• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.27-42
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• 2018

Due to the increasing number of foreign investments made by state-owned enterprises, there has been a growth in the number of investment arbitration claims submitted by them. However, international investment treaties including the ICSID Convention are intended to apply to investor-state disputes and according to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, the claimant has to be "a national of another Contracting State." This raises the question of whether state-owned companies can be considered as "nationals of another Contracting State" or private investors. This issue has been discussed in the ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction in BUCG v. Yemen which has been released in 2017. Since there would be more claims related to the standing of state-owned enterprises as claimants, it is required to understand whether state-owned enterprises could be permitted access to the ICSID under the ICSID Convention Article 25. Moreover, the ICSID cases addressing the jurisdictional issues including BUCG v. Yemen has to be closely analyzed. In particular, as the Broches test was applied in order to decide the standing of state-owned companies, it is necessary to examine how the Broches criteria has been interpreted and adopted in the ICSID cases.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.37-57
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• 2017

On 9 March 2017, a Tribunal constituted under the ICSID Convention issued its ruling in the case of Ansung Housing v. People's Republic of China, dismissing with prejudice all claims made by the Claimant, Ansung Housing Co., Ltd., in its Request for Arbitration, pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5). Ansung Housing v. PRC has drawn attention since it is the first case where an investor with Korean nationality initiated an ICSID arbitration on the basis of the Korea-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) as amended in 2007 between the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. The Tribunal finds that its ruling is about a lack of jurisdiction of the ICSID and of its own competence as well as regarding manifest lack of legal merit due to a lack of temporal jurisdiction, since a Respondent's Rule 41(5) objection is concerned with the three-year limitation period in Article 9(7) of the Korea-China BIT. The Tribunal held that, under Article 9(7) of the Korea-China BIT, the limitation period begins with an investor's first knowledge of the fact that it has incurred loss or damage, not with the date on which it gains knowledge of the quantum of that loss or damage. Finally, the Tribunal held that Ansung submitted its dispute to ICSID and made its claim for purposes of Article 9(3) and (7) of the BIT after more than three years had elapsed from the date on which Ansung first acquired knowledge of loss or damage and that the claim is time-barred and, as such, is manifestly without legal merit. It remains to be seen whether the aggrieved Claimant initiates annulment proceedings before an ad hoc committee under the ICSID Convention. It is quite interesting to see whether the decisions by the Tribunal should be reversed on the basis of the Claimant's arguments as to the start date as well as the end date of the limitation period under the Korea-China BIT.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.141-165
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• 2007

This study aims to make a contribution to the promotion of trade and economic development of South Korea, and, at the same time, call attention to the increasing trend of investment agreements concluded within Free Trade Agreements (FTA) by examining theoretically FTAs and dispute resolution and investigating systematically the conclusion procedure of agreements, and the system, institutions, and jurisdiction of dispute resolution, and presenting these findings to the government and investors involved. The most problematic aspect in the legal process of arbitration involving disputes over investment is that of arguments concerning the right of jurisdiction. When a dispute arises, even though an investor files for arbitration at an ICSID institution, the parties become involved in another energy-consuming argument even before proceeding to the hearing and decision of the original plan in cases in which the respondent of the dispute files an objection to the decision rights of the arbitral tribunal. As the main basis for this type of plea, the point of non-existence of jurisdiction is first raised where the applicable dispute does not fall under the range of investments defined in individual investment contracts or investment agreements such as a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). To avoid an open-ended definition of investment for the range of investments, articles concerning investments in the FTA and NAFTA between Canada and the USA adopt the limited closed-list method. Article 96 of the FTA between Japan and Mexico applied the same abovementioned method of limited form of definition regarding range of investments and concluded BITs between member countries of APEC applied a similar method as well. Instead of employing the previously used inclusive definition, the BITs concluded between countries of Latin America and the USA are equipped with limited characteristics of an investment. Furthermore, to correspond with this necessary condition the three following requirements are needed : 1) fixed investment funding; 2) expected profits resulting from such investments; 3) and the existence of fixed risk bearing.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.42 no.4
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• pp.139-157
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• 2017

Whether an investor can invoke a dispute settlement procedure stipulated in other BIT based on the MFN clause in the original BIT is an important issue. There is a difference in the interpretation of MFN clause in which the scope of the treatment stipulates the slightly different contents for each investment treaty. Therefore, this study considered ICSID arbitration cases related to the applicability of MFN clause for investment dispute settlement provisions. There are two different approaches for the applicability of MFN clause by arbitral tribunals. At first, the expanded interpretation of the MFN clause can be applied to procedural regulations, in that the purpose of the investment treaty is to protect foreign investors and to ensure their status. So, foreign investors can invoke a BIT of a third country that is advantageous to them. Second, the limited interpretation of the MFN clause can not be applied to procedural regulations. Without explicit regulation, the term treatment can not be considered to include dispute resolution provisions. And the BIT that the host state has concluded with third country is a treaty that applies only to the contracting party, so it can not be used by foreign investors of other nationality. Therefore, this study suggests concretely stipulating the scope of MFN clause under the investment treaty, highlighting that certain restrictions should be applied to the MFN clause. Furthermore, it is required continually investigating and analyzing the database of the scope of MFN clause.