• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.35-48
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• 2014

According to the 2013 construction market outlook report, the liquidation of construction companies is expected to continue due to the ongoing residential construction recession. Bankruptcies of construction companies have a greater social impact compared to other industries. However, due to the different nature of the capital structure and debt-to-equity ratio, it is more difficult to forecast construction companies' bankruptcies than that of companies in other industries. The construction industry operates on greater leverage, with high debt-to-equity ratios, and project cash flow focused on the second half. The economic cycle greatly influences construction companies. Therefore, downturns tend to rapidly increase the bankruptcy rates of construction companies. High leverage, coupled with increased bankruptcy rates, could lead to greater burdens on banks providing loans to construction companies. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy prediction model concentrated mainly on financial institutions, with rare construction-specific studies. The bankruptcy prediction model based on corporate finance data has been studied for some time in various ways. However, the model is intended for all companies in general, and it may not be appropriate for forecasting bankruptcies of construction companies, who typically have high liquidity risks. The construction industry is capital-intensive, operates on long timelines with large-scale investment projects, and has comparatively longer payback periods than in other industries. With its unique capital structure, it can be difficult to apply a model used to judge the financial risk of companies in general to those in the construction industry. Diverse studies of bankruptcy forecasting models based on a company's financial statements have been conducted for many years. The subjects of the model, however, were general firms, and the models may not be proper for accurately forecasting companies with disproportionately large liquidity risks, such as construction companies. The construction industry is capital-intensive, requiring significant investments in long-term projects, therefore to realize returns from the investment. The unique capital structure means that the same criteria used for other industries cannot be applied to effectively evaluate financial risk for construction firms. Altman Z-score was first published in 1968, and is commonly used as a bankruptcy forecasting model. It forecasts the likelihood of a company going bankrupt by using a simple formula, classifying the results into three categories, and evaluating the corporate status as dangerous, moderate, or safe. When a company falls into the "dangerous" category, it has a high likelihood of bankruptcy within two years, while those in the "safe" category have a low likelihood of bankruptcy. For companies in the "moderate" category, it is difficult to forecast the risk. Many of the construction firm cases in this study fell in the "moderate" category, which made it difficult to forecast their risk. Along with the development of machine learning using computers, recent studies of corporate bankruptcy forecasting have used this technology. Pattern recognition, a representative application area in machine learning, is applied to forecasting corporate bankruptcy, with patterns analyzed based on a company's financial information, and then judged as to whether the pattern belongs to the bankruptcy risk group or the safe group. The representative machine learning models previously used in bankruptcy forecasting are Artificial Neural Networks, Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost) and, the Support Vector Machine (SVM). There are also many hybrid studies combining these models. Existing studies using the traditional Z-Score technique or bankruptcy prediction using machine learning focus on companies in non-specific industries. Therefore, the industry-specific characteristics of companies are not considered. In this paper, we confirm that adaptive boosting (AdaBoost) is the most appropriate forecasting model for construction companies by based on company size. We classified construction companies into three groups - large, medium, and small based on the company's capital. We analyzed the predictive ability of AdaBoost for each group of companies. The experimental results showed that AdaBoost has more predictive ability than the other models, especially for the group of large companies with capital of more than 50 billion won.

• 한국벤처창업학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2018.11a
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• pp.165-175
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• 2018

Since the 1997 financial crisis, large scale unemployment and poverty have become serious, and public and social job creation projects have been carried out. However, with the limitations of low-wage and short-term jobs, the need for long-term and high quality jobs gradually began to attract attention. In recent years, social enterprises have grown both quantitatively and qualitatively and interest in social enterprises has increased. And also it is interested in the determinants of success and failure of social enterprises in the academic field. In this study, we examined the effects of social enterprise characteristics on financial and social performance, and we analyzed empirically by using social enterprises registered in the Korea Social Enterprise Agency. The financial performance of the social enterprise is measured by the net income ratio, operating income ratio, and the return on asset. The social performance of the social enterprise is measured by total number of workers and the employment rate of the vulnerable social groups. The characteristics of the social enterprise include the CEO characteristics (gender, age, experience in operating the social enterprise), the firm size, and the elapsed time of the authentication. The results of the empirical analysis are as follows. First, as a result of analysis for the effect on financial performance, we found that the financial performance have a statistically significant positive relationship with firm size, organizational form, government subsidies and capital adequacy ratio. And it is found that the social performance have a statistically significant negative relationship with CEO age, credit debt dependence. Second, as a result of analysis for the effect on social performance, we foumd that total number of workers have a significant positive relationships with CEO gender, CEO age, and firm size, government subsidies, while total number of workers have a significant negative relationship with certification type and industry dummy. On the other hand, the employment rate of the vulnerable social groups have a siginificant positive relationship with CEO gender and certification type and It have not statistically significant relationship with the government subsidies and the firm size.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.61-72
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• 2019

