• Journal for History of Mathematics
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.47-58
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• 2006

This paper aims to introduce $G\ddot{o}del's$ life and thought, and insists that implication of the incompleteness theorem is saving blank space. The space has epistemological and ethical meaning, and I argue that the implication supports philosophy of blank space.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.241-271
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• 2017

Dialetheism is the view that there exists a true contradiction. This paper ventures to suggest that Priest's argument for Dialetheism from $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ theorem is unconvincing as the lesson of $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ proof (or Rosser's proof) is that any sufficiently strong theories of arithmetic cannot be both complete and consistent. In addition, a contradiction is derivable in Priest's inconsistent and complete arithmetic. An alternative argument for Dialetheism is given by applying $G{\ddot{o}}del$ sentence to the inconsistent and complete theory of arithmetic. We argue, however, that the alternative argument raises a circularity problem. In sum, $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ and its related theorem merely show the relation between a complete and a consistent theory. A contradiction derived by the application of $G{\ddot{o}}del$ sentence has the value of true sentences, i.e. the both-value, only under the inconsistent models for arithmetic. Without having the assumption of inconsistency or completeness, a true contradiction is not derivable from the application of $G{\ddot{o}}del$ sentence. Hence, $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ and its related theorem never can be a ground for Dialetheism.

• Journal for History of Mathematics
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.27-36
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• 2004

This paper addresses G$\ddot{o}$del's critique of Turing's mechanism that a configuration of the Turing machine corresponds to each state of human mind. The first part gives a quick overview of Turing's analysis of cognition as computation and its variants. In the following part, we describe the concept of Turing machines, and the third part explains the computational limitations of Turing machines as a cognitive system. The fourth part demonstrates that Godel did not agree with Turing's argument, sometimes referred to as mechanism. Finally, we discuss an oracle Turing machine and its implications.

• Journal for History of Mathematics
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.71-75
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• 1984

Whether the complete Hilbert program could be carried out was rendered very doubtful by results due to Godel. These results may be roughly characterized as a demonstration that, in any system broad enough to contain all the formulas of a formalized elementary number theory, there exist formulas that neither can be proved nor disproved within the system. In this paper, Godel's incompleteness theorem is explained roughly moreover formul system and machines being refered, related to his theory.