• Journal of the Korean Institute of Gas
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.1-20
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• 2018

Despite many measures, still from time to time catastrophic events occur, even after reviewing potential scenarios with HAZID tools. Therefore, it is evident that in order to prevent such events, answering the question: "What can go wrong?" requires more enhanced HAZID tools. Recently, new system based approaches have been proposed, such as STPA (system-theoretic process analysis) and Blended Hazid, but for the time being for several reasons their availability for general use is very limited. However, by making use of available advanced software and technology, traditional HAZID tools can still be improved in degree of completeness of identifying possible hazards and in work time efficiency. The new HAZID methodology proposed here, the Data-based semi-Automatic HAZard IDentification (DAHAZID), seeks to identify possible scenarios with a semi-automated system approach. Based on the two traditional HAZID tools, Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study and Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), the new method will minimize the limitations of each method. This will occur by means of a thorough systematic preparation before the tools are applied. Rather than depending on reading drawings to obtain connectivity information of process system equipment elements, this research is generating and presenting in prepopulated work sheets linked components together with all required information and space to note HAZID results. Next, this method can be integrated with proper guidelines regarding process safer design and hazard analysis. To examine its usefulness, the method will be applied to a case study.

• Journal of Advanced Research in Ocean Engineering
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• v.3 no.3
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• pp.125-135
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• 2017

The paper considers the practical application of the FMEA(Failure Mode and Effect Analysis) method to assess the operational reliability of the LNG(Liquefied Natural Gas) transfer system, which is a potential problem for the connection between the LNG FPSO and LNG carrier. Hazard Identification (HAZID) and Hazard operability (HAZOP) are applied to identify the risks and hazards during the operation of LNG transfer system. The approach is performed for the FMEA to assess the reliability based on the detection of defects typical to LNG transfer system. FTA and FMEA associated with a probabilistic risk database to the operation scenarios are applied to assess the risk. After providing an outline of the safety assessment procedure for the operational problems of system, safety assessment example is presented, providing details on the fault tree of operational accident, safety assessment, and risk measures.

• Journal of the Society of Naval Architects of Korea
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• v.59 no.3
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• pp.164-172
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• 2022

A HAZID is a brainstorming workshop to identify hazards in an early phase of a project. It should be flexible to capture all probable accidents allowing experienced participants to exploit their expertise and experiences. A bowtie analysis is a graphical representation of major accident hazards elaborating safety measures i.e. barriers. The result of these workshops should be documented in an organized manner to share as good as possible details of the discussion through the lifetime of the project. Currently results are documented using a three-step representation of an accident; causes, top event and consequences, which cannot capture correctly sequence of events leading to various accidents and roles of barrier between two events. Another problem is that barriers would be shown repeatedly leading to a misunderstanding that there are an enough number of safety measures. A new bowtie analysis method is proposed to describe an accident in multiple steps showing relations among causes or consequences. With causes and consequences shown in a format of a tree, the frequencies of having the top event (Fault tree analysis) and various consequences (Event tree analysis) are evaluated automatically based on the frequency of initiating causes and the probabilities of failure of barriers. It will provide a good description of the accident scenario and help the risk to be assessed transparently.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Navigation and Port Research Conference
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• 2010.10a
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• pp.112-117
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• 2010

본 논문은, 국적일반화물선 공식안전성평가(Formal Safety Assessment, 이하 FSA) 연구의 1, 2 단계에 해당하는 위험요소 식별(Hazard identification) 및 식별된 사고 시나리오에 대한 위험도 분석(Risk analysis) 결과를 소개한 "국적일반화물선 초기안전성평가 연구(1)"에 이어서 FSA 연구의 3, 4 그리고 5단계의 내용으로, 국적일반화물선의 위험도 수준을 저감할 수 있는 위험도제어방안들(Risk Control Options)을 식별하는 단계(Step 3)와 식별된 위험도제어방안들 중 전문가 의견수렴을 통하여 선별된 위험도제어방안들을 대상으로 한 비용-효과 평가 단계(Step 4: Cost-Benefit Assessment) 그리고 비용-효과 평가의 결과를 정리하여 국적일반화물선의 안전성 제고를 위한 구체적인 방안을 제안하는 단계(Step 5: Recommendation for Decision Making)의 결과를 소개하였다.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.213-220
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• 2010

Following the application of Formal Safety Assessment(FSA) to bulk carriers, crude oil tankers and large passenger ships, an urgent need to consider the safety of general cargo ships has recently been raised through the International Maritime Organization(IMO)(IMO, 2006a), and related FSA studies are being carried out by International Association of Classification Societies(IACS) as a preparatory work for the discussion on the issue of general cargo ship safety in the IMO committee. FSA is a structured and systematic methodology which is based on the techniques of risk analysis and cost benefit assessment to assist in the decision-making process, and aims at enhancing maritime safety, including protection of life, health, the marine environment and property. FSA can be used as a tool to facilitate the development of regulatory changes equitable to the various parties, with a view to aiding the achievement of consensus, and to help in the evaluation of new regulations and in making a comparison between existing and possibly improved regulations(IMO, 2007). This study aims at verifying the usefulness of FSA methods as a tool to conduct a safety assessment of general cargo ships flying the Korean flag, and providing useful information on 'the safety of general cargo ships' for IMO committee's discussion on the matter at a future session. FSA comprises five steps, however, steps 1(Hazard identification) and 2 (Risk analysis) from the FSA study for the Korean-flagged general cargo ships are discussed in this paper.