• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.27-59
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• 2023

This study aims to serve as a critical comparison of the currently controversial 'new cold war' discourse. It took three triggers for the 'new cold war' discourse to emerge as a major issue in the media and academia and to have real political impact. With the launch of China's 'Belt and Road' project and Russia's annexation of Crimea leading to the 'Ukraine crisis,' the 'new cold war' discourse has begun to take shape. Trump's U.S.-China trade spat has brought the 'new cold war' debate to the forefront. The 'new cold war' debate is currently being intensified by the Biden administration's framing of "democracy versus authoritarianism" and Putin's invasion of Ukraine. Currently, there is no consensus among scholars on whether the controversial 'new cold war' is a new version, or a continuation of the historically defined concept of the Cold War. The term 'New Cold War' is less of an analytical concept and more of a topical term that has yet to achieve analytical status, let alone a theoretical validation and systematization, and the related debate remains at the level of assertion or discourse. Through this comparative analysis, I will argue that the ongoing discourse of the 'New Cold War' does not have the instrumental explanatory power to analyze the transitional phenomena of the world order today.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.249-274
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• 2011

This paper examines agri-food export competitiveness among 4 countries(Korea, USA, Japan, China) based on Porter's Diamond model approach. Korea agri-food competitiveness index is much less than those of other countries. Korea is the lowest ranked among the 4 countries in terms of three determinants(except 1 factor, related and supporting industries) of Porter's Diamond Model: Factor condition, demand condition, firm strategy, structure and rivalry. Korea is assumed to have weak point in the factor condition, demand condition because of low capital and land as well as insufficient investment on the agri-food sector. on the other hand, it seems to have strong factor in consumer condition(demand condition). This paper suggest the following strategies to reinforced the agri-food export sector in Korea. 1) an incentive system for seed development and capital investment, 2) a cluster strategy between agriculture and related industry.

• Proceedings of the Korea Water Resources Association Conference
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• 2023.05a
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• pp.245-245
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• 2023

This paper examines the extent to which the Mekong River Basin countries have achieved socioeconomic benefits based on regional cooperation through the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Program, focusing on hydropower development and the Mekong Power Grid. This study pays attention to the time period from 2012 to 2022. The benefit sharing approach is employed to evaluate the extent to which hydropower development and the Mekong Power Grid have contributed to the regional energy trade in the GMS program. The GMS program was launched by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1992, and the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi, Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam have taken an active part in the program. The goals of the GMS program are to achieve poverty alleviation, economic development, and regional cooperation in various sectors, including energy, tourism, and transportation. The GMS Economic Cooperation Program Strategic Framework 2030 (GMS-2030), in 2021, provides a new framework for prosperous and sustainable development in the river basin. In the energy sector, the GMS program has been instrumental in facilitating hydropower development and creating the Mekong Power Grid with the Regional Grid Code (RGC), contributing to economic benefits and promoting regional trade of hydroelectricity. It is argued that the GMS program has enhanced regional cooperation between the riparian countries. Despite such achievements, the GMS program has faced challenges, including the gap of economic development between the riparian countries, socioeconomic and environmental concerns regarding hydropower development between the Upper and Lower Mekong countries, and geopolitical tensions from the US-China rivalry. These challenges should adequately be addressed within the program, which can guarantee the sustainability of the program for the river basin.

• The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.73-81
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• 2024

Purpose: South Korea is a close ally of the US and an important partner of China. Caught between the two most powerful countries, South Korea's strategic directions are critical. This article emphasizes that the deeper core of the US-China trade war is to improve the business environment to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to boost the economy, rather than engaging in the trade war. Research design, data, and methodology: Considering the complexity of this issue, this article applies a systematic analytical tool, the ABCD (Agility, Benchmarking, Convergence, and Dedication) model, to provide strategic guidance for inducing investments into South Korea in the context of the ongoing US-China trade war. Results: Specifically, South Korea needs to provide a more attractive business environment along the four points: expedite commercial activities through deregulation (Agility); adopt global standards of the flexible labor markets and technological developments (Benchmarking); integrate various industries and connect them to global value chains (Convergence); and create more economy-friendly policies rather than politics-oriented ones such as protectionism (Dedication). Conclusion: This study stands out not just by utilizing the ABCD model but, also by providing more systematic analysis and practical implications, particularly within the context of the escalating US-China competition. Unlike many existing studies that analyze the broader impacts of this geopolitical rivalry, this research delves into specific strategic guidelines for South Korea to attract FDI. The findings also provide implications for multinational corporations (MNCs) in choosing the locations for their overseas operations, particularly in South Korea.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.111-141
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• 2018

