• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.223-234
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• 2016

This study aimed to the adsorption-removal of high- radioactive iodide (I) contained in the initially generated high-radioactive seawater waste (HSW), with the use of AgX (Ag-impregnated X zeolite). Adsorption of I by AgX (hereafter denoted as AgX-I adsorption) was increased by increasing the Ag-impregnated concentration in AgX, and its concentration was suitable at about 30 wt%. Because of AgCl precipitation by chloride ions contained in seawater waste, the leaching yields of Ag from AgX (Ag-impregnated concentration : about 30~35 wt%) was less than those in distilled water (< 1 mg/L). AgX-I adsorption was above 99% in the initial iodide concentration ($C_i$) of 0.01~10 mg/L at m/V (ratio of weight of adsorbent to solution volume)=2.5 g/L. This shows that efficient removal of I is possible. AgX-I adsorption was found to be more effective in distilled water than in seawater waste, and the influence of solution temperature was insignificant. Ag-I adsorption was better described by a Freundlich isotherm rather than a Langmuir isotherm. AgX-I adsorption kinetics can be expressed by a pseudo-second order rate equation. The adsorption rate constants ($k_2$) decreased by increasing $C_i$, and conversely increased by increasing the ratio of m/V and the solution temperature. This time, the activation energy of AgX-I adsorption was about 6.3 kJ/mol. This suggests that AgX-I adsorption is dominated by physical adsorption with weaker bonds. The evaluation of thermodynamic parameters (a negative Gibbs free energy and a positive Enthalpy) indicates that AgX-I adsorption is a spontaneous reaction (forward reaction), and an endothermic reaction indicating that higher temperatures are favored.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.183-193
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• 2018

Currently, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is planning to build the Ki-Jang Research Reactor (KJRR) in Ki-Jang, Busan. It is important to safely dispose of low-level radioactive waste from the operation of the reactor. The most efficient way to treat radioactive waste is cement solidification. For a radioactive waste disposal facility, cement solidification is performed based on specific waste acceptance criteria such as compressive strength, free-standing water, immersion and leaching tests. Above all, the leaching test is important to final disposal. The leakage of radioactive waste such as $^{137}Cs$ causes not only regional problems but also serious global ones. The cement solidification method is simple, and cheaper than other solidification methods, but has a lower leaching resistance. Thus, this study was focused on the development of cement solidification for an enhancement of cesium leaching resistance. We used Zeolite and Loess to improve the cesium leaching resistance of KJRR cement solidification containing simulated KJRR liquid waste. Based on an SEM-EDS spectrum analysis, we confirmed that Zeolite and Loess successfully isolated KJRR cement solidification. A leaching test was carried out according to the ANS 16.1 test method. The ANS 16.1 test is performed to analyze cesium ion concentration in leachate of KJRR cement for 90 days. Thus, a leaching test was carried out using simulated KJRR liquid waste containing $3000mg{\cdot}L^{-1}$ of cesium for 90 days. KJRR cement solidification with Zeolite and Loess led to cesium leaching resistance values that were 27.90% and 21.08% higher than the control values. In addition, in several tests such as free-standing water, compressive strength, immersion, and leaching tests, all KJRR cement solidification met the waste acceptance or satisfied the waste acceptance criteria for final disposal.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.113-132
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• 2019

The degree of females' participation in corporate activity has been recently increased over the world and females' participation in economic activity may be new dynamic fuel for the Korean economy that falls into the vicious cycle of low growth. Start-up, therefore, has increasingly taken attention as an opportunity for females whose careers were interrupted to re-enter the labor market. The need for studies that examine factors influencing the decision of start-up is also increased along with the increase of the ratio of females' start-up. This study aims to verify effects of the women's characteristics(women discrimination, women's role conflict) and the human networks of females whose careers were interrupted, with the intention for entrepreneurial intention, which are mediated by personal attitudes and subjective norm suggested by Ajzen's Theory of Reasoned Action, based on an empirical research. The findings show that the human networks of females have an effect on attitudes toward start-up activity and subjective norm and the woman discrimination influence the personal attitudes. In contrast, the women's role conflict have no effect on both personal attitude toward start-up activity and subjective norm. This can be supposed as an outcome resulted from the subjects' low level of conflict caused by their sex roles, on their age distribution. The relation between subjective norm and entrepreneurial Intention seemed to be moderated by their perceived strong entrepreneurial supporting policy. Their attitudes toward start-up activity were found to have a mediating effect on the relation between the women discrimination, human networks and entrepreneurial Intention, while the subjective norm only mediated the relation between human networks and entrepreneurial Intention. Based on such results, this study attempts to suggest theoretical suggestions and the direction of various entrepreneurial supporting policy for the increase and the growth of start-up of females whose careers were interrupted, in Korea.

