• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.24 no.6
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• pp.1243-1261
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• 2014

With the methods of electronic financial frauds becoming advanced, economic losses have greatly increased. The Electronic Financial Fraud Prevention Service(hereafter EFFPS) has taken effect to prevent electronic financial frauds, but economic losses still occurring. This paper aimed to suggest a direction for improvement of the EFFPS, through the analysis of electronic financial fraud cases. As a result of analysis on the fraud cases before and after implementation of the EFFPS, 'Fraud using Smartphone App' and 'Fraud using Calls and SMS' were increased after implementation of the EFFPS, and also the damage cost of 'Fraud using Smartphone App' had increased. Also we revealed some limitations of the EFFPS. For complementing this limitations, authors considered direction for improvement of the EFFPS focus on application of current services/systems related prevention of electronic financial fraud and considered the ways that are make connection with several measurements related prevention currently being discussed and implemented in perspective of defense in depth.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.179-198
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• 2009

This paper aims at assessing reasonableness for restraining the independence principle in the operation of documentary credit in case of the illegality appeared in the underlying transactions. It has been a major rule under the independence principle to keep the credit operation free from the defences made by the issuing bank and/or credit applicant with a view to prevent the payment as specified under the credit. And also, it is generally accepted in the international commercial community to examine a presentation to determine, on the basis of the document alone, whether or not the documents appear on their face to constitute a complying presentation. Even though these two essences are major rules in the credit operation, if a presentation is made with the documents forged or materially fraudulent, the issuing bank can refuse to pay the documents in respect of fraud rule based on fraud exception for which a court of appropriate jurisdiction would enjoin such honour. Now we have newly come to another situation to determine whether or not we have to apply the same as fraud rule which is applicable to the illegality in the underlying contract under the new conception of illegality principle based on illegality exception. English Commercial Court handled the illegality case under the case of Mahonia Ltd., v. JP Morgan Chase Bank in 2003 and Justice Colman decided that issuing bank can rely on illegality affecting a letter of credit as an excuse for failure to pay. This judgement brought about the acceptance of illegality principle based on illegality exception as a defence to payment under a letter of credit as far as the illegality concerned in the underlying transactions. It is noticeable that this case will affect our international commercial community more to rely on the illegality in the underlying transactions as a good issue to stop payment for the issuing bank in the L/C operation.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.119-139
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• 2012

In the case of Banque Paribas V. Banco Santander in England for the reimbursement request of deferred payment credit by the nominated bank, the L/C-issuing bank refused to pay the proceeds at maturity because of a fraudulent transaction. The reason of refusal was that the nominated bank, Banco Santander, had no right of payment in deferred credit before its maturity if it made payment of proceeds without notice to the issuing bank, that is, payment not based upon a credit transaction but on its own account. However, in the case of ADIB V. Fortis Bank in America, the New York court made the decision that the deferred payment bank could not refuse to reimburse to the nominated bank, Fortis Bank, because of fraud. Its decision was based on the UCP600. We have analyzed and investigated the above two cases-one was an English court's decision and the other an American's. The English court's decision was made under UCP500, but the American court's was made under UCP600, which was revised in 2007. As a result, we can expect that from now on in deferred payment credit transactions, the power of the nominated bank will be greater than before, but the issuing bank will bear the risk of the beneficiary's fraud, so the issuing bank will be hesitant to issue deferred payment credit. Notwithstanding, we thought that the New York court decision would come into effect in the activation of deferred payment credit in practical trade transactions.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.33
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• pp.191-219
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• 2007

Section 39(5) of Marine Insurance Act 1906 concerns the case where with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy state. The underwriters argue that the assured had"blind-eye knowledge" of the particular respect in which the ship was unseaworthy. Blind-eye knowledge requires a conscious reason for blinding the eye. There must be at least a suspicion of a truth about which one do not want to know and which one refuse to investigate. What has caused greater difficulty is the broad provision in s.17 which appears to be unlimited in its scope. The expression "utmost good faith" appears to derive from the idea of uberrimae fidei, words which indeed appear in the sidenote. The concept of uberrima fides does not appear to have derived from civil law and it has been regarded as unnecessary in civilian systems. S.17 raises many questions. But only two of them are critical to the decision of the present appeal-the fraudulent claim question and the litigation question. It is however necessary to discuss them in the context of a consideration of the problematic character of s.17. In the Star Sea Case, for the defendants to succeed in their defence under this part of the case the defendants have to show that claim was made fraudulently. They have failed to obtain a finding of fraud. It is not enough that until part of the way through the trial the owners failed to disclose to the defendants would have wished to see in order to provide them with some, albeit inadequate, evidential support for their alleged defence under s.39(5). The defence under s.17 fails. The Purpose of this work is to analyze the Star Sea Case, and to explore problems of the MIA relating to the judgement of this case.