• 시큐리티연구
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• 제37호
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• pp.29-50
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• 2013

최근 동북아시아 각국은 천안함 피격, 연평도 포격 등 북한의 대남 도발, 북한의 장거리미사일 발사와 핵실험 등 군사적 위협, 센카쿠 열도(댜오위다오)를 둘러싼 중국과 일본 간의 충돌 등 심각한 안보 위기를 맞고 있다. 특히 한국과 일본은 각기 2013년 2월 박근혜 정부, 2012년 12월 제2차 아베 신조(안부보삼(安部普三)) 내각 등 새로운 정권 출범을 맞아, 공히 주요 선거공약으로 제시한바 있는 위기관리 및 안보 정책의 정비 강화를 시도하고 있다. 그 핵심 중 하나는 최근 미국의 모델을 참조로 한 안보 및 위기관리 정책에서의 NSC 또는 그 유사 기구의 기능 확대 및 강화이다. 해당 각국의 NSC 조직은 각기 다른 특성을 가지고 있으나, 현 정치 안보 상황에서 안보 및 위기관리 정책의 컨트롤 타워로서 주된 역할을 담당할 수 있는 잠재성이 있다고 볼 수 있다. 따라서 이 논문에서는 한국, 미국, 일본 등 3개 국가 정부의 NSC 기구를 그 조직, 기능, 역사를 중심으로 비교 분석하고, 최근 이 3개 국가들, 특히 대한민국이 직면한 정치 안보 상황에 비추어 시사점을 도출해 보고자 한다.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제44권3호
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• pp.225-236
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• 2012

The Fukushima-Daiichi accident shook the world, as a well-known plant design, the General Electric BWR Mark I, was heavily damaged in the tsunami, which followed the Great Japanese Earthquake of 11 March 2011. Plant safety functions were lost and, as both AC and DC failed, manoeuvrability of the plants at the site virtually came to a full stop. The traditional system of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) failed to protect core and containment, and severe core damage resulted, followed by devastating hydrogen explosions and, finally, considerable radioactive releases. The root cause may not only have been that the design against tsunamis was incorrect, but that the defence against accidents in most power plants is based on traditional assumptions, such as Large Break LOCA as the limiting event, whereas there is no engineered design against severe accidents in most plants. Accidents beyond the licensed design basis have hardly been considered in the various designs, and if they were included, they often were not classified for their safety role, as most system safety classifications considered only design basis accidents. It is, hence, time to again consider the Design Basis Accident, and ask ourselves whether the time has not come to consider engineered safety functions to mitigate core damage accidents. Associated is a proper classification of those systems that do the job. Also associated are safety criteria, which so far are only related to 'public health and safety'; in reality, nuclear accidents cause few casualties, but create immense economical and societal effects-for which there are no criteria to be met. Severe accidents create an environment far surpassing the imagination of those who developed EOPs and SAMG, most of which was developed after Three Mile Island - an accident where all was still in place, except the insight in the event was lost. It requires fundamental changes in our present safety approach and safety thinking and, hence, also in our EOPs and SAMG, in order to prevent future 'Fukushimas'.