• Journal of Practical Engineering Education
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.119-126
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• 2023

Today, in order to improve fuel efficiency and dynamic behavior of automobiles, an era of light weight and simplification of automobile parts is being formed. In order to simplify and design and manufacture the shape of the product, various components are integrated. For example, in order to commercialize three products into one product, product processing is occurring to a very narrow area. In the case of existing parts, precision die casting or casting production is used for processing convenience, and the multi-piece method requires a lot of processes and reduces the precision and strength of the parts. It is very advantageous to manufacture integrally to simplify the processing air and secure the strength of the parts, but if a deep and narrow pocket part needs to be processed, it cannot be processed with the equipment's own spindle. To solve a problem, research on cutting processing is being actively conducted, and multi-axis composite processing technology not only solves this problem. It has many advantages, such as being able to cut into composite shapes that have been difficult to flexibly cut through various processes with one machine tool so far. However, the reality is that expensive equipment increases manufacturing costs and lacks engineers who can operate the machine. In the five-axis cutting processing machine, when producing products with deep and narrow sections, the cycle time increases in product production due to the indirectness of tools, and many problems occur in processing. Therefore, dedicated machine tools and multi-axis composite machines should be used. Alternatively, an angle spindle may be used as a special tool capable of multi-axis composite machining of five or more axes in a three-axis machining center. Various and continuous studies are needed in areas such as processing vibration absorption, low heat generation and operational stability, excellent dimensional stability, and strength securing by using the angle spindle.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Economic and Environmental Geology
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• v.5 no.4
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• pp.187-209
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• 1972

Drilling position is one of the most important factors affecting on the blasting effects. There has been many reports on several blasting factors of burn-cut by Messrs. Brown and Cook, but in this study the author tried to compare drilling positions of burn-cut to pyramid-cut, and also to correlate burn-cut effects of drilling patterns, not being dealt by Prof. Ito in his theory, which emphasized on dynamical stress analysis between explosion and free face. According to former theories, there break out additional tensile stress reflected at the free face supplemented to primary compressive stress on the blasting with one-free-face. But with these experimented new drilling patterns of burn-cut, more free faces and nearer distance of each drilling holes make blasting effects greater than any other methods. To promote the above explosive effect rationary, it has to be considered two important categories under-mentioned. First, unloaded hole in the key holes should be drilled in wider diameter possibly so that it breaks out greater stress relief. Second, key holes possibly should have closer distances each other to result clean blasting. These two important factors derived from experiments with, theories of that the larger the dia of the unloaded hole, it can be allowed wider secondary free faces and closes distances of each holes make more developed stress relief, between loaded and unloaded holes. It was suggested that most ideal distance between holes is about 4 clearance in U. S. A., but the author, according to the experiments, it results that the less distance allow, the more effective blasting with increased broken rock volume and longer drifted length can be accomplished. Developed large hole burn-cut method aimed to increase drifting length technically under the above considerations, and progressive success resulted to achieve maximum 7 blasting cycles per day with 3.1m drifting length per cycle. This achievement originated high-speed-drifting works, and it was also proven that application of Metallic AN-FO on large hole burn-cut method overcomes resistance of one-free-face. AN-FO which was favored with low price and safety handling is the mixture of the fertilizer or industrial Ammonium-Nitrate and fuel oil, and it is also experienced that it shows insensible property before the initiation, but once it is initiated by the booster, it has equal explosive power of Ammonium Nitrate Explosives (ANE). There was many reports about AN-FO. On AN-FO mixing ratio, according to these experiments, prowdered AN-FO, 93.5 : 6.5 and prilled AN-FO 94 : 6, are the best ratios. Detonation, shock, and friction sensities are all more insensitive than any other explosives. Residual gas is not toxic, too. On initation and propagation of the detonation test, prilled AN-FO is more effective than powered AN-FO. AN-FO has the best explosion power at 7 days elapsed after it has mixed. While AN-FO was used at open pit in past years prior to other conditions, the author developed new improved explosives, Metallic AN-FO and Underwater explosive, based on the experiments of these fundmental characteristics by study on its usage utilizing AN-FO. Metallic AN-FO is the mixture of AN-FO and Al, Fe-Si powder, and Underwater explosive is made from usual explosive and AN-FO. The explanations about them are described in the other paper. In this study, it is confirmed that the blasting effects of utilizing AN-FO explosives are very good.