Park, Seon Jung;Park, Seol Hwa;Seo, Heui Jung;Park, Seung Min
Journal of Korean Society of Coastal and Ocean Engineers
/
v.33
no.6
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pp.226-237
/
2021
Coastal safety accidents are characterized by a high proportion of human negligence and repeated occurrences of accidents caused by the same factors. The Korea Coast Guard prepares and implements various countermeasures to prevent accidents at coastal safety accident sites. However, there is a shortage of safety facilities and safety management personnel according to the limited budget. In addition, the ability to be proactively and proactively respond is low due to the limitations of the coastal safety accident risk forecasting system, which relies on the meteorological warning of the Korea Meteorological Administration. In this study, as part of preparing the foundation for establishing a preemptive and active coastal safety management system that can manage accident-causing factors, predict and evaluate risk, and implement response and mitigation measures after an accident occurs before coastal safety accidents occur. The establishment of a risk assessment system was proposed. The main evaluation factors and indicators for risk assessment were established through the analysis of the status of coastal safety accidents. The risk assessment methodology was applied to 40 major hazardous areas designated and managed by the Korea Coast Guard.
Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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v.29
no.2
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pp.160-167
/
2023
An INS is a composite navigation system providing "added value" so defined if work stations provide Multi-Function Displays(MFDs) integrating information and functions for navigational tasks. Even though the minimum requirements for an INS are defined by IMO performance standards, a generic list of the devices and functions that constitute an INS does not exist, so the configuration of the INS is different for each manufacturer, and guidelines based on users' perspectives are also insufficient. This study was conducted to enhance the usability of the INS by analyzing the information required by users according to the ship's operating status and tasks and effectively structuring it in the MFD of the INS. By analyzing INS-related international standards and manufacturers' component equipment lists, mandatory navigation information was selected and card sorting tests were conducted on ship operators with experience in using MFDs to group the information required for each INS task. The results of the study can serve as a basic guideline for manufacturers to structure information based on users' experience when designing products.
Ha, Min-Jae;Jang, Ha-Lyong;Yun, Jong-Hwui;Lee, Moonjin;Lee, Eun-Bang
Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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v.22
no.2
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pp.228-232
/
2016
As the quantity of HNS sea trasport and the number of HNS accidents at sea are increasing recently, the importance of HNS management is emphasized so that we try to develop marine accident case standard code for making HNS accidents at sea databased systemically in this study. First and foremost, we draw the related requisites of essential accident reports along with internal and external decrees and established statistics of classified items for conducting study, and we referred to analogous standard codes obtained from developed countries in order to research code design. Code design is set like 'Accident occurrence ${\rightarrow}$ The initial accident information ${\rightarrow}$ Accident response ${\rightarrow}$ Accident investigation' in accordance with the general flow of marine HNS accidents of in which the accident information is input and queried. We classified initial accident information into the items of five categories and constructed "Preliminary Information Code(P.I.C.)". In addition we constructed accident response in two categories and accident investigation in three categories that get possible after the accident occurrence as called "Full Information(F.I.C.)", including the P.I.C. It is represented in 3 kinds of steps on each topic by departmentalizing the classified majority as classified middle class and classified minority. As a result of coding marine HNS accident and of the code to a typical example of marine HNS accident, HNS accident was ascertained to be represented sufficiently well. We expect that it is feasible to predict possible trouble or accident henceforward by applying code, and also consider that it is valuable to the preparedness, response and restoration in relation to HNS accidents at sea by managing systemically the data of marine HNS accidents which will occur in the future.
Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
/
v.28
no.2
/
pp.334-345
/
2022
The Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on the Management of Disasters and Safety Article 3-2 specifies two 'disaster management supervision agencies' for responding to shipping disasters. These are the Korea Coast Guard, which is an on-scene disaster-responding and coordinating agency, and the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries, which is a government department, thereby leading to possibilities for confusion. In the case of shipping disasters, where a personnel entitled full power to deal with shipping disasters is designated and his/her powers and duties are clearly made, relationship of leading and supporting agencies is made clear, and command system is simplified, an efficient response to shipping disasters is made possible. In the management of shipping disasters, all the disaster management processes, that is, prevention-preparedness-response-recovery, should be dealt with systematically and consistently. Notably, to swiftly and efficiently cope with a disastrous situation, the decision-making and command system must be simplified. The establishment of a command system and decision-making must be made independently, based on expertise. In the US, irrespective of the type of disasters, the FEMA plays a leading role and the USCG responds a response to maritime disasters by establishing the Incident Command System or Unified Command System that is an incident management system. In the UK, the MCA supervises an event and responds to it, and the SOSREP has full power to work with command and coordination independently. SOSREP, among others, is necessary to prevent an inefficient dealing of a shipping disaster owing to confrontation between participants. With reference to such leading States' practice, the Korean government should make a standardized and simplified response to maritime disasters. This study deals with a new maritime disaster responding system and provides an idea of the revision of the existing legal regime.
Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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v.15
no.3
/
pp.205-212
/
2009
With an entry into force of OPRC-HNS on June 14th 2007, response system against any large scale accidents related to HNS is required to respond rapidly and effectively in a national scale, US national response system and national contingency plan for any chemicals in operation were analyzed to understand the characteristics of management system and response system for any HNS driven accidents in the Us. Main characteristics of the US system were well described as an unified information window and an integrated incident command system supported by response facilities, manpower and technical support from other response organizations through good cooperation. In general, response activities are conducted by private sectors, however, the government will take over response activities in case large scale accidents occur in the Us. Expected expenses for response activities are covered by a type of Superfund in the Us. Several applicable ways are proposed to enable NGO to participate in and reorganize response system in ROK, and are feasible in collaboration with other response organizations and private sectors in the aspects of equipment, technology and manpower, Based upon the above activities, it is desirable to reorganize domestic rules and/or regulations related to response measures in ROK.
This paper is to analyse the necessity and development direction of the ROK's maritime security strategy white paper. To this end the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction; the necessity of the ROK's maritime security strategy white paper; the ROK's actual situation in relation to maritime security strategy and cases of major advanced oceanic countries; the vision, goals, strategic tasks, and implementation system of the ROK's 'national maritime security strategy'; and conclusion. The achievement of the national marine strategic vision, such as the 'Ocean G5,' is of course possible when Korea can maintain and strengthen the maritime safety and maritime security of the people. The Sewol Ferry incident reminds us that we need a 'national maritime security strategy white paper' like the advanced marine countries. In order for the national maritime security strategy to be carried our efficiently, as in advanced oceanic countries, mere should be a dedicated department with sufficient authority and status to mobilize the cooperation of related organizations including naval-coastal cooperation. It would be good to set up a tentatively named Maritime Security Council, an organization of minister-level officials involved under the National Security Council, and an executive body composed of working-level officials from related ministries. In order to successfully carry out the national maritime security strategy for the maritime safety and maritime security of the people like the United States and the United Kingdom, we need to further strengthen our domestic cooperation and cooperation system, international cooperation, and maritime security. We have to promote the establishment and promotion of maritime security strategies by the Navy; strengthening the operational link between the Navy and the Coast Guard; strengthening the maritime surveillance capability at the national level, and promoting sharing with the private sector, etc.
