• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.49-168
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• 2010

Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

• KOREAN JOURNAL OF CROP SCIENCE
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• v.3
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• pp.1-40
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• 1965

To measure variations in some of the important agronomic characteristics of rice varieties under shifting of seedling dates, this study has been carried out at the Paddy Crop Division of Crop Experiment Station(then Agricultural Experiment Station) in Suwon for the period of three years 1958 to 1960. The varieties used in this study were Kwansan, Suwon ＃82, Mojo, Paltal and Chokwang, which have the different agronomic characteristics such as earliness and plant type. Seeds of each variety were sown at 14 different dates in 10-day interval starting on March 2. The seedlings were grown on seed bed for 30, 40, 50, 60, 70 and 80 days, respectively. The results of this study are as follows: A. Heading dates. 1. As the seeding date was delayed, the heading dates was almost proportionally delayed. The degree of delay was higher in early varieties and lower in late varieties and the longer the seedling stage, the more delayed the heading date. 2. Number of days to heading was proportionally lessened as seeding was delayed in all the varieties but the magnitude varied depending upon variety. In other words, the required period for heading in case of late planting was much shortened in late variety compared with early one. Within a variety, the number of days to heading was less shortened as the seedling stage was prolonged. Early variety reached earlier than late variety to the marginal date for the maximum shortening of days to heading and the longer the seeding stage, the limitted date came earlier. There was a certain limit in seeding date for shortening of days to heading as seeding was delayed, and days to heading were rather prolonged due to cold weather when seeded later than that date. 3. In linear regression equation, Y=a+bx obtained from the seeding dates and the number of days to heading, the coefficient b(shortening rate of days to heading) was closely correlated with the average number of days to heading. That is, the period from seeding to heading was more shortened in late variety than early one as seeding was delayed. 4. To the extent that the seedling stage is not so long and there is a linear relationship between delay of seeding and shortening of days to heading, it might be possible to predict heading date of a rice variety to be sown any date by using the linear regression obtained from variation of heading dates under the various seeding dates of the same variety. 5. It was found out that there was a close correlation between the numbers of days to heading in ordinary culture and the other ones. When a rice variety was planted during the period from the late part of March to the middle of June and the seedling ages were within 30 to 50 days, it could be possible to estimate heading date of the variety under late or early culture with the related data of ordinary culture. B. Maturing date. 6. Within (he marginal date for maturation of rice variety, maturing date was proportionally delayed as heading was delayed. Of course, the degree of delay depended upon varieties and seedling ages. The average air temperature (Y) during the ripening period of rice variety was getting lower as the heading date. (X) was delayed. Though there was a difference among varieties, in general, a linear regression equation(y=25.53-0.182X) could be obtained as far as heading date were within August 1 to September 13. 7. Depending upon earliness of a rice variety, the average air temperature during the ripening period were greatly different. Early variety underwent under 28$^{\circ}C$ in maximum while late variety matured under as low as 22$^{\circ}C$. 8. There was a highly significant correlation between the average air temperature (X) during the ripening period, and number of day (Y) for the maturation. And the relationship could be expressed as y=82.30-1.55X. When the average air temperature during the period was within the range of 18$^{\circ}C$ to 28$^{\circ}C$, the ripening period was shortened by 1.55 days with increase of 1$^{\circ}C$. Considering varieties, Kwansan was the highest in shortening the maturing period by 2.24 days and Suwon ＃82 was the lowest showing 0.78 days. It is certain that ripening of rice variety is accelerated at Suwon as the average air temperature increases within the range of 18$^{\circ}C$ to 28$^{\circ}C$. 9. Between number of days to heading (X) related to seeding dates and the accumulated average air temperature (Y) during the ripening period, a positive correlation was obtained. However, there was a little difference in the accumulated average air temperature during the ripening period even seeding dates were shifted to a certain extent. C. Culm- and ear-lengths. 10. In general all the varieties didn't show much variation in their culm-lengths in case of relatively early seeding but they trended to decrease the lengths as seeding was delayed. The magnitude of decreasing varied from young seedlings to old ones. Young seedlings which were seeded during May 21 to June 10 didn't decrease their culm-lengths, while seedlings old as 80 days decreased the length though under ordinary culture. 11. Variation in ear-length of rice varieties show the same trend as the culm-length subjected to the different seeding dates. When rice seedlings aged from 30 to 40 days, the ear-length remained constant but rice plants older than 40 days obviously decreased their ear-lengths. D. Number of panicles per hill. 12. The number of panicles per hill decreased up to a certain dates as seeding was delayed and then again increased the panicles due to the development of numerous tillers at the upper internodes. The seeding date to reach to the least number of panicles of rice variety depended upon the seedling ages. Thirty- to 40-day seedlings which were seeded during May 31 to June 10 developed the lowest number of panicles and 70- to 80-day seedlings sown for the period from April 11 to April 21 reached already to the minimum number of panicles. E. Number of rachillae. 13. To a certain seeding date, the number of rachillae didn't show any variation due to delay of seeding but it decreased remarkably when seeded later than the marginal date. 14. Variation in number of rachillae depended upon seedling ages. For example, 30- to 40-day old seedlings which, were originally seeded after May 31 started to decrease the rachillae. On the other hand, 80-day old seedlings which, were seeded on May 1 showed a tendency to decrease rachillae and the rice plant sown on May 31 could develop narrowly 3 or 4 panicles. F. Defective grain and 1.000-grain weights. 15. Under delay of the seeding dates, weight of the defective grains gradually increased till a certain date and then suddenly increased. These relationships could be expressed with two different linear regressions. 16. If it was assumed that the marginal date for ripening was the cross point of these two lines, the date seemed. closely related with seedling ages. The date was June 10- in 30- to 40-day old seedlings but that of 70- to 80-day old seedlings was May 1. Accordingly, the marginal date for ripening was getting earlier as the seedling stage was prolonged. 17. The 1.000-grain weight in ordinary culture was the heaviest and it decreased in both early and late cultures. G. Straw and rough rice weights. 18. Regardless of earliness of variety, rice plants under early culture which were seeded before March 22 or April 1 did not show much variation in straw weight due to seedling ages but in ordinary culture it gradually decreased and the degree was became greater in late culture. 19. Relationship between seeding dates (X) and grain weight related to varieties and seedling ages, could be expressed as a parabola analogous to a line (Y=77.28-7.44X$_1$-1.00lX$_2$). That is, grain yield didn't vary in early culture but it started to decrease when seeded later than a certain date, as seeding was delayed. The variation was much greater in cases of late planting and prolongation of seedling age. 20. Generally speaking, the relationship between grain yield (Y) and number of days to heading (X) was described with linear regression. However, the early varieties were the highest yielders within the range of 60 to 110, days to heading but the late variety greatly decreased its yield since it grows normally only under late culture. The grain yield, on the whole, didn't increase as number of days to heading exceeded more than 140 days.