• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.2 no.4
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• pp.31-38
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• 2015

During the last two decades the idea that central bank independence and transparency helps to maintain price stability, became popular among economists and central bankers. Many countries' governments give their monetary authorities higher independence and transparency to achieve the price stability goal. However, emerging countries such as Kazakhstan, suffer from high inflation. This inflation occurs largely due to a low level of independence and transparency of central banks. This research project measures the current level of independence and transparency of central bank of Kazakhstan. Indices were used to measure central bank independence and transparency. Central bank independence was measured by two types of indices: based on central bank laws (legal independence) and based on central banks governor's turnover (TOR). Developing countries have a weak legal framework, implying that a legal independence index cannot be appropriate to use as a measures of actual independence. Therefore, by paying attention to the other two indices, we can say that the central bank of Kazakhstan has a low level of independence and transparency. This, in turn, can be one of the causes of high inflation in Kazakhstan.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.499-524
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• 2010

The purpose of this study is to based on review of theoretical and empirical studies to assess the independence of central banks - the former Socialist republics, including the Russian Federation and Czech, Poland. In addition, the work is expected to clarify whether a link exists between independence and the most important economic indicators such as inflation, economic activity, the budget deficit. And The subject of this study are the formal and actual independence of national banks, as well as limiting factors: political and economic. Background investigation of the problem of independence of central banks from the fact that, according to many economists, it is essential to the successful development of a market economy. The effectiveness of any country's economy due to currency volatility, low inflation, high reliability of the banking system, etc. As far as the independence of monetary regulation contributes to these goals - one of the most actively debated issues in the world of economic theory and practice for a long time. The issue of central bank independence is extremely important for Russia, Czech, Poland. In the near future to the central bank has important tasks, among which are the transition to inflation targeting in the rejection of significant intervention in the foreign exchange market, as well as improving the sustainability of the national banking system. Transparency and independence of the Bank of Russia, Czech Republic, Poland, in my view, should be an important factor in achieving these goals. The countries of Czech Republic, Poland have already made a number of steps to bring the status of their banks to the European standards. Many other developing countries are also in the process of reforming their central banks and the improving conditions of their functioning. However, despite the fact that as a model for reform used by the central banks of countries with developed market economies, central banks in developing countries are still yet deprived of the legal, economic and political independence. A different situation exists in transition space. Because of significant differences in the views of the authorities in transition republics at the necessary level of independence of central banks and the exchange rate and monetary policy reform of monetary management in these countries led to different results.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.11
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• pp.23-31
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• 2020

This paper investigates the impact of monetary policy independence shock on bond yield by allowing for heterogeneous coefficients in the model based on panel data for 19 developing countries using quarterly data from 1991 to 2016. First, we estimate the model using conventional panel VAR estimation with the assumption of homogeneous coefficients across countries. Second, by performing Chow and Roy-Zellner tests to check the homogeneity assumption, we find that the assumption does not hold in the model. Third, we apply a mean-group estimation for panel VAR as a solution for heterogeneity panel model. The results reveal that central bank independence is effective in reducing bond yield with the maximum at period 6 after the shock. Shock one standard deviation bond yield has a negative effect on consumption and investment. We determine that central bank independence has a contradictory effect on real activity; a negative effect on consumption but a positive influence on investment for the first two years after the shock. Additionally, we split our sample into three groups to make the subgroups pool. Our empirical result shows that monetary policy independence shock reduces bond yield. Meanwhile, the response of economic activity to bond yield varies for all three groups.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.221-244
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• 2024

This study examines how the independence of monetary policy changes in situations where the interest rate differential between domestic and foreign rates inverts, utilizing the trilemma indices. For analysis, this paper uses the trilemma indices developed by Kim et al. (2017) to analyze the relationship between the monetary policy independence index and the other two trilemma indices, namely the capital account openness index and the exchange rate stability index, across 45 countries from 2002 to 2018. The analysis reveals that the trilemma's validity is contingent. In particular, no statistically significant negative correlation was found between the monetary policy independence index and exchange rate stability index during periods of interest rate differential inversion. A positive correlation emerges between exchange rate stability and the independence of monetary policy, particularly when the inverted interest rate differential exceeds a certain threshold. This situation, where the exchange rate remains stable despite low domestic interest rates, implies that the central bank is effectively managing monetary policy to appropriately respond to economic conditions, which is reflected in the monetary policy independence index.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.209-247
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• 2004

Although various publicly reserved funds have recently come to the fore of academic and policy-making attention in Korea, researchers rarely take up the issue of the reserve fund retained from annual profits by the central bank (i.e., the Bank of Korea). Starting with the general public choice premise that bureaucrats seek to maximize their discretionary budget, this paper first provides a theoretical reasoning why central bank's bureaucrats would prefer retaining annual profits to turning them to the Treasury. The major tenet to be emphasized is that retained profits as a reserve fund can give the central bankers discretionary power in their disposition. In particular, we focus on the close relationship between the reserve fund and the discount windows. The latter, as a monetary instrument, has traditionally been demonstrated to cause secrecy, arbitrariness, and other bureaucratic amenities in the previous literature. Subsequently, this paper, based on 61 countries data, empirically verifies that the central bank's reserve fund is at least partially used to additionally increase the discount windows. Since an excessive use of discount windows results in inflationary bias, we conclude the paper with some policy suggestions to have such bureaucratic power of discretion in check. This paper, if in its experimental nature yet, is expected to shed a critical implication for establishing the meaningful independence of the central bank to a host of countries.

• Journal of the Korean Society of International Agriculture
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.269-276
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• 2018

Achievement of sustainable agricultural development is one of the most important issues in many developing countries. In addition, basic inputs such as labor and capital, and social and environmental factors are important factors in agricultural production in developing countries. This study examines impact of governance conditions of Central Asian newly independent Post-Soviet Union countries on agricultural production and production efficiencies by using World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators. The studied countries had similar socio-economic conditions and environments before independence; however, those countries have different forms of development. Empirical results showed that governance improvement helped to increase agricultural production significantly. In addition, we found that each governance factor has different effects on agricultural production. The findings of this study would be a base for sustain agricultural production in developing countries, and stressed the necessity of improved governance conditions as well as input investments for achievement of agricultural development.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.191-221
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• 2014

South Sumatra's capital, Palembang, has long maintained a river-oriented transportation system. With road transportation's increased importance for exploiting natural resources, however, hundreds of roads have been constructed since the Dutch colonial period. This article examines how the construction of roads and bridges affected people's lives and social networks in Palembang, and what social and political significance it has in the context of a region in the postcolonial Indonesia, with a focus on the huge river called the Musi River, which horizontally crosses the city. After independence, there has been strong aspiration to link these two parts by road, and in 1965 the Musi Bridge (then the Sukarno Bridge) over the river was eventually opened. The construction of the bridge apparently initiated socioeconomic transformations and development in the region, including Ulu (the southern river bank)'s rapid urbanization. However, the features of regional development actually were prerequisites for "national" development. The regional development was impossible without financial support from the central government, and the local or regional aspiration for development was often supported only when it fitted with national envision. The Musi Bridge was a model case that fitted with such national envision. While it was the symbol of regional development, it was also celebrated as an exemplary sign of "national" development, by both Sukarno's government and Suharto's New Order regime. By analyzing the discussions and discourses regarding the Musi project since early 1950s, in addition to its social and economic impact after the construction, this article explores the continuities and changes in the roles and significance of the (construction of the) Musi Bridge with the changing political backstops in both regimes. Together with it, this article also aims to reexamine the interplay between "the national" and "the regional" in the prevalent aspiration for the national and regional "development" throughout the 1950s and 1960s.