Since the financial crisis in 1997, large scale unemployment and poverty have become serious, but there has been a surge in public and social job creation projects. However, with the limitations of low-wage and short-term jobs, the need for long-term, high quality jobs gradually began to garner attention. In recent years, social enterprises have grown both quantitatively and qualitatively and interest in social enterprises has increased; more specifically, scholars are interested in the determinants of success and failure of social enterprises in the academic field. In this study, we examined the effects of social enterprise characteristics on financial and social performance. In particular, we empirically analyzed social enterprises registered in the Korea Social Enterprise Agency. The financial performance of the social enterprise was measured using the net income ratio, operating income ratio, and the return on asset. The social performance of the social enterprise was measured by the total number of workers and the employment rate of vulnerable social groups. The characteristics of the social enterprise included CEO characteristics (gender, age, experience in operating the social enterprise), firm size, and the elapsed time of authentication. The results of the empirical analysis are as follows. First, as a result of analysis for the effect on financial performance, we found that the financial performance has a statistically significant, positive relationship with firm size, organizational form, government subsidies, and capital adequacy ratio. And we found that the social performance has a statistically significant, negative relationship with CEO age and credit debt dependence. Second, as a result of analysis for the effect on social performance, we found that the total number of workers had a significant, positive relationship with CEO gender and CEO age, as well as firm size, government subsidies; whereas the total number of workers had a significant, negative relationship with certification type and industry dummy. Comparatively, the employment rate of the vulnerable social groups had a significant, positive relationship with CEO gender and certification type, but there was no statistically significant relationship with the government subsidies or firm size.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.31-68
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• 1990

The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.193-208
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• 2020

In this study, we investigate the effects of technology innovation investments and employment on credit ratings of very small start-up businesses using the data period of 2009 till 2015 test two hypotheses: asymmetric information hypothesis or competence hypothesis. We use financial and non-financial data of 51,903 observations of 12,028 small businesses from a database of a commercial bank and fixed effects panel models and two-stage instrumental variable models. We find that in the short-run small size startups show lower credit ratings than non-startups, and that both technology innovation activities and employment capability improve their credit ratings. In the long-run, technology innovation investments do not improve their credit ratings of later years while employment capability improve their credit ratings of the subsequent year. In addition, the age of startups improves their credit ratings of the current year and until the subsequent two years while employee productivity, fixed ratio and ROA positively affect their credit ratings for up to three years. However, short-term and overall debt ratios, cost of borrowings and firm-size negatively affect their credit ratings for up to three years. The results of the study on credit ratings suggest that credit rating agencies seem to consider both technology innovation activities and employment capability in the credit ratings of small start-ups as 'competence factors' rather than 'asymmetric information factors' with inefficiency and cost burdens. The results also suggest that we must find ways to reflect properly the severe asymmetric information of the early-stage start-ups, and technology innovation activities and employment capability in the credit rating formula.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.1-44
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• 1973

