• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.305-335
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• 2016

In the eighteenth century, the scottish philosophers Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith share the idea that morality comes from moral sense, which is a feeling of approval or disapproval of agent's motive and action. However, they have the different views in explaining the mechanism that generates the moral sentiments. Hutcheson takes a moral sense to be a unique mental faculty that is innate to all humans, and regards it as being guaranteed by supernatural apparatus like divine Providence. Hume and Smith reject Hutcheson's concept of internal moral sense and take a stage further Hutcheson's projects of internalisation by naturalizing morality in terms of the principle of sympathy. It is widely held that Hume's moral sentimentalism is essentially similar to Adam Smith's. Though there are important points of contact between Smith's account of sympathy and Hume's, the differences are considerable. The chief of them lies in the fact that Hume grounds our approval of virtue on our recognition of its utility and convention, and Smith does not. Smith grounds our approval of virtue on the impartial spectator's judgment, i.e., conscience. Hence for Smith, the impartial spectator is the one that bridges the gap between particularity and universality and works the vehicle of practical reason. Given this, in this paper, first, I will clarify the difference between Hume's and Adam Smith's understandings of sympathy. Second, I will elucidate how they explain the process to produce the moral sentiments based on their understandings of sympathy. I shall finally explicate in what way Hume's and Smith's theories on sympathy work as moral normativity.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.69-88
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• 2005

Hume's principle says that the number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs iff there are just as many Fs as Gs. Frege seems to suggest at Grundlagen $\S64$ that (i) the content of the two sentences are the same, (ii) the left hand side sentence is a result of 'carving up the content' of the right hand side in a new way, (iii) 'the true order of things' are from the right to left rather than the other way round. We examine here if there is a room for arguing these three theses altogether within Frege's philosophy, and give a positive answer to it.

• Journal of Korea Entertainment Industry Association
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• v.13 no.6
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• pp.211-220
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• 2019

It helps to wisely abstain from errors of the a priori subjective emotions related to human emotions, and orders emotions to make rational choices. These emotional happiness of human and moral sensitivities work directly or indirectly in rational choice of rational thought and reason. Abraham would have been troubled by the divine mandate to sacrifice a son who was only one, and a son who had been healed. Was his reason reasonable at this time? In rational reason, it can be said that the act of dedicating his son is an appropriate act, but is it possible in the human mind? Aristoteles also called human virtue virtue in good for human beings. Because happiness is also a mental activity, we have to know a certain degree about the mind. This ψυχή(psyche, spirit) spirit is an irrational element that is invisible but an intervention in rational principles. Also C. G. Jung states that all human beings have four dynamic psychological functions that are not visible, and that the mind is driven by these four functional dimensions. This means that the elements of S, Sensing, N, Intuition, T, Thinking, and Feeling are combined. David Hume also emphasized the principle of empathy, asserting that morality can not be derived from reason, and Max Ferdinand Scheler, before grasping the visual characteristics of a person, has already captured the whole feeling of the person, And that the value given to this feeling is the value, and that the function of emotion that is elevated to the perceived object by grasping the value through this process and the value is always preceded by the reason. Emmanuel Levinas states that emotional emotions of love are ahead of reason and that emotions precede human reasoning and rationality is the inability of emotional control that we need rational thought and rational and wise action as reason of control and temperance. As part of human emotional education, in the 7th curriculum, Bloom's cognitive, perceptive, and behavioral domain, which is a person with integrated thinking, is trying to be a moral practitioner. It focuses on how to act according to the direction of emotions for virtuous acts and how to develop emotions for emotions on behalf of vicious acts. We can design the possibility and direction of cultivating human emotions and emotional happiness and happy sensitivities by the principle of strengthening virtue and the principle of elimination of ill feeling.