• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
• /
• v.29 no.3D
• /
• pp.381-389
• /
• 2009

Korean government is investing 1.8 billion won on infrastructure and investment on PPP projects constitutes 16.3%. This phenomenon is to promote private investment as well as lessening government burdens of public budgeting. However, the only criterion to be considered is government financial status in selecting public or private highway investment projects. So systematic decision support model is required in choosing public or private highway investment projects. So, this paper suggests a systematic decision support model for deciding public or private highway investment at the early stage of project planning. Furthermore, this paper identifies key decision variables with respect to economic, politic, project management criterions based on the related literatures and feedbacks from experts. This paper analyzed 30 cases of government investment and PPP projects and got the survey result from highway specialists. As a result, this paper presents an interval with respect to economic criteria using mean and standard deviation and a logistic regression equation which can predict the possibility of PPP project. Through this study, decision maker of central or local government can decide public or PPP highway project more systematically and reasonably.

• Korean Journal of Agricultural Science
• /
• v.39 no.1
• /
• pp.17-21
• /
• 2012

The purpose of this study is to review the laws on foreign investment and the changed licensing procedures in Laos and to provide the data for basic understanding of foreign forestation investment in Laos. The conclusions are as follows. The Laos government has been consistently trying to promote foreign investment. In particular, in 2004, the "Law on the Promotion of Foreign Investment" was legislated. In 2009, the Foreign Investment Promotion Act and the Domestic Investment Promotion Act to incorporate the principles of the "Law on Investment Promotion" were enacted. In Laos, the country's land is owned by the nation's community and maintained by the government. Therefore, through the procedures for registration of land, land can be conceded or leased. The ways to invest are joint ventures (where at least 10% of the total capital investment has to be made), foreign sole investment (where the investor must have a minimum capital of $100,000 or more), joint venture agreement and etc. Lastly, the forestation licensing procedures in Laos are carried out in the following order: site selection, business investments feasibility studies, environmental and social impact assessment, forestry permit application.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
• /
• v.12 no.4
• /
• pp.788-818
• /
• 2009

Renewable energy refers to solar energy, biomass energy, hydrogen energy, wind power, fuel cell, coal liquefaction and vaporization, marine energy, waste energy, and liquidity fuel made out of byproduct of geothermal heat, hydrogen and coal; it excludes energy based on coal, oil, nuclear energy and natural gas. Developed countries have recognized the importance of these energies and thus have set the mid to long term plans to develop and commercialize the technology and supported them with drastic political and financial measures. Considering the growing recognition to the field, it is necessary to analysis up-to-now achievement of the government's related projects, in the standards of type of renewable energy, management of sectional goals, and its commercialization. Korean government is chiefly following suit the USA and British policies of developing and distributing renewable energy. However, unlike Japan which is in the lead role in solar rays industry, it still lacks in state-directed support, participation of enterprises and social recognition. The research regarding renewable energy has mainly examinedthe state of supply of each technology and suitability of specific region for applying the technology. The evaluation shows that the research has been focused on supply and demand of renewable as well as general energy and solution for the enhancement of supply capacity in certain area. However, in-depth study for commercialization and the increase of capacity in industry followed by development of the technology is still inadequate. 'Cost-benefit model for each energy source' is used in analysis of technology development of renewable energy and quantitative and macro economical effects of its commercialization in order to foresee following expand in related industries and increase in added value. First, Investment on the renewable energy technology development is in direct proportion both to the product and growth, but product shows slightly higher index under the same amount of R&D investment than growth. It indicates that advance in technology greatly influences the final product, the energy growth. Moreover, while R&D investment on renewable energy product as well as the government funds included in the investment have proportionate influence on the renewable energy growth, private investment in the total amount invested has reciprocal influence. This statistic shows that research and development is mainly driven by government funds rather than private investment. Finally, while R&D investment on renewable energy growth affects proportionately, government funds and private investment shows no direct relations, which indicates that the effects of research and development on renewable energy do not affect government funds or private investment. All of the results signify that although it is important to have government policy in technology development and commercialization, private investment and active participation of enterprises are the key to the success in the industry.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
• /
• v.35 no.4
• /
• pp.360-373
• /
• 2017