With an entering into force of OPRC-HNS started in June 14th 2007, establishment of response system in a nationwide scale to take care of accidents is required to respond rapidly and effectively. This necessities drove us to analyze national contingency plan for chemicals including national response system against accidents, which is in operation in the US. Main characteristics of the system are well described as an integrated incident command system with a cooperation of responsibilities facilities, manpower, and technical support. In addition, state anψor local authorities tend to have responsibilities on management of disaster with its response activities. Polluters are also charged to pay expenses 3 times expensive provided state or local authorities are conducted. In general, response activities are conducted by private sectors. However, the government will take action with Superfund if the response capacity is over than the polluters can. However, safety are regarded as a primary factor to be considered in the response activities, and try not to recover any pollutants. Personals belonging to USCG and EPA are required to complete specialized courses to promαe professional skills, and are also welcomed to participate in "certification program"
Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
/
v.18
no.1
/
pp.61-65
/
2012
Once oil has spilled, oil spill responders use a variety of countermeasures to reduce the adverse effects of spilled oil on the environment. Mechanical methods of containment and recovery are preferred as the first response when the use of other methods fail or are ineffective. In these cases, the application of oil dispersants shall be use only as a last resort. While effectiveness of dispersants in removing oil form the sea surface is proven, the use of dispersants is controlled in almost all countries due to the toxicity of their active agents and the dispersed oil on the marine environment. However, according to reports, after dispersant application, no significant toxicity to fish or shrimp was observed in the field-collected samples. Moreover, the results also indicate that dispersant-oil mixtures are generally no more toxic to the aquatic test species than oil alone. During the Deepwater Horizon Incident, dispersants were applied to floating oil and injected into the oil plume at depth. These decisions were carefully considered by state and federal agencies, as well as BP, to prevent as much oil as possible from reaching sensitive shoreline habitats. Net Environmental Benefit Analysis for dispersant use assumed that dispersants appear to prevent long-term contamination resulting absence of oil in the substrate and will benefit marine wildlife by decreasing the risk of significant contamination to feathers or fur. Further study to use dispersants with scientific baseline is needed for our maritime environment which consistently threaten huge oil spill incidents occurrence.
Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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v.27
no.1
/
pp.97-112
/
2021
This study introduces lessons learned from investigation and analysis of major domestic and overseas cases of marine chemical incidents involving hazardous and noxious substances (HNS) during maritime transportation by chemical tankers carrying petrochemical products in bulk. The study then suggests plans to improve domestic marine HNS training curricula based on these lessons. Lessons learned from six incident cases are classified into the following six categories: 1) incident-related information, 2) safety, 3) pollution, 4) response, 5) salvage and 6) others. Based on these six categories, it is suggested that the curriculum provided by the Marine Environment Research & Training Institute for marine pollution prevention managers aboard noxious liquid substance carriers should be changed from the existing two-day training of eight subjects (16 h) to a three-day training of sixteen subjects (24 h). In addition, it is proposed that the marine chemical incident response course of the Korea Coast Guard Academy should be changed from the existing five-day training of fifteen subjects (35 h) to a six-day training of thirty-two subjects (48 h). These results are expected to contribute to sharing experiences and lessons learned about response to marine chemical incidents and to be used as basic data for improving the education and training courses for response personnel in preparedness for marine HNS incidents.
Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
/
v.28
no.7
/
pp.1169-1178
/
2022
This study examines an effective operational plan of a maritime safety enforcement task that is distributed in the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and the Korea Coast Guard for maritime safety. Considering the sinking of the MV Sewol and Seohae vessels and the MV Hebei Spirit oil spill, normally marine safety accidents tend to not only damage human life, property, and marine environment but can also expand to disasters; therefore, precautionary measures are required. However, the Korean government takes superficial efforts in case of large-scale accidents. In case of the MV Sewol ferry, the government only focused on punishing the officials involved as a follow up and never mentioned any effective plan, such as "unification of maritime safety enforcement," in contrast to an advanced country. As a result, there are endless major and minor backward accidents. The probability of large-scale maritime accidents and backwardness accidents is increasing owing to vessels becoming large sized, high speed, and aged; sailors being unqualified; port traffic increase, development of marine leisure; and inefficiency dual marine safety systems. Therefore, based on the review of previous studies related to maritime safety, major advanced country's cases, and unified case of the vessel traffic service, this study suggests effective methods such as coastal vessel safety management, port state control and aid to navigation management, which are directly connected with maritime safety.
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