• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.458-464
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• 2014

In the future, an increasing number of heterogeneous networks will be connected with each other. Each of them has its own interest. Existing systems lack good incentive mechanisms to attract more networks to participate in cooperations. In this paper, we design an auction-based incentive mechanism for routing protocols applied in heterogeneous networking which is computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and truthful. Through several simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the properties of our mechanism.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.25 no.7
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• pp.973-982
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• 2022

As a new marketing tool, gamification design has been used in marketing practice by e-commerce platforms, aiming to motivate consumers to participate. Based on this, by sorting out relevant domestic and foreign literature, analysis of actual business cases, in-depth interviews with users, experiments and data analysis, this study extracts and describes in detail the elements of the e-commerce platform gamification incentive mechanism. Draw conclusions through research: (1) The incentive mechanism of gamification design of e-commerce platform contains four main dimensions : The richness of symbols, The fun of gamification, The contagiousness of Social and The seduction of achievement. (2) The four elements are closely related, and these can work on a system at the same time and have significant mutual effects. (3) Achievement and fun can bring intrinsic motivation to consumers, while sociability and symbols can bring external motivation to consumers and promote internal motivation through external motivation. (4) The seduction of achievement and the richness of symbol are most closely related.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.31 no.5
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• pp.889-899
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• 2021

This paper proposes a reliable data sharing scheme on the internet of vehicles (IoV) by utilizing blockchain technology for constructing a decentralized system approach. In our model, to maintain the credibility of the information messages sent by the vehicles to the system, we propose a reputation rating mechanism, in which neighboring vehicles validate every received information message. Furthermore, we incorporate an incentive mechanism based on smart contracts, so that vehicles will get certain rewards from the system when they share correct traffic information messages. We simulated the IoV network using a discrete event simulator to analyze network performance, whereas the incentive model is designed by leveraging the smart contract available in the Ethereum platform.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.1-8
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• 2019

In this paper, we design a new mobile crowdsourcing control scheme based on the incentive mechanism. By using a novel incentive mechanism, mobile nodes can get the maximum payoff when they report their true private information. As mobile nodes participate in the overlapping coalition formation game, they can effectively invest their resource while getting the higher reward. Simulation results clearly indicate that the proposed scheme has a better performance than the other existing schemes under various mobile crowdsourcing environments.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.9 no.12
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• pp.321-332
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• 2020

Decentralized approaches are extensively researched by academia and industry in order to cover up the flaws of existing systems in terms of data privacy. Blockchain and decentralized learning are prominent representatives of a deconcentrated approach. Blockchain is secure by design since the data record is irrevocable, tamper-resistant, consensus-based decision making, and inexpensive of overall transactions. On the other hand, decentralized learning empowers a number of devices collectively in improving a deep learning model without exposing the dataset publicly. To motivate participants to use their resources in building models, a decent and proportional incentive system is a necessity. A centralized incentive mechanism is likely inconvenient to be adopted in decentralized learning since it relies on the middleman that still suffers from bottleneck issues. Therefore, we design an incentive model for decentralized learning applications by leveraging the Ethereum smart contract. The simulation results satisfy the design goals. We also outline the concerns in implementing the presented scheme for sensitive data regarding privacy and data leakage.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.33-50
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• 2014

Though South Korea has world-class volume of Venture Capital Investment, as a share of GDP, early stage venture investments are still short, and investments are concentrated in high technology area and Capital area. Because of the high barriers to entry of the new IPO and M&A market, the venture capital companies undergo difficulties in profit. High-tech ventures face difficulties in raising money from outside investors due to information asymmetry between venture investors and venture companies. To resolve these problems, developed countries's government make a co-funding investment scheme with private sectors and design incentive mechanism such as receiving knowledge of the reputable investors' joint venture. Korean central and local government can benchmark those of things. For example, the expansion of the investment volume with private sector, region-specific matching fund and venture capital's exit path diversification such as M&A through the establishment of a business venture eco-system. At the same time, venture companies are to make an efforts to enhance the ability of screening for venture companies and the value for investment activities through a joint venture investments.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.16 no.7
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• pp.137-148
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• 2011

Different from the traditional client-server model, it is possible for participants in a cooperative distributed system to get quality services regardless of the number of participants in the system since they voluntarily pool or share their resources in order to achieve their common goal. However, some selfish participants try to avoid providing their resources while still enjoying the benefits offered by the system, which is termed free-riding. The results of free-riding in cooperative distributed systems lead to system collapse because the system capacity (per participant) decreases as the number of free-riders increases, widely known as the tragedy of commons. As a consequence, designing an efficient incentive mechanism to prevent free-riding is mandatory for a successful cooperative distributed system. Because of the importance of incentive mechanisms in cooperative distributed system, a myriad of incentives mechanisms have been proposed without a standard for performance evaluation. This paper draws general incentive design considerations which can be used as performance metrics through an extensive survey on this literature, providing future researchers with guidelines for the effective incentive design in cooperative distributed systems.

• 한국사회정책
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.69-96
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• 2013

This paper is to critically review the economic reasoning of non-sustainability of welfare state due to its intrinsic incentive problems and to see how the nordic welfare state responds to them. The welfare state as a political design of state to pursue equality has social insurance as its main economic function. It survives market failure of private insurance to contribute to human capital investment and industrial restructuring. The universal tax-financed welfare state, however, has the problem of tragedy of commons such as reduced work incentive and work ethics. But, the existing nordic welfare state overcomes it through employment-focused policy arrangements, maintenance of work ethics and benefits moral, incentive mechanism of wage-compression, public educational investment and its complementation with social security. The Nordic model shows that problems of incentive and moral are not about those of theory and reasoning, but about their reality which policies and institutions could respond to.

• Proceedings of the Korean DIstribution Association Conference
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• 2000.10a
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• pp.47-59
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• 2000

Following the increasing importance of logistics function in today's company operation, this work explores the mechanism for cooperation within a supply chain, especially between a firm and an independent logistics supplier. We first characterize the optimal linear logistics contract based upon the recent developments in contract theory, and then investigate the effect of such a contract on the firm's inventory policy. The results indicate that the order quantity becomes smaller and the lead time becomes shorter and under the optimal contract than without the incentive scheme. Accordingly, the service level under the optimal contract becomes higher. These findings are in accordance with the literature on vertical control and JIT (Just in Time) philosophy.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.285-309
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• 2019

Unlike the popular belief, digital transformation mainly gets stymied by legal and regulatory issues related with legacy institutions in Asia rather than technical difficulties. The real challenges triggered by the PSD2 (Payment Services Directive 2) are how the region would overcome the overly fragmented, centralized, and hierarchical legacy framework to allow necessary changes to respond to the digital single market initiatives as promulgated by the European counterpart. The PSD2 is expected to bring about substantial changes in the payment ecosystem by allowing payment service providers to access customers' accounts and transactions information via API that have been traditionally controlled by banks. This paper suggests an incentive-compatible mechanism design for open collaboration among legacy institutions in the region to help them adapt to the PSD2. As evidenced by case studies in Korea, the Asian equivalent of PSD2 can be implemented and further expanded to create region-wide PCS (payment-clearing-settlement) network by reconnecting the dots of legacy infrastructures. These decentralized, diverse, small payment networks can be further combined with the expanded RTGS-CDS platform to evolve into the next phase of Asian Financial Network.