• Journal of Christian Education in Korea
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• v.68
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• pp.11-40
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• 2021

The coronavirus pandemic has brought about significant negative changes in our society to the point where it has to be divided into 'Before Corona'(BC) and 'After Corona'(AC). Typical examples include economic difficulties and medical inequality of some social excluded groups as well as individuals who die alone because they are alienated from social networks, and hate and violent discrimination against Asian immigrants, which are rapidly increasing in Western countries in these days. In addition, the pandemic is at a global level, ranging from the vaccine gap between the first and third worlds, triggered by competition for securing vaccines between countries that put their own interests first, the income gap due to changes in the economic environment and financial market, and the bankruptcy of individuals and corporations. In 'all'(pan) and 'people'(demos) became a limit situation that could not be avoided. There is also the opinion that the world could witness the worst catastrophe if the pandemic spreads to poor countries at risk of increasing violence, poverty and famine. The purpose of this paper is to examine the changes in society caused by the Coronavirus pandemic and to suggest the direction of Christian education accordingly. To this end, this paper analyzes the medical, economic, and psychological crises that society faces in the post-corona era. Next, we look at the changes in Christian theology, mission, and worship, which are strongly required for fundamental changes in the context of the pandemic. Based on the above discussion, we propose a new direction for Christian education necessary in the post-corona era.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.71-94
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• 1990

This paper reviews the rationale of monetary and banking intervention by an outside authority, either the government or the central bank, and seeks to delineate clearly the optimal limits to the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway in Korea as well as on a global scale. Furthermore, this paper seeks to establish an objective and balanced view on the role of the central bank, especially in light of the current discussion on the restructuring of Korea's central bank, which has been severely contaminated by interest-group politics. The discussion begins with the recognition that the modern free banking school and the new monetary economics are becoming formidable challenges to the traditional role of the government or the central bank in the monetary and banking sector. The paper reviews six arguments that have traditionally been presented to support intervention: (1) the possibility of an over-issue of bank notes under free banking instead of central banking; (2) externalities in and the public good nature of the use of money; (3) economies of scale and natural monopoly in producing money; (4) the need for macro stabilization policy due to the instability of the real sector; (5) the external effects of bank failure due to the inherent instability of the existing banking system; and (6) protection for small banknote users and depositors. Based on an analysis of the above arguments, the paper speculates on the optimal role of the government or central bank in the monetary and banking system and the optimal degree of monetary and banking deregulation. By contrast to the arguments for free banking or laissez-faire monetary systems, which become fashionable in recent years, monopoly and intervention by the government or central bank in the outside money system can be both necessary and optimal. In this case, of course, an over-issue of fiat money may be possible due to political considerations, but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. On the other hand, the issue of inside monies based on outside money could indeed be provided for optimally under market competition by private institutions. A competitive system in issuing inside monies would help realize, to the maxim urn extent possible, external economies generated by using a single outside money. According to this reasoning, free banking activities will prevail in the inside money system, while a government monopoly will prevail in the outside money system. This speculation, then, also implies that the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway should and most likely will be limited to the inside money system, which could be liberalized to the fullest degree. It is also implied that it will be impractical to deregulate the outside money system and to allow market competition to provide outside money, in accordance with the arguments of the free banking school and the new monetary economics. Furthermore, the role of the government or central bank in this new environment will not be significantly different from their current roles. As far as the supply of fiat money continues to be monopolized by the government, the control of the supply of base money and such related responsibilities as monetary policy (argument(4)) and the lender of the last resort (argument (5)) will naturally be assigned to the outside money supplier. However, a mechanism for controlling an over-issue of fiat money by a monopolistic supplier will definitely be called for (argument(1)). A monetary policy based on a certain policy rule could be one possibility. More importantly, the deregulation of the inside money system would further increase the systemic risk inherent in the current fractional banking system, while enhancing the efficiency of the system (argument (5)). In this context, the role of the lender of the last resort would again become an instrument of paramount importance in alleviating liquidity crises in the early stages, thereby disallowing the possibility of a widespread bank run. Similarly, prudential banking supervision would also help maintain the safety and soundness of the fully deregulated banking system. These functions would also help protect depositors from losses due to bank failures (argument (6)). Finally, these speculations suggest that government or central bank authorities have probably been too conservative on the issue of the deregulation of the financial system, beyond the caution necessary to preserve system safety. Rather, only the fullest deregulation of the inside money system seems to guarantee the maximum enjoyment of external economies in the single outside money system.