Needless to say, the management of national forest in all countries is very important in view of the national mission and management purposes. Korean national forest is also in particular significant in promoting national economy for the continuous increasing of the demand for wood, conservation of the land and social welfare. But there's no denying the fact that the leading aim of the Korean forest policy has been based upon the conservation of forest resources and recovery of land conservation function instead of improvement of the forest productive capacity. Therefore, the management of national forest should be aimed as an industry in the chain of the Korean national economy. And the increment of the forest productive capacity based on rationalized forest management is also urgently needed. Not only the increment of the timber production but also the establishment of the good forest in quality and quantity are to bring naturally many functions of conservation and other public benefits. In 1908 Korean national forest was historically established for the first time as a result of the notification for ownership, and was divided into two kinds in 1911-1924, such as indisposable national forest for land conservation, forest management, scientific research and public welfare, and the other national forest to be disposed. Indisposable forest is mostly under the jurisdiction of national forest stations (Chungbu, Tongbu, Nambu), and the tother national forests are under custody of respective cities and provinces, and under custody of the other government authorities. As of the end of 1971, national forest land is 19.5% (1,297,708 ha) of the total forest land area, but growing stock is 50.1% ($35,406,079m^3$) of the total forest growing stock, and timber production of national forest is 23.6% ($205,959m^3$) of the year production of total timber in Korea. Accordingly, it is the important fact that national forest occupies the major part of Korean forestry. The author positively affirms that success or failure of the management of national forest controls rise or fall of forestry in Korea. All functions of forest are very important, but among others the function of timber production is most important especially in Korea, that unavoidably imports a large quantity of foreign wood every year (in 1971 import of foreign wood-$3,756,000m^3$, 160,995,000 dollars). So, Korea urgently needs the improvement of forest productive capacity in national forest. But it is difficult that wood production meets the rapid increase of demand for wood to the development of economy, because production term of forestry is long, so national forest management should be rationalized by the effective investment and development of forestry techniques in the long view. Although Korean national forest business has many difficulties in the budget, techniques and the lack of labour due to outflow of rural village labour by development of national economy, and the increase of labour wages and administrative expenses etc. the development of national forest depends on adoption of the suitable forest techniques and management adapted for social and economical development. In this view point the writer has investigated and analyzed the status of the management of national forest in Korea to examine the irrational problems and suggest an improvement plan. The national forestry statistics cited in this study is based on the basic statistics and the statistics of the forest business as of the end of 1971 published by Office of Forestry, Republic of Korea, and the other depended on the data presented by the national forest stations. The writer wants to propose as follows (seemed to be helpful in improvement of Korean national forest management). 1) In the organization of national forest management, more national forest stations should be established to manage intensively, and the staff of working plan officials should be strengthened because of the importance of working plan. 2) By increasing the staff of protection officials, forest area assigned for each protection official should be decreased to 1,000-2,000 ha. 3) The frequent personnel changes of supervisor of national forest station(the responsible person on-the-spot) obstructs to accomplish the consistent management plan. 4) In the working plan drafting for national forest, basic investigations should be carefully practiced with sufficient expenditure and staff not to draft unreal working plan. 5) The area of working-unit should be decreased to less than 2,000 ha on the average for intensive management and the principle of a working-unit in a forest station should be realized as soon as possible. 6) Reforestation on open land should be completed in a short time with a debt of the special fund(a long term loan), and the land on which growing hardwood stands should be changed with conifers to increase productivity per unit area, and at the same time techical utilization method of hardwood should be developed. 7) Expenses of reforestation should be saved by mechanization and use of chemicals for reforestation and tree nursery operation providing against the lack of labour in future. 8) In forest protection, forest fire damage is enormous in comparison with foreign countries, accordingly prevention system and equipment should be improved, and also the minimum necessary budget should be counted up for establishment and manintenance of fire-lines. 9) Manufacture production should be enlarged to systematize protection, processing and circulation of forest business, and, by doing this, mich benefit is naturally given for rural people. 10) Establishment and arrangement of forest road networks and erosion control work are indispensable for the future development of national forest itself and local development. Therefore, these works should be promoted by the responsibility of general accounting instead of special accounting. 11) Mechanization of forest works should be realized for exploiting hinterlands to meet the demand for timber increased and for solving lack of labour, consequently it should promote import of forest machines, home production, training for operaters and careful adminitration. 12) Situation of labour in future will grow worse. Therefore, the countermeasure to maintain forest labourers and pay attention to public welfare facilities and works should be considered. 13) Although the condition of income and expenditure grows worse because of economical change, the regular expenditure should be fixed. So part of the surplus fund, as of the end of 1971, should be established for the fund, and used for enlarging reforestation and forest road networks(preceding investment in national forest).