The BTO-a projects is the types, which has a demand risk among the type of PPP projects in Korea. When demand risk is realized, private investor encounters financial difficulties due to lower revenue than its expectation and the government may also have a problem in stable infrastructure operation. In this regards, the government has applied various risk sharing policies in response to demand risk. However, the amount of government's risk sharing is the government's contingent liabilities as a result of demand uncertainty, and it fails to be quantified by the conventional NPV method of expressing in the text of the concession agreement. The purpose of this study is to estimate the value of investment risk sharing by the government considering the demand risk in the profit sharing system (BTO-a) introduced in 2015 as one of the demand risk sharing policy. The investment risk sharing will take the form of options in finance. Private investors have the right to claim subsidies from the government when their revenue declines, while the government has the obligation to pay subsidies under certain conditions. In this study, we have established a methodology for estimating the value of investment risk sharing by using the Black - Scholes option pricing model and examined the appropriateness of the results through case studies. As a result of the analysis, the value of investment risk sharing is estimated to be 12 billion won, which is about 4% of the investment cost of the private investment. In other words, it can be seen that the government will invest 12 billion won in financial support by sharing the investment risk. The option value when assuming the traffic volume risk as a random variable from the case studies is derived as an average of 12.2 billion won and a standard deviation of 3.67 billion won. As a result of the cumulative distribution, the option value of the 90% probability interval will be determined within the range of 6.9 to 18.8 billion won. The method proposed in this study is expected to help government and private investors understand the better risk analysis and economic value of better for investment risk sharing under the uncertainty of future demand.

• Journal of Information Technology Services
• /
• v.12 no.3
• /
• pp.165-178
• /
• 2013

The interest in economics and efficiency of IT investment is growing as the amount of overall governmental IT investment steadily increase. Accordingly, there is a strong need to determine whether the expenditure incurs effectively for IT investment and to accurately analyze the economics of IT investment, In this perspective, this study discusses the prior researches on concepts regarding the analysis of IT investment management framework as proposed from academic and professional perspectives in advanced countries' government sectors. Thereafter, an adoption of IT investment management (ITIM) framework has been considered so as to enhance the performance of ICT initiative projects in the public sector. In the suggested IT investment management framework, we suggest economics and efficiency of public IT investment should be improved by integrating ICT project selection and control as well as evaluation stage into single governance framework.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
• /
• 1995.09a
• /
• pp.156-169
• /
• 1995

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of government in innovation. That is, how much should government invest in R&D activity for social welfare enhancement. An optimal control problem is proposed to answer the above question. Because of difficulties in solving the problem, simulation utilized to find an approximate solution. All results obtained from the simulation are very similar. The investment in R&D activity increases and reaches its maximum and then decreases continuously. If the importance of technology grows the investment in R&D activity should be expanded.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.13 no.4
• /
• pp.31-57
• /
• 1991

