• Journal of Global Scholars of Marketing Science
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.80-88
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• 2010

There has been considerable research examining the relationship between stockholders equity and various marketing strategies. These include studies linking stock price performance to advertising, customer service metrics, new product introductions, research and development, celebrity endorsers, brand perception, brand extensions, brand evaluation, company name changes, and sports sponsorships. Another facet of marketing investments which has received heightened scrutiny for its purported influence on stockholder equity is television advertisement embedded within specific sporting events such as the Super Bowl. Research indicates that firms which advertise in Super Bowls experience stock price gains. Given this reported relationship between advertising investment and increased shareholder value, for both general and special events, it is surprising that relatively little research attention has been paid to investigating the relationship between advertising in the Olympic Games and its subsequent impact on stockholder equity. While attention has been directed at examining the effectiveness of sponsoring the Olympic Games, much less focus has been placed on the financial soundness of advertising during the telecasts of these Games. Notable exceptions to this include Peters (2008), Pfanner (2008), Saini (2008), and Keller Fay Group (2009). This paper presents a study of Olympic advertisers who ran TV ads on NBC in the American telecasts of the 2000, 2004, and 2008 Summer Olympic Games. Five hypothesis were tested: H1: The stock prices of firms which advertised on American telecasts of the 2008, 2004 and 2000 Olympics (referred to as O-Stocks), will outperform the S&P 500 during this same period of time (i.e., the Monday before the Games through to the Friday after the Games). H2: O-Stocks will outperform the S&P 500 during the medium term, that is, for the period of the Monday before the Games through to the end of each Olympic calendar year (December 31st of 2000, 2004, and 2008 respectively). H3: O-Stocks will outperform the S&P 500 in the longer term, that is, for the period of the Monday before the Games through to the midpoint of the following years (June 30th of 2001, 2005, and 2009 respectively). H4: There will be no difference in the performance of these O-Stocks vs. the S&P 500 in the Non-Olympic time control periods (i.e. three months earlier for each of the Olympic years). H5: The annual revenue of firms which advertised on American telecasts of the 2008, 2004 and 2000 Olympics will be higher for those years than the revenue for those same firms in the years preceding those three Olympics respectively. In this study, we recorded stock prices of those companies that advertised during the Olympics for the last three Summer Olympic Games (i.e. Beijing in 2008, Athens in 2004, and Sydney in 2000). We identified these advertisers using Google searches as well as with the help of the television network (i.e., NBC) that hosted the Games. NBC held the American broadcast rights to all three Olympic Games studied. We used Internet sources to verify the parent companies of the brands that were advertised each year. Stock prices of these parent companies were found using Yahoo! Finance. Only companies that were publicly held and traded were used in the study. We identified changes in Olympic advertisers' stock prices over the four-week period that included the Monday before through the Friday after the Games. In total, there were 117 advertisers of the Games on telecasts which were broadcast in the U.S. for 2008, 2004, and 2000 Olympics. Figure 1 provides a breakdown of those advertisers, by industry sector. Results indicate the stock of the firms that advertised (O-Stocks) out-performed the S&P 500 during the period of interest and under-performed the S&P 500 during the earlier control periods. These same O-Stocks also outperformed the S&P 500 from the start of these Games through to the end of each Olympic year, and for six months beyond that. Price pressure linkage, signaling theory, high involvement viewers, and corporate activation strategies are believed to contribute to these positive results. Implications for advertisers and researchers are discussed, as are study limitations and future research directions.

