• Title/Summary/Keyword: Input Collision-based CPA

Search Result 2, Processing Time 0.016 seconds

Algorithm for Pairwise Collision Detection and Avoidace in 3-D (3차원 일대일 충돌 감지 및 회피 알리고리듬)

  • Kim, Kwang-Yeon;Park, Jung-Woo;Tahk, Min-Jea
    • Journal of the Korean Society for Aeronautical & Space Sciences
    • /
    • v.36 no.10
    • /
    • pp.996-1002
    • /
    • 2008
  • This paper presents the development of a real-time algorithm for collision detection, collision avoidance and guidance to way-point. Three-dimensional point-mass aircraft models are used. For collision detection, time of closest point of approach(CPA) and distance at CPA are compared to threshold values. For collision avoidance, optimal acceleration input which maximizes the terminal relative distance is calculated based on optimal control theory. For guidance to way-point, proportional navigation guidance, the well-known method, is used. Two scenarios of encounter situation are illustrated to validate performance of proposed algorithm.

Side-Channel Analysis Based on Input Collisions in Modular Multiplications and its Countermeasure (모듈라 곱셈의 충돌 입력에 기반한 부채널 공격 및 대응책)

  • Choi, Yongje;Choi, Dooho;Ha, Jaecheol
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
    • /
    • v.24 no.6
    • /
    • pp.1091-1102
    • /
    • 2014
  • The power analysis attack is a cryptanalytic technique to retrieve an user's secret key using the side-channel power leakage occurred during the execution of cryptographic algorithm embedded on a physical device. Especially, many power analysis attacks have targeted on an exponentiation algorithm which is composed of hundreds of squarings and multiplications and adopted in public key cryptosystem such as RSA. Recently, a new correlation power attack, which is tried when two modular multiplications have a same input, is proposed in order to recover secret key. In this paper, after reviewing the principle of side-channel attack based on input collisions in modular multiplications, we analyze the vulnerability of some exponentiation algorithms having regularity property. Furthermore, we present an improved exponentiation countermeasure to resist against the input collision-based CPA(Correlation Power Analysis) attack and existing side channel attacks and compare its security with other countermeasures.