• Korean Security Journal
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• no.37
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• pp.29-50
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• 2013

With the recent global threats of terrorism as well as religious conflicts, Northeast Asian countries including South Korea, China, and Japan are experiencing particularly serious security crises as demonstrated by North Korea's threats of nuclear weapons testings and long-range missile launching as well as military provocation toward South Korea such as sinking of ROKS Cheonan and bombardment of Yeonpyeong island and the territorial dispute between China and Japan over Senkaku Islands(Diaoyu Islands). As a result, Park Geun Hye Administration of South Korea and the 2nd Abe Shinzo Cabinet of Japan, both recently established, are making efforts to improve their national security and crisis management policies. One of the key elements of such efforts is the strengthening of National Security Council(NSC) or its equivalent organization as the control tower of national security policy, modeled after the NSC of the United States. This paper compares NSC organization of Korea, the U.S., and Japan and draws policy insights focusing on the current political and national security situation South Korea is facing. Although organizational structure, function, and history of NSC of each country differs, it can be inferred from this comparison that NSC-type of organizations can play an important role as a control tower of security and emergency management policies.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.225-236
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• 2012

The Fukushima-Daiichi accident shook the world, as a well-known plant design, the General Electric BWR Mark I, was heavily damaged in the tsunami, which followed the Great Japanese Earthquake of 11 March 2011. Plant safety functions were lost and, as both AC and DC failed, manoeuvrability of the plants at the site virtually came to a full stop. The traditional system of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) failed to protect core and containment, and severe core damage resulted, followed by devastating hydrogen explosions and, finally, considerable radioactive releases. The root cause may not only have been that the design against tsunamis was incorrect, but that the defence against accidents in most power plants is based on traditional assumptions, such as Large Break LOCA as the limiting event, whereas there is no engineered design against severe accidents in most plants. Accidents beyond the licensed design basis have hardly been considered in the various designs, and if they were included, they often were not classified for their safety role, as most system safety classifications considered only design basis accidents. It is, hence, time to again consider the Design Basis Accident, and ask ourselves whether the time has not come to consider engineered safety functions to mitigate core damage accidents. Associated is a proper classification of those systems that do the job. Also associated are safety criteria, which so far are only related to 'public health and safety'; in reality, nuclear accidents cause few casualties, but create immense economical and societal effects-for which there are no criteria to be met. Severe accidents create an environment far surpassing the imagination of those who developed EOPs and SAMG, most of which was developed after Three Mile Island - an accident where all was still in place, except the insight in the event was lost. It requires fundamental changes in our present safety approach and safety thinking and, hence, also in our EOPs and SAMG, in order to prevent future 'Fukushimas'.