By the middle of 2018 there are signs of China's entry into a new period of development, characterized by a change in the old model: "market reforms-inner-party democratization - moderate foreign policy" to another: "market reforms - Xi Jinping personality cult - offensive foreign policy." This model contains the risks of arising of the contradiction between economic freedom and political-ideological rigidity which can lead to destabilization of the political life. However, in the current positive economic dynamics, these risks may come out, rather, in the medium and long term. Today, the political situation in China remains stable - despite growing dissatisfaction in scientific expert and educational circles due to increased control over the intellectual sphere by the authorities. The need for a new redistribution of power between central and provincial authorities could potentially disrupt political stability in the medium term, but, at the moment, is not a critical negative factor. The economic situation is positive-stable. Forecasts indicate a possible increase in China's GDP in 2018 at 6.5%. At the same time, there are negative expectations in connection with the Sino-US and potentially Sino-European "trade war". In the Chinese foreign policy, as a response to Western pressure, China increasingly uses the Russian direction of its diplomacy in the expanded version of Russia + SCO. The nuance here is seen in China's adjusted approach to the SCO: first of all, not as a mechanism for cooperation with Russia, but as an organization that allows using Russia's potential for pressure on the US in the Sino-US strategic rivalry. In the second half of 2018, the Chinese economy will continue to develop steadily, albeit with unresolved traditional problems (debts of provinces and state-owned enterprises, ineffective state sector, risks on the financial and real estate market). In politics, discontent with the cult of Xi will accumulate, but without real threats to its power. Weakening in economic opposition between China and the United States is possible due to Beijing's search for compromises on tariffs, intellectual property, trade deficit. To find such trade-offs, Xi will use the so-called. "Personal diplomacy" of direct contacts with Trump.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.128-148
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• 2014

In south Korea, the so-called 'conservative-liberal' rivalry over the assessment of the government's North Korean policies is seen to be impeding the road to right policy choices. For example, the liberals accused former President Lee Myung-bak's hardline policy of provoking Pyongyang and leading to a deterioration of inter-Korean relations, while the conservatives appreciated it for helping nurture mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations in the longer term by compelling North Korea to observe international norms. However, such debate over the vices and virtues of Seoul's North Korea policies is hardly meaningful as the measuring sticks used by the liberals and the conservatives are entirely different matters. The two major goals South Korea must pursue with its North Korean policies should be 'peaceful management of division' and 'change in North Korea'. The former is related to maintaining stability within South Korea and promoting co-prosperity with North Korea. For this, the nation needs to engage, encompass and assist the Pyongyang regime. The second goal is also necessary since South Korea, as a divided nation, must seek a unified Korea under the system of democracy and market economies by bringing change in North Korea. For this, South Korea needs powerful leverages with which it can persuade and coerce the North. This means that the nation is destined to simultaneously chase the above-mentioned two goals, while also both recognizing and negating the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. This situation necessitates Seoul to apply flexibility in reconciling with Pyongyang while applying firm principles to sever the vicious circle involving the North's military provocations. The May 25 Measures, which banned trade and economic cooperation with the North except those related to humanitarian assistance, were taken as sanctions against Pyongyang for sinking the South Korean corvette Chonan in March 2010. The Measures were taken by the Seoul government immediately after a multinational investigation team discovered evidence confirming that the South Korean naval ship had been torpedoed by a midget North Korean submarine. Naturally, the May 24 Measures have since then become a major stumbling block in inter-Korean exchange, prompting opposition politicians and concerned entrepreneurs to demand Seoul to unilaterally lift the Measures. Given the significant damages the Measures have inflicted on inter-Korean economic relations, removing them remains as homework for both Koreas. However, the Measures pertains to the 'principles on national security' the Seoul government must adhere to under all circumstances. This is why North Korea's apology and promises not to repeat similar provocations must come first. For now, South Korea has no alternative but to let North Korea solve the problems it has created. South Korea's role is to help the North do so.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.229-258
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• 2023

For the main countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States, China and Russia, a situation of "new normality" is emerging. Moreover, for each of the countries, this "new normality" has its own meaning. For the United States, this is an aggravation of the military confrontation with China in the Taiwan Strait. For China, this is an increase in the degree of rivalry with the United States and a slowdown in the pace of economic development with a very high probability of their decline in the future. For Russia, this is an almost complete curtailment of relations with the United States against the background of a special military operation and imposed sanctions. These nuances, in addition to the results of the 20th CPC Congress, will determine the main trends in Sino-American and Sino-Russian relations. It seems that China's attitude towards Russia will not change against the background of the Ukrainian crisis. Beijing will maintain a position of "benevolent neutrality" towards Moscow. At the same time, the balance between "goodwill" and "neutrality" may vary depending on the scope of Sino-Russian cooperation. For example, in the economic sphere, Chinese companies will be afraid to cooperate with Russian partners for fear of secondary sanctions. However, in general, Russia will retain its importance for China as the strongest anti-American pole. In relations with the United States, China will continue to firmly defend its interests, while at the same time not excluding the normalization of relations with Washington in certain areas of cooperation: strategic stability, non-traditional threats, ecology, etc. In general, the decisions of the 20th CPC Congress do not allow us to say either in favor or against the idea of China's readiness to resume dialogue with the United States in the post-congress period. Sino-American relations, as noted above, have their own logic and will probably continue to develop within its framework. However, so are Sino-Russian relations. Within the framework of these logics, Beijing seems to continue to balance between the two vectors of its foreign policy. On the one hand, this is the development of bilateral cooperation with Russia in order to strengthen its own negotiating positions in the confrontation with the United States: military cooperation with an emphasis on joint exercises, political cooperation based on anti-Americanism, economic cooperation with an eye to the risks of secondary sanctions. On the other hand, it is unacceptable for China to recognize the collapse of Ukraine, the inadmissibility of a direct military clash with the United States and the extreme undesirability of further aggravation of relations with the United States on the factor of Chinese friendship with Russia.