• Strategy21
• /
• s.38
• /
• pp.47-82
• /
• 2015

To control the sphere, it required a strategic understanding to sphere and a power for overcome to it. In the early 20th century, the Pacific-War is a confrontation between the U.S. and the Japan for holding supremacy a pacific ocean sphere, building on maritime geopolitical perception. The Pacific ocean is a large of sphere, so if a country pursues a Pacific region supremacy, it needs a strategic perception and capability to control the sphere. After the U.S. has unified the continental, it has formed geopolitical perception in the Pacific ocean and by the way to control the Pacific ocean selected a naval power. The U.S. must have overcome a Pacific sphere for getting through to the Pacific region, this concept has developed the War Plan Orange(war plan relations with the Japan). Meanwhile, at this point of time, the Japan has recognized to a geopolitical point of view about security environment in the Pacific ocean. like as the U.S. has the War Plan Orange in mind for building on geopolitical perception of the Pacific ocean, the Japan also has learned geopolitical perception from the U.S. Because of this, the Japan has established the Interception-Attrition strategy(war plan relations with the U.S.). If we don't have overcome a sphere of the Pacific ocean, we don't hold hegemony of the Asia-Pacific region. So the analysis of perspective maritime geopolitics about the Pacific war is a meaningful study.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
• /
• v.10 no.4
• /
• pp.389-395
• /
• 2024

This study aims to deeply analyze the military strategies and tactics used in the battles between Israel and Hamas, to understand the military approaches, technical capabilities, and their impact on the outcomes of the conflict. To achieve this, methodologies such as literature review, data analysis, and case studies were utilized. The research findings confirm that Hamas employed asymmetric tactics, such as rocket attacks and surprise attacks through underground tunnels, to counter Israel's military superiority. On the other hand, Israel responded to Hamas's attacks with the Iron Dome interception system and intelligence-gathering capabilities, but faced difficulties due to Hamas's underground tunnel network. After six months of fighting, the casualties in the Gaza Strip exceeded 30,000, and more than 1.7 million people became refugees. Israel also suffered over 1,200 deaths. Militarily, neither side achieved a decisive victory, resulting in a war of attrition. This study suggests that the Israel-Hamas war exemplifies the complexity of modern asymmetric warfare. Furthermore, it recommends that political compromise between the two sides and active mediation efforts by the international community are necessary for the peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict.