• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.4
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• pp.611-629
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• 2000

In the legislation interpretation and fundamental viewpoint about the legal system of insider trading, Japan strictly legislate under the proposition, the principle of 'nulla poena,' adopted 'the principle of limited enumeration,' and United states, under 'the principle of comprehension,' has entrusted courts with establishment of concrete concepts and standard, so the courts are very flexible in determining the range of insiders and the importance of inside information to show a strong will to eradicate insider trading. Korea has a legislative position of 'the principle of limited indication' which has been created by the negotiation between those principles of United states and Japan. Though this court has interpreted insider trading, insider trading using non-disclosed information has increased lately, needing the strengthening of its regulations. However, this shows us that sophisticate the regulations may be, the exposure of insider trading has limitations. The most important thing is to change recognition for transparency of the securities market, security of investors and to establish the atmosphere which is that fair stock trading made in a sound capital market to raise funds for corporation. The policies of improving unfair trading, self-regulation bodies, raising the transparency and legality of procedures of supervision and monitoring and applying 'compliance program' to stock companies are very needed to eliminate unfair trading in the securities market and establish the order of trading.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.126
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• pp.213-233
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• 2013

The aim of this paper is to reveal the ethical problem of insider trading. 'Insider trading' refer to obtaining information from non-public sources such as private acquaintances about trade secret, using it purposes of enhancing insider's financial advantages. And sometimes such a practice can be conducted fraudulently. Therefore, the focus of this paper will be on fairness or justice arguments against insider trading. And all kinds of discussion this paper are to focus the underlying consideration behind these arguments, that is, the underlying consideration about violation of ethical standards of fairness. First, one of these arguments argues that insider trading does necessarily involve defrauding general investors such as general employees, general stockholders. And economic power and unjust advantage of insider can be exercised to the detriment of this non-insider's interests. Second, another argument argues that insider trading undermines competition which is the principle of any free market. And insider trading is not only a complication in the free market mechanism, but also thwarts free competition which free markets depend. Third, the final argument argues that insider trading will be made something unfair about the concept of equal access to information. This argument argues, therefore, that to permit insider trading would be to set up stock market trading rules that are unfair to non-insiders.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.11-16
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• 2013

This paper derives an equilibrium asset price when there exist three kinds of traders in financial market: a risk-averse informed trader, noise traders, and risk neutral market makers. This paper is an extended version of Kyle's (1985, Econometrica) continuous time model by introducing insider's risk aversion. We obtain not only the equilibrium asset pricing and market depth parameter but also insider's value function and optimal insider's trading strategy explicitly. The comparative static shows that the market depth (the reciprocal of market pressure) increases with time and volatility of noise traders' trading.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.315-344
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• 1995

The relationship of information flow and market price formation are central to the basic tenets of financial economics. Whereas information is usually treated as being either public or private(monopolistic), most empirical studies focus on the price effects of public announcements. More recent research has centered more on the role of private information, such as insider trading, in efficient pricing and whether such trading increases investor welfare. Typically, 'insider trading' refers to an officer that trades in his/her company's shares. Insider trading, however, also refers to anyone who generates private, albeit costly, information concerning a stock's fundamental value. Normally, such insider activity is more difficult to ascertain. One way in which negative information is revealed is through short-selling activity, especially the monthly short-interest positions reported by the national stock exchanges. Diamond and Verrecchia(1987) provide a theoretical paradigm that predicts a negative price adjustment upon announcement of n company's monthly short interest, if the short interest displays an unusual increase and is correlated with negative information that is not yet public. Empirical studies of the short-run, negative price effect predicted by Diamond and Verrecchia find mixed results. One explanation is that the time period studied is too short for the market to absorb the informational content of these announcements. One reason is that these announcements are an ambiguous signal that requires more individuals and time to collect and act on the same information before full revelation occurs or before the implicit information becomes publicly known. This 'long delayed reaction' also serves as a motivation for related research on the wealth effect of mergers, share repurchases, and initial equity offerings in which long-run performance differs from the initial, short-run reaction to such announcements or offerings.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.233-265
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• 1996

We examine the impact of public and private information on price movements using the thirty DJIA stocks and twenty-one NASDAQ stocks. We find that the standard deviation of daily returns on information days (dividend announcement, earnings announcement, insider purchase, or insider sale) is much higher than on no-information days. Both public information matters at the NYSE, probably due to masked identification of insiders. Earnings announcement has the greatest impact for both DJIA and NASDAQ stocks, and there is some evidence of positive impact of insider asle on return volatility of NASDAQ stocks. There has been considerable debate, e.g., French and Roll (1986), over whether market volatility is due to public information or private information-the latter gathered through costly search and only revealed through trading. Public information is composed of (1) marketwide public information such as regularly scheduled federal economic announcements (e.g., employment, GNP, leading indicators) and (2) company-specific public information such as dividend and earnings announcements. Policy makers and corporate insiders have a better access to marketwide private information (e.g., a new monetary policy decision made in the Federal Reserve Board meeting) and company-specific private information, respectively, compated to the general public. Ederington and Lee (1993) show that marketwide public information accounts for most of the observed volatility patterns in interest rate and foreign exchange futures markets. Company-specific public information is explored by Patell and Wolfson (1984) and Jennings and Starks (1985). They show that dividend and earnings announcements induce higher than normal volatility in equity prices. Kyle (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Barclay, Litzenberger and Warner (1990), Foster and Viswanathan (1990), Back (1992), and Barclay and Warner (1993) show that the private information help by informed traders and revealed through trading influences market volatility. Cornell and Sirri (1992)' and Meulbroek (1992) investigate the actual insider trading activities in a tender offer case and the prosecuted illegal trading cased, respectively. This paper examines the aggregate and individual impact of marketwide information, company-specific public information, and company-specific private information on equity prices. Specifically, we use the thirty common stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and twenty one National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) common stocks to examine how their prices react to information. Marketwide information (public and private) is estimated by the movement in the Standard and Poors (S & P) 500 Index price for the DJIA stocks and the movement in the NASDAQ Composite Index price for the NASDAQ stocks. Divedend and earnings announcements are used as a subset of company-specific public information. The trading activity of corporate insiders (major corporate officers, members of the board of directors, and owners of at least 10 percent of any equity class) with an access to private information can be cannot legally trade on private information. Therefore, most insider transactions are not necessarily based on private information. Nevertheless, we hypothesize that market participants observe how insiders trade in order to infer any information that they cannot possess because insiders tend to buy (sell) when they have good (bad) information about their company. For example, Damodaran and Liu (1993) show that insiders of real estate investment trusts buy (sell) after they receive favorable (unfavorable) appraisal news before the information in these appraisals is released to the public. Price discovery in a competitive multiple-dealership market (NASDAQ) would be different from that in a monopolistic specialist system (NYSE). Consequently, we hypothesize that NASDAQ stocks are affected more by private information (or more precisely, insider trading) than the DJIA stocks. In the next section, we describe our choices of the fifty-one stocks and the public and private information set. We also discuss institutional differences between the NYSE and the NASDAQ market. In Section II, we examine the implications of public and private information for the volatility of daily returns of each stock. In Section III, we turn to the question of the relative importance of individual elements of our information set. Further analysis of the five DJIA stocks and the four NASDAQ stocks that are most sensitive to earnings announcements is given in Section IV, and our results are summarized in Section V.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.139-153
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• 1991

This paper examines the pecuniary effects stemming from insider trading in the equities of firms targeted for acquisition. Illegal exchanges by those having advantageous information are found to result in excessive returns to stockholders of the sought firms. However, unusual market activities are not typical immediately subsequent to the illegal trading date, suggesting that nonpublic information is synthesized by market mechanisms with sufficient speed so that others cannot profit by imitating the better informed traders. The obtained evidence does not support the contention that insider trading on nonpublic information harms the outsider stockholders of involved firms.

• Journal of Legislation Research
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• no.41
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• pp.367-399
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• 2011

This Article examines the regulation of outsider trading under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (the "Capital Markets Act"). Outsider trading occurs when a market participant who is not a traditional corporate insider trades securities based on either "inside" or "outside" nonpublic information. Unlike "inside" information, "outside" information is referred to as information not derived directly or indirectly from the issuer. "Outside" information includes both "corporate" and "market" information. "Corporate information" is information about events or circumstances which affect the company's assets or earning power. "Outside corporate information" is information about the company's assets or earning power not derived directly or indirectly from the issuer. "Market information" is information about events or circumstances which affect the market for a company's securities but which do not affect the company's assets or earning power. The Capital Markets Act prohibits both "temporary insiders" from using "corporate" information in trading securities and "outsiders" from using "market" information, such as (i) information regarding the initiation or discontinuance of a tender offer; or (ii) information regarding acquisition or disposition of stocks in bulk. However, the Act does not encompass circumstances (i) where an outsider trades securities based on confidential corporate information obtained through certain types of wrongful conduct; (ii) where an outsider trades securities based on corporate information obtained through eavesdropping; and (iii) where an outsider trades securities based on either outside corporate information or market information created by the outsider himself. In order to plug a few of the gaps left open in the law of outsider trading under the Capital Markets Act, this Article suggests that regulators adopt a relatively broad reading of the scope of ${\S}$ 178(1) of the Act, which is similar to SEC Rule 10b-5, to include outsiders with no relationship to the corporation that had issued the securities. Since ${\S}$ 178(1) of the Act does not require "deception" for liability, it would seem to evade the limitations imposed by the U.S. misappropriation theory. Key Words : Outsider Trading, Insider Trading, Material Nonpublic Information, the Capital Markets Act, Misappropriation Theory, Fiduciary Theory.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.127-135
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• 2021

We analyze the information asymmetry in the capital market by examining the long-term performance by the insider's trading behavior in the companies that made investment announcements for the construction of the new office building. The results are summarized as follows. On average, the long-term abnormal returns on share prices of sample firms represent a significant positive value. The regression analysis confirmed that there is a statistically significant positive correlation between the factor of the change in equity of large shareholders and the long-term performance. On the other hand, negative correlation was observed between change in equity of small individual investors and long-term performance. These results mean that an insider can determine the authenticity of a manager's private intention. In other words, it supports that the insider is in a position of information superiority. In addition, it is expected to provide practical usefulness to investors in that the change in equity can be used as a predictor of long-term performance.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.4
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• pp.165-189
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• 2009

According to disclosure regulation, insider can hide their trading until disclosure day, because there be interval between trading time and disclosure time. To accommodate strategic trade, they have an incentive to be brought disclosure interval as long as possible. This research investigate whether strategical behaviour of informed traders using disclosure intervals exists in domestic stock market.ls xt, we aney he whether they can get abnormal return through stealth strategy after announcement date. We also evaluate the effect of mimicking trading on price impact with the assumption of existence of mimicking trading. Our major research results are as follows: In case of main shareholder without having no prompt disclosure duty, the frequency of trading started at the beginning of month is shown significantly higher than others. This result shows a direct evidence that informed traders buy or sell their equity strategically using disclosure intervals. Also, we find the result that the coefficient of strategic variables has highest value in middle size information. However, the empirical evidence that informed trader get abnormal return through strategic trading was not shown in this study. Meanwhile, stock price over-reacts for selling transaction on trading point and is recovered after disclosure date., so we assume possibility of mimicking trading exists in domestic stock market.