• Journal of the Korean Society for Railway
• /
• v.8 no.2
• /
• pp.161-169
• /
• 2005

In this paper, we provide safety requirements and advices to guarantee the safety of an interface in a level crossing system which is an interface between the conventional facilities and the new ATP (Automatic Train Protection) system, as well as we accomplish a safety management for the facilities of a country that has a different standard with already standardized ATP system. The system model has been made based on a safety activity of the international standard, and then a tolerance of a risk by the safety activity through PHA (Preliminary Hazard Analysis) has been analyzed. finally we achieved HIA (Hazard Identification and Analysis) for the assumptions that have been produced from a operating scenario and a functional interface. Thus, the safety requirements for the interface has been provided from the safety plan of HIA, and we showed the safety activity to guarantee the system safety through HIA which was depend on the design.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Railway
• /
• v.9 no.4 s.35
• /
• pp.412-418
• /
• 2006

In this paper we deal with the APARP theory which has been applied for UK railway system and risk assessment method which has been using in the domestic railway system for the safety demonstration. Both techniques are applied to the ATP wayside equipment for interface. Also, fur the applications of each techniques a analysis of the safety activity and a possibility of the application of ALARP theory are evaluated. Finally, we generate requirements of the safety demonstration for the future domestic railway system by way of the analysis of some assumptions and requirement data which can be applied to the risk assessment of ALARP.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers B
• /
• v.54 no.7
• /
• pp.309-316
• /
• 2005

In this paper we analyzed a dangerous failure and a safety requirement based on HIA (Hazard Identification and Analysis) of an interface model between CTC (Centralized Traffic Control) system and El (Interlocking) system, and assigned SU (Safety Integrity Level) by way of an risk estimation of the interface, which employed PHA (Preliminary Hazard Analysis) for the interface of the track control system, being managed as separated system between the centralized traffic control system and the interlocking system, An estimation which satisfies a safety reference of the international standard has been achieved through a quantification of the system failure rate and the dangerous failure rate of the interface model.