• 한국항공운항학회지
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• 제19권3호
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• pp.43-53
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• 2011

It is well known some Foreign aircraft used to fly INCHEON FIR(Flight Information Region), especially the island of IEODO without a flight plan, even though foreign aircraft is subject to submitting a flight plan to Flight Information Center(FIC) before its flight. IEODO is a sunken rock 4.6m beneath the sea level, 149km away from Marado. Facing the Yangtze river's sea entrance horizontally and military zones of Korea and China vertically, IEODO is a very important place for national security of North East Asia because it is located at the boundary between China East Sea and Yellow Sea of South Korea. Moreover, JDZ(the 7th mine lot) is just 77NM from IEODO, which possesses natural gas eight times bigger than the gulf region and oil 4.5 times bigger than that of the U.S. In addition, INCHEON FIR, managed by MLTM(Air Traffic Control Center) and Japanese Self-Defense Force's JADIZ(Japanese Air Defense Identification Zone) are overlapping on IEODO whose air space is very complex. This paper focuses on air space, FIR, ADIZ(Air Defense Identification Zone) and related airspace system and suggests strategic implications of how to prevent foreign aircraft from invading INCHEON FIR without permission and of how to utilize the airspace efficiently.

• 항공우주시스템공학회지
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• 제10권1호
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• pp.127-132
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• 2016

Recently, China & Japan have expanded their responding ADIZ(Air Defence Identification Zone) to implement each Government's maritime policy and to project their Air Power in preparation for maritime provocation & contingency, especially over the piled area where East Asia countries have claimed to have maritime jurisdiction one another. So this is to guide the Development Option for Korea Air Defence Identification Zone to cope with the maritime intentions of the neighboring countries, considering the international law for ADIZ, the maritime policy and the maritime sovereign & jurisdiction area of the Republic of Korea, etc.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

• 한국위성정보통신학회논문지
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• 제12권4호
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• pp.78-86
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• 2017

일본은 과거 2차 세계대전과 러시아와 북방4개 도서 영토분쟁, 중국과 센카쿠 열도 및 태평양 진출정책 등으로 인한 갈등문제로 주변 국가 무기체계에 대한 정보획득에 지속적인 관심을 갖고 정보자산 확충에 많은 투자를 해왔으며 1998년에 북한의 대포동 미사일 발사 계기로 고주파수대역을 활용한 탄도미사일 탐지 및 요격을 위한 정책수립, 탐지체계 개발, 요격무기체계 도입에 많은 예산을 사용해왔다. 1950~1960년대 미군에서 설치, 운용하던 SIGINT장비를 미국으로부터 이전받아 기술분석 후 성능이 우수한 SIGINT장비를 제작, 일본 전역 19개소에 설치하였고, 첨단 조기경보 레이더도 국내업체에서 제작, 28개소에 설치하여 일본영역으로 침입하는 항공기와 고속으로 비행하는 탄도미사일을 감시하고 있다. 해상도가 우수한 광학 및 SAR위성 6기의 위성정찰체계와 탄도미사일 탐지능력이 탁월한 이지스함 6척을 해상에 배치하여 미사일 발사 준비 활동과 엔진실험, 미사일 발사 순간을 언제든지 탐지가 가능하며 또한 미국과의 긴밀한 공조로 우주적외선 감시망인 SBIRS망에 접근하여 주변국의 탄도미사일 발사를 조기에 탐지가 가능하다. 향후에도 동북 동남아시아에서 미군에 대한 일본의 역할이 증가되기 때문에 일본의 미사일의 탐지능력은 더욱 확장되리라 예상된다.