AirAsia QZ8501 Jet departed from Juanda International Airport in, Surabaya, Indonesia at 05:35 on Dec. 28, 2014 and was scheduled to arrive at Changi International Airport in Singapore at 08:30 the same day. The aircraft, an Airbus A320-200 crashed into the Java Sea on Dec. 28, 2014 carrying 162 passengers and crew off the coast of Indonesia's second largest city Surabaya on its way to Singapore. Indonesia's AirAsia jet carrying 162 people lost contact with ground control on Dec. 28, 2014. The aircraft's debris was found about 66 miles from the plane's last detected position. The 155 passengers and seven crew members aboard Flight QZ 8501, which vanished from radar 42 minutes after having departed Indonesia's second largest city of Surabaya bound for Singapore early Dec. 28, 2014. AirAsia QZ8501 had on board 137 adult passengers, 17 children and one infant, along with two pilots and five crew members in the aircraft, a majority of them Indonesian nationals. On board Flight QZ8501 were 155 Indonesian, three South Koreans, and one person each from Singapore, Malaysia and the UK. The Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 departed from Kuala Lumpur International Airport on March 8, 2014 at 00:41 local time and was scheduled to land at Beijing's Capital International Airport at 06:30 local time. Malaysia Airlines also marketed as China Southern Airlines Flight 748 (CZ748) through a code-share agreement, was a scheduled international passenger flight that disappeared on 8 March 2014 en route from Kuala Lumpur International Airport to Beijing's Capital International Airport (a distance of 2,743 miles: 4,414 km). The aircraft, a Boeing 777-200ER, last made contact with air traffic control less than an hour after takeoff. Operated by Malaysia Airlines (MAS), the aircraft carried 12 crew members and 227 passengers from 15 nations. There were 227 passengers, including 153 Chinese and 38 Malaysians, according to records. Nearly two-thirds of the passengers on Flight 370 were from China. On April 5, 2014 what could be the wreckage of the ill-fated Malaysia Airlines was found. What appeared to be the remnants of flight MH370 have been spotted drifting in a remote section of the Indian Ocean. Compensation for loss of life is vastly different between US. passengers and non-U.S. passengers. "If the claim is brought in the US. court, it's of significantly more value than if it's brought into any other court." Some victims and survivors of the Indonesian and Malaysia airline's air crash case would like to sue the lawsuit to the United States court in order to receive a larger compensation package for damage caused by an accident that occurred in the sea of Java sea and the Indian ocean and rather than taking it to the Indonesian or Malaysian court. Though each victim and survivor of the Indonesian and Malaysia airline's air crash case will receive an unconditional 113,100 Unit of Account (SDR) as an amount of compensation for damage from Indonesia's AirAsia and Malaysia Airlines in accordance with Article 21, 1 (absolute, strict, no-fault liability system) of the 1999 Montreal Convention. But if Indonesia AirAsia airlines and Malaysia Airlines cannot prove as to the following two points without fault based on Article 21, 2 (presumed faulty system) of the 1999 Montreal Convention, AirAsia of Indonesiaand Malaysia Airlines will be burdened the unlimited liability to the each victim and survivor of the Indonesian and Malaysia airline's air crash case such as (1) such damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the air carrier or its servants or agents, or (2) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a third party. In this researcher's view for the aforementioned reasons, and under the laws of China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea the Chinese, Indonesian, Malaysia and Korean, some victims and survivors of the crash of the two flights are entitled to receive possibly from more than 113,100 SDR to 5 million US$ from the two airlines or from the Aviation Insurance Company based on decision of the American court. It could also be argued that it is reasonable and necessary to revise the clause referring to bodily injury to a clause mentioning personal injury based on Article 17 of the 1999 Montreal Convention so as to be included the mental injury and condolence in the near future.
The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.