륙한 국가와 항공기등록국간 관할권문제가 발생하는데 대부분의 경우 착륙국이 하이재커를 처벌하는 예가 많다. 둘째, 국제법상 전통적인 관할권이론에서 많은 이론이 제기되었던 소극적 국적주의(passive personality principle)가 국제항공테러협약의 제정 이후 각종 국제테러협약에서 점차적으로 발전되어가고 있는 경향을 볼 수 있다. 1973년의 뉴욕협약 제3조 1항, 1979년 인질협약 제5조 1항 (d) 그리고 1988년 로마협약 제6조 2항 (b)가 그 예이다. 또한 1979년 인질협약 제5조 1항 (c)와 1988년 로마협약 제6조 2항 (c)에서는 자국에게 작위 또는 부작위를 강요하기 위한 범행의 경우에도 그 대상국가가 관할권을 행사할 수 있도록하고 있다. 만일 장래에 국제항공테러협약이 개정이 될 경우에는 국제항공 테러범죄를 좀 더 효과적으로 억제하기 위하여 소극적 국적주의를 고려할 필요가 있다. 셋째, 헤이그협약이나 몬트리올협약은 범인의 국적주의를 부여하고 있지않으나 인질협약은 제5조 1항 (b)에 인질억류범의 국적국가에게 관할권을 부여하고 있다. 만일 A국가의 국민이 어떤 국가나 제3자의 작위나 부작위를 강요할 목적으로 B국가에서 인질을 억류했다면 A국가도 그자에 대한 관할권을 행사할 권리를 가진다는 것이다. 따라서 만일 국제항공테러협약이 개정이 될 때는 이 문제도 고려할 필요가 있다. 마지막으로 인질협약 제 5조 1항 (b)는 무국적자가 상주하는 국가에서 만약 그가 인질억류범죄를 행했고, 그 국가가 그렇게 하는 것이 적절하다고 고려하는 경우 그에 대하여 관할권을 행사할 권리를 부여한다. 이와 같은 목적에서 볼 때 무국적거주자를 국민과 동일하게 보고 있는데 헤이그협약이나 몬트리올협약에서는 없는 조항이다. 만일 국제항공테러협약이 개정이될 때는 이 문제도 함께 고려할 필요가 있다고 생각한다.

• 수산경영론집
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• 제24권1호
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• pp.45-64
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• 1993

The law of territorial sea is a fundamental law by which the width of sovereign domain of a coastal state is determined. The P.R.China'a regime on the territorial sea was established through the Declaration on China's Ttrritorial Sea of 1958 and the P.R.China's Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law of 1992. And the P.R.China's consistent policy on the territorial sea can be summarized as follows ; \circled1 The adoption of the straight baseline and 12 nautical miles of the territorial sea width, \circled2 The foreign merchant vessels can enjoy the right of innocent passage, while requesting for prior permission for the foreign military vessels on the entry into territorial sea. \circled3 The Chiungchow Strait and the Bohai Bay are claimed as the internal waters. \circled4 Enlistment of the whole coastal islands including the Taiwan. 12 nautical miles of the territorial sea width can be recognized as lawfull with respect to the 1982 UNLOS Convention. But the P.R.China's Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law of 1992 contains some problems on the legality viewed in the light of customary international law. Firstly, it can be said that the adoption of simple straight baseline is not reasonable, and it must be investigated closely on the hidden intention of China. Secondly, there involved some possibility of international dispute on making Tung Tao which is 69 nautical miles apart from the mainland of a basepoint and on making the Bohai Bay of a historic bay. And also public notification of all basepoints for the straight baselines is necessary to meet the requirement of customary international law, Thirdly, two military zones established unilaterally in 1950 are illegal with respect to the customary international law, and they must be repealed deservedly. Fourthly, there have a lot of restrictions on the innocent passage even for foreign merchant vessels by the municipal law such as the Maritime Traffic Safety Law. As a conclusion, the P.R.China's territorial sea regime contains some illegal elements such as unilateral expansion of the maritime sovereignty or jurisdiction. In order to meet the general principle of the international law, the P.R.China's territorial sea policy must be modified on the basis of multilateral agreement with the states concerned. And Korea, as a state with opposite, has a definite right to take countermeasure agaist the P.R.China's contiguous zone.

• 해양정책연구
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• 제33권2호
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• pp.57-82
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• 2018

This study aimed to review the reorganization of fisheries and the future tasks in accordance with the establishment of new fishery order in the Northeast Asian Seas. As the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which recognized the sovereign rights of Coastal States in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), entered into force in 1994, the three countries of Korea, China and Japan ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1996 and started negotiations to establish a new fishery order consistent with the EEZ system. However, a conflict of interest occurred because of differences in fisheries between countries, negotiations many times have proceeded, resulting in the signing of fishery agreement between China and Japan in 1997, Korea and Japan in 1998, and Korea and China in 2000. Each fishery arrangement consists of a dual system of EEZ and provisional waters (middle waters, provisional waters). The two countries are engaged in mutual fishing based on coastal states in EEZ, and in the fishing operation under the principle of flag state in provisional waters. There are overlapping or ambiguous jurisdictions in the intermediate waters and provisional waters that are jointly available to both fisheries. The presence of these seas is a challenge to the establishment of a reasonable international fisheries management system for the entire Northeast Asian Seas. In this context, the challenges of the reorganization of the new fisheries order are as follows: 1) conversion to a fishery order for coexistence of fisheries, 2) expansion to an international fishery management system, and 3) establishment of a multilateral fishery cooperation system. Although the jurisdiction of their own waters has been expanded through the establishment of EEZ according to new fishery order, the need for mutual cooperation grows when considering the movement and migration of fishery resources, fishery management, fish consumption and trade. In addition to the fisheries cooperation between the governments, it is also necessary to revitalize the civil cooperation focused on fishermen who exploit fishing grounds together.