Korean firms of all sizes, from virtually every industry, have used and are using the term "excessive competition" to describe the state of their industry and to call for government interventions. Moreover, the Korean government has frequently responded to such calls in various ways favorable to the firms, such as controlling entry, curbing capacity investments, or allowing collusion. Despite such interventions' impact on the overall efficiency on the Korean economy as well as on the wealth distribution among diverse groups of economic agents, the term "excessive competition", the basis for the interventions, has so far escaped rigorous scrutiny. The objective of this paper is to clarify the notion of "excessive competition" and "over-investment" which usually accompanies "excessive competition", and to examine the circumstances under which they might occur. We first survey the cases where the terms are most widely used and proceed to examine those cases to determine if competition is indeed excessive, and if so, what causes "excessive competition". Our main concern deals with the case in which the firms must make investment decisions that involve large sunk costs while facing uncertain demand. In order to analyze this case, we developed a two period model of capacity precommitment and the ensuing competition. In the first period, oligopolistic firms make capacity investments that are irreversible. Demand is uncertain in period 1 and only the distribution is known. Thus, firms must make investment decisions under uncertainty. In the second period, demand is realized, and the firms compete with quantity under realized demand and capacity constraints. In the above setting, we find that there is "no over-investment," en ante, and there is "no excessive competition," ex post. As measured by the information available in period 1, expected return from investment of a firm is non-negative, overall industry capacity does not exceed the socially optimal level, and competition in the second period yields an outcome that gives each operating firm a non-negative second period profit. Thus, neither "excessive competition" nor "over-investment" is possible. This result will generally hold true if there is no externality and if the industry is not a natural monopoly. We also extend this result by examining a model in which the government is an active participant in the game with a well defined preference. Analysis of this model shows that over-investment arises if the government cannot credibly precommit itself to non-intervention when ex post idle capacity occurs, due to socio-political reasons. Firms invest in capacities that exceed socially optimal levels in this case because they correctly expect that the government will find it optimal for itself to intervene once over-investment and ensuing financial problems for the firms occur. Such planned over-investment and ensuing government intervention are the generic problems under the current system. These problems are expected to be repeated in many industries in years to come, causing a significant loss of welfare in the long run. As a remedy to this problem, we recommend a non-intervention policy by the government which creates and utilizes uncertainty. Based upon an argument which is essentially the same as that of Kreps and Wilson in the context of a chain-store game, we show that maintaining a consistent non-intervention policy will deter a planned over-investment by firms in the long run. We believe that the results obtained in this paper has a direct bearing on the public policies relating to many industries including the petrochemical industry that is currently in the center of heated debates.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
• /
• v.8 no.2
• /
• pp.29-42
• /
• 2010

To improve the performance of R&D investments, government has taken great efforts for advancing the structure and process in R&D systems. However, due to the drastic internal/external changes in the technological environment and the steady increase of investment scale, the necessity for a innovative approach which accomplishes returns to scale through the utilization of various external resources is emerging. In this regard, open innovation approach can minimize the possibility of government failures by strengthening the absorptive capacity of external resources and enhancing the cooperation and participation of diverse innovative participants within the R&D system. This paper evaluates the previous researches and government policies concerning the performances of government R&D investments, and presents the connectivity between open innovation and its possible contribution to the improvement of R&D investment performances.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
• /
• v.25 no.1
• /
• pp.61-81
• /
• 2015

Investment in research and development (R&D) is critical in the information technology (IT) firms, where newer and better technology is a quintessential goal that directly affects innovation and competitive advantage. This study investigates how R&D investment influences firm performance and value, and how the effect of R&D investment differs between IT hardware and software firms. We also analyze the relationship between firm age and R&D investment in order to identify learning effects on continuous R&D investment. The empirical investigation in this study, based on longitudinal archival data from 2001 to 2010, found a significant effect of R&D investment on firm performance in IT firms. Further, this study demonstrates causal relationship between firm age, and verifies that learning effects are present in R&D investment. Moreover, the results are found to differ between IT hardware and IT software firms.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.44 no.1
• /
• pp.77-98
• /
• 2022

This paper empirically verifies that the types of capital adjustment costs serve as an important mechanism in relation to investment decision-making after confirming that the investment dispersion of Korean firms is pro-cyclical and can affect business cycles. Specifically, it is found through empirical methods using corporate financial data that capital adjustment costs generally assumed to take a quadratic form in macroeconomics are asymmetric and irreversible in the Korean economy. In particular, capital adjustment costs are empirically proven to cause investment dispersion to expand given that the substitution effect of the marginal value to the marginal cost for one unit of investment in the inter-temporal investment decision is affected by that cost with regard to the resale of owned equipment assets, as opposed to new investments in equipment assets. We ultimately show, albeit indirectly, that investment dispersion can affect business cycles as capital adjustment costs influences investment decisions. What is implied is that the capital adjustment cost is not merely an exogenously deep parameter that fits the dynamics of business cycles in a macroeconomic model but could instead be a policy variable that can be endogenized through government policies.