• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.1-30
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• 2019

The involuntary delisting of public companies has a detrimental effect on economies caused by the loss of stock value and confidence in the capital market. Previous studies have focused on prediction or prevention models for firm delisting events using various financial and accounting information. However, the timely disclosure of companies, another important indicator, has not been investigated before in connection with companies that have been delisted. To address this gap, this study investigates the timely disclosure behavior of companies prior to delisting using sample firms listed on the Korean stock market between 2000 and 2014. The results show a significant correlation between the frequency of timely disclosure and delisted firms prior to their delisting on the Korean stock market. The delisted companies appear to increase their timely disclosure to deliver specific information to the public. Furthermore, these companies are likely to increase the frequency of timely disclosure as they get closer to their delisting. Notably, the timely disclosure of delisted firms has a capital market effect; namely, timely disclosure increases trading volume while decreasing the market value of the shares, reflecting price efficiency. This study appears to be the first that considers timely disclosure in the involuntary delisting literature.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.1-20
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• 2020

Purpose - This paper shows an unexplored area related to involuntary delisting. Specifically, this research investigates the effect of target firm information asymmetry on the likelihood that the acquirer or newly merged firm will be forcibly delisted post-merger. Design/methodology/approach - The research uses a sample gathered on local US mergers and acquisitions from the Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database. It applies the logistic regression with industry and year effects and corrects the error term using clustering at the industry level. The research also matches the forced delisted firms to control firms based on industry, acquisition completion year, and firm size and then employs a matched sample analysis. Findings - Findings show that M&As between firms where the target firm is opaque and burdened with high information asymmetry issues are likely to be paid for using majority stock and that M&As involving such opaque targets also have a higher likelihood of getting delisted post-merger. Research implications or Originality - Our results are relevant given the very nature of M&As which involve two players: the acquirer and target who both may have different incentives. Acquirers especially have the tendency to suffer losses and even get delisted if they over-pay for or get merged to a poor target which conceals its poor performance evidenced by higher accruals quality.