• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.15 no.1
• /
• pp.17-53
• /
• 2012

Some Korean Philosophers has manifested their opinions on Sleeping Beauty problem. For example, Hasuk Song and Namjoong Kim stands for an thirder, while Hanseung Kim for a perspectivistic compatibilist. In order to fill a vacant position, I shall make an argument for halfers in this paper. My presumption is that the probability the question now given to sleeping beauty is the first question among several is greater than thirder's calculated value. Futhermore, I argue that the probability the coin landed heads on condition that the question now given to sleeping beauty is the first question is greater than 1/2.

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.14 no.2
• /
• pp.77-104
• /
• 2011

Professor Hasuk Song argues that every argumentum ad ignorantiam, i.e. the argument from ignorance is not fallacious, and social contexts play a crucial role to judge whether the argument is fallacious or not. I generally agree with him, but I think we cannot have help from his position without knowing what those contexts are. In this paper, I argue that the concept of burden of proof is the crucial one to judge whether ad ignorantiam is plausible or not, and then present four criterions who have the burden of proof. There is a burden of proof on one who argues first, who insists the doubtful ones, who has powers, and who thinks that a situation is not dangerous.

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.17 no.3
• /
• pp.373-399
• /
• 2014

This paper deals with the question whether the metaphysical dialetheism is a persuasive view or not. That is, the purpose of this paper is to criticize the metaphysical dialetheism by answering three questions, whether the dialetheism is compatible with the correspondence theory of truth, whether there is an observable contradiction, finally what the status of LNC is. In conclusion, it is argued that dialetheism is incompatible with the correspondence theory of truth, because it results in trivialism to suppose that two views are compatible. It is also claimed that LNC should be understood as the principle of exclusion which constrains the structure of the world and that the real world is consistent. Therefore, there is no observable contradiction in the world and the metaphysical dialetheism is not persuasive.

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.16 no.3
• /
• pp.381-406
• /
• 2013

This paper deals with the question whether the para-completeness theory of Kripkian style can avoid the revenge problem. According to the para-completeness theory, there are some sentences that are neither true nor false. And the liar sentence is the exemplar of such sentences. But the para-completeness theory has been criticised to give rise to the revenge problem, since Kripke suggested his theory. Maudlin argues that he can construct the para-completeness theory which avoids the problem by appealing to his foundationalist semantics. The aim of this paper shows that the para-completeness theory, including Maudlin's, cannot avoid the problem. Furthermore, it is argued that Maudlin's view is ad hoc suggestion just to avoid the problem.

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.17 no.2
• /
• pp.233-253
• /
• 2014

The Pinocchio paradox that Eldridge-Smith suggested is a version of the semantic paradox. But it is unique in the sense that this paradox does not contain a semantic predicate. Tarski's solution which appeals to the hierarchy of language and Kripke's para-completeness which accepts the third truth value cannot solve the Pinocchio paradox. This paper argues that Eldridge-Smith's trial to criticize semantical dialetheism is not successful and that the paradox implies the rule of the truth predicate is inconsistent. That is, the proper diagnosis to this paradox is that the Pinocchio principle should be considered to be potentially inconsistent, which suggests that semantic paradoxes such as the liar paradox arise because the rule of the truth-predicate is inconsistent. The Pinocchio paradox teaches us that consistent view of truth cannot be successful to solve the semantic paradoxes and that we should accept the inconsistent view of truth.

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.15 no.2
• /
• pp.273-294
• /
• 2012

In my previous article "An Inferentialist Account of Indicative Conditionals" and "An Inferentialist Account of Indicative Conditionals and Hasuk Song's Objections", I argued that the so-called Uncontested Principle is not uncontestable. According to the Uncontested Principle, an indicative conditional '$A{\rightarrow}C$' logically implies a material conditional '$A{\supset}C$'. In his recent paper "On the Recent Controversies surrounding the Uncontested Principle" Wonbae Choi presents three objections to my claim. First, my denial of the Uncontested Principle implies rejecting modus ponens. Second, my denial of the Uncontested Principle is tantamount to taking the truth-conditions of an indicative conditional as weaker than those of a material conditional, which are usually taken to be the weakest among conditionals. Third, my view that we can warrantedly assert '$A{\rightarrow}C$' even when 'A ${\therefore}$ C' is inductively justified is based on a misunderstanding of the way in which indicative conditionals are justified. In this paper I argue that Choi's objections are all based on misunderstandings of my view. First, I do not deny the validity of modus ponens (as a form of deductive reasoning). Second, the fact that the inductive warrantability of 'A ${\therefore}$ C' does not imply the truth of '$A{\supset}C$' does not show that the truth-conditions of an indicative conditional is weaker than those of a material conditional. Third, Choi's claim that a contingent conditional '$A{\rightarrow}C$' is true only when 'C' can be deductively derived from 'A' in conjunction with a hidden premiss is not well grounded, nor does it fit the facts.