• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.113-136
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• 2022

China has been pushing for a systematic strategy for territorialization over a long period of time to invade Korea's West Sea (Yellow Sea) in order to create China's territorial water. China's strategy for territorializing the West Sea is an activity in which China curbs the use of South Korea and enforces the illegal use of China in order to dominate the West Sea exclusively. China aided Chinese fishing boats that engaged in illegal fishing in Korea's jurisdiction as a means to territorialize the West Sea, and is opposed to combined exercise and training of Korea and the United States Naval Forces in the West Sea, while intentionally entering KADIZ(Korea Air Defense Identification Zone). In addition, Beijing used 'scientific exploration and research' measures as a pretext for its strategies in order to encroach on Korea's West Sea. China is carrying out such work to announce to the world that China is a systematic and organized country while consistently attempting to dominate the West Sea. China's activities in the West Sea seriously infringe South Korea's sovereignty. In order to respond to China's strategies of territorialization in the West Sea stated above, I analyzed the rejection effect of the ROK-US combined military training in the West Sea and presented a 'proportional response strategy centered on the ROK-US combined forces'. Korea should be able to respond proportionally to China's activities in the seas around the Korean peninsula, and Korea should be able to neutralize China's attempt to a Fait Accompli. In addition, just as China installs buoys in the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone, Korea should be able to install and actively utilize some devices in the West Sea and for the use of free and open West Sea. Korea should not just wait for the tragic future to come without preparing for China's gradual and long-term strategy, and Seoul needs to respond to China's maritime policy in the West Sea with a more active attitude than it is now. China has historically taken a bold and aggressive response to neighboring countries that are consistent with a passive attitude, on the other hand, Beijing has taken a cautious approach to neighboring countries that respond with an active attitude. It should not be forgotten that Korea's passive response to the Chinese strategy in the name of a 'realistic approach' such as Korea's economic dependence on China for economy will result in China's success for territorialization of the West Sea.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.38 no.2
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• pp.312-323
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• 2003

This writer absolutely agrees with the government that regional disequilibrium is severe enough to consider moving the administrative capital. Pursuing this course solely to establish a balanced development, however, is not a convincing enough reason. The capital city is directly related to not only the social and economic situation but, much more importantly, to the domestic political situation as well. In the mid-1970s, the proposal by the Third Republic to move the capital city temporarily was based completely on security reasons. At e time, the then opposition leader Kim, Dae-jung said that establishing a safe distance from the demilitarized zone(DMZ) reflected a typically military decision. His view was that retaining the capital city close to the DMZ would show more consideration for the will of the people to defend their own country. In fact, independent Pakistan moved its capital city from Karachi to Islamabad, situated dose to Kashmir the subject of hot territorial dispute with India. It is regrettable that no consideration has been given to the urgent political situation in the Korean peninsula, which is presently enveloped in a dense nuclear fog. As a person requires health to pursue his/her dream, a country must have security to implement a balanced territorial development. According to current urban theories, the fate of a country depends on its major cities. A negligently guarded capital city runs the risk of becoming hostage and bringing ruin to the whole country. In this vein, North Koreas undoubted main target of attack in the armed communist reunification of Korea is Seoul. For the preservation of our state, therefore, it is only right that Seoul must be shielded to prevent becoming hostage to North Korea. The location of the US Armed Forces to the north of the capital city is based on the judgment that defense of Seoul is of absolute importance. At the same time, regardless of their different standpoints, South and North Korea agree that division of the Korean people into two separate countries is abnormal. Reunification, which so far has defied all predictions, may be realized earlier than anyone expects. The day of reunification seems to be the best day for the relocation of the capital city. Building a proper capital city would take at least twenty years, and a capital city cannot be dragged from one place to another. On the day of a free and democratic reunification, a national agreement will be reached naturally to find a nationally symbolic city as in Brazil or Australia. Even if security does not pose a problem, the governments way of thinking would not greatly contribute to the balanced development of the country. The Chungcheon region, which is earmarked as the new location of the capital city, has been the greatest beneficiary of its proximity to the capital region. Not being a disadvantaged region, locating the capital city there would not help alleviate regional disparity. If it is absolutely necessary to find a candidate region at present, considering security, balanced regional development and post-reunification scenario of the future, Cheolwon area located in the middle of the Korean peninsula may be a plausible choice. Even if the transfer of capital is delayed in consideration of the present political conflict between the South and the North Koreas, there is a definite shortcut to realizing a balanced regional development. It can be found not in the geographical dispersal of the central government, but in the decentralization of power to the provinces. If the government has surplus money to build a new symbolic capital city, it is only right that it should improve, for instance, the quality of drinking water which now everyone eschews, and to help the regional subway authority whose chronic deficit state resoled in a recent disastrous accident. And it is proper to time the transfer of capital city to coincide with that of the reunification of Korea whenever Providence intends.

• The Korean Journal of Vision Science
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.579-588
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• 2018

Purpose : To analyze the eyeglasses supply system for ametropic soldiers in ROK military. Methods : We investigated and analyzed the supply system of eyeglasses for the ametropic soldiers provided by the Korean military. The refractive powers and corrected visual acuity were measured for 37 ametropic soldiers who wear insert glasses for ballistic protective and gas-masks supplied by the military based on their habitual prescriptions. Full correction of refractive error was prescribed for subjects having less than 1.0 of distance visual acuity, and comparison was held for inspecting the changes in corrected visual acuity. Suggestions were provided for solving the issues regarding current supplying system, and this study investigated the applicabilities for utilizing professional optometric manpower. Results : The new glasses supplied by army for ametropic soldiers were duplicated from the glasses they worn when entering the army. The spherical equivalent refractive powers of the conventional, ballistic protective and gas-mask insert glasses supplied for 37 ametropic soldiers were $-3.47{\pm}1.69D$, $-3.52{\pm}1.66D$ and $-3.55{\pm}1.63D$, respectively, and the spherical equivalent refractive power of full corrected glasses was $-3.79{\pm}1.66D$, which showed a significant difference(p<0.05). The distant corrected visual acuity measured at high and low contrast(logMAR) of conventional, ballistic protective and gas-mask insert glasses were $0.06{\pm}0.80$, $0.21{\pm}0.82$, $0.15{\pm}0.74$, $0.34{\pm}0.89$, $0.10{\pm}0.70$ and $0.22{\pm}0.27$, respectively, while the corrected visual acuity by full corrected glasses were increased to $0.02{\pm}1.05$, $0.10{\pm}0.07$, $0.09{\pm}0.92$, $0.26{\pm}0.10$, $0.04{\pm}1.00$ and $0.19{\pm}1.00$, respectively. There was a significant difference(p<0.05) except for the case of the low contrast corrected visual acuity of the conventional and gas-mask insert glasses. The procedure for ordering, dispensing, and supplying military glasses consists of 5 steps, and it was found that approximately two weeks or more are required to supply from the initial examination. Conclusion : The procedure of supplying the military glasses showed three issues: 1) a lack of refraction for prescription system, 2) relatively long length of time required for supplying the glasses, 3) an inaccurate power of supplied glasses. In order to solve those issues, in the short term, education is necessarily required for soldiers on the measurement of the refractive powers, and in the near future, further standard procedures for prescription of glasses as well as the securement of optometric manpower are expected.