• Clean Technology
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.151-157
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• 2020

Rapid urbanization has elevated the risk of urban flooding due to the increase in the impervious surface, causing environmental disasters and environmental pollution problems, such as lowering the groundwater level and increasing water pollution. In Korea, low impact development (LID) techniques have been introduced to minimize these environmental impacts and maintain the water cycle soundness. However, most small-scale development projects are in blind spots because there is no legal basis for rainfall runoff management. Small-scale development projects that increase the surface runoff of rainwater are required to mandate the application of LID facilities in accordance with the polluters' responsibility principle. Therefore, it is necessary to implement a preliminary consultation system for water cycle recovery. This study focuses on the cost-benefit analysis on the application of LID techniques for small-scale development projects. The scale of nationwide small-scale development projects used for cost-benefit analysis were defined as buildings with a land area of more than 1,000 ㎡ or a total floor area of 1,500 ㎡. As a result of analyzing the cost-benefits from the installation of LID facilities, they were found to be much lower than the economic standard value of 1. This might be due to the high cost of facilities compared to the scale of the project. However, considering the overall environmental value of improving the water environment and air quality by the installation of LID facilities and the publicity of reducing the operating cost of sewage treatment facilities, the introduction of a prior consultation for small-scale development projects is inevitable. In the future, institutional and financial support from local governments is required to improve the cost-benefits with the introduction of a prior consultation for small-scale development projects.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.71-94
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• 1990

This paper reviews the rationale of monetary and banking intervention by an outside authority, either the government or the central bank, and seeks to delineate clearly the optimal limits to the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway in Korea as well as on a global scale. Furthermore, this paper seeks to establish an objective and balanced view on the role of the central bank, especially in light of the current discussion on the restructuring of Korea's central bank, which has been severely contaminated by interest-group politics. The discussion begins with the recognition that the modern free banking school and the new monetary economics are becoming formidable challenges to the traditional role of the government or the central bank in the monetary and banking sector. The paper reviews six arguments that have traditionally been presented to support intervention: (1) the possibility of an over-issue of bank notes under free banking instead of central banking; (2) externalities in and the public good nature of the use of money; (3) economies of scale and natural monopoly in producing money; (4) the need for macro stabilization policy due to the instability of the real sector; (5) the external effects of bank failure due to the inherent instability of the existing banking system; and (6) protection for small banknote users and depositors. Based on an analysis of the above arguments, the paper speculates on the optimal role of the government or central bank in the monetary and banking system and the optimal degree of monetary and banking deregulation. By contrast to the arguments for free banking or laissez-faire monetary systems, which become fashionable in recent years, monopoly and intervention by the government or central bank in the outside money system can be both necessary and optimal. In this case, of course, an over-issue of fiat money may be possible due to political considerations, but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. On the other hand, the issue of inside monies based on outside money could indeed be provided for optimally under market competition by private institutions. A competitive system in issuing inside monies would help realize, to the maxim urn extent possible, external economies generated by using a single outside money. According to this reasoning, free banking activities will prevail in the inside money system, while a government monopoly will prevail in the outside money system. This speculation, then, also implies that the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway should and most likely will be limited to the inside money system, which could be liberalized to the fullest degree. It is also implied that it will be impractical to deregulate the outside money system and to allow market competition to provide outside money, in accordance with the arguments of the free banking school and the new monetary economics. Furthermore, the role of the government or central bank in this new environment will not be significantly different from their current roles. As far as the supply of fiat money continues to be monopolized by the government, the control of the supply of base money and such related responsibilities as monetary policy (argument(4)) and the lender of the last resort (argument (5)) will naturally be assigned to the outside money supplier. However, a mechanism for controlling an over-issue of fiat money by a monopolistic supplier will definitely be called for (argument(1)). A monetary policy based on a certain policy rule could be one possibility. More importantly, the deregulation of the inside money system would further increase the systemic risk inherent in the current fractional banking system, while enhancing the efficiency of the system (argument (5)). In this context, the role of the lender of the last resort would again become an instrument of paramount importance in alleviating liquidity crises in the early stages, thereby disallowing the possibility of a widespread bank run. Similarly, prudential banking supervision would also help maintain the safety and soundness of the fully deregulated banking system. These functions would also help protect depositors from losses due to bank failures (argument (6)). Finally, these speculations suggest that government or central bank authorities have probably been too conservative on the issue of the deregulation of the financial system, beyond the caution necessary to preserve system safety. Rather, only the fullest deregulation of the inside money system seems to guarantee the maximum enjoyment of external economies in the single outside money system.