• Journal of the Institute of Electronics and Information Engineers
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• v.53 no.10
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• pp.103-108
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• 2016

With the growing trend of pervasive computing, (the idea that technology is moving beyond personal computers to everyday devices) there is a growing demand for lightweight ciphers to safeguard data in a network that is always available. For all block cipher applications, the AES is the preferred choice. However, devices used in pervasive computing have extremely constraint environment and as such the AES will not be suitable. In this paper we design and implement a new lightweight compact block cipher that takes advantage of both S-P network and the Feistel structure. The cipher uses the S-box of PRESENT algorithm and a key dependent one stage omega permutation network is used as the cipher's P-box. The cipher is implemented on iNEXT-V6 board equipped with virtex-6 FPGA. The design synthesized to 196 slices at 337 MHz maximum clock frequency.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.12 no.7
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• pp.3421-3437
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• 2018

With the enlargement of wireless technology, vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are rising as a hopeful way to realize smart cities and address a lot of vital transportation problems such as road security, convenience, and efficiency. To achieve data confidentiality, integrity and authentication applying lightweight cryptosystems is widely recognized as a rather efficient approach for the VANETs. The Khudra cipher is such a lightweight cryptosystem with a typical Generalized Feistel Network, and supports 80-bit secret key. Up to now, little research of fault analysis has been devoted to attacking Khudra. On the basis of the single nibble-oriented fault model, we propose a differential fault analysis on Khudra. The attack can recover its 80-bit secret key by introducing only 2 faults. The results in this study will provides vital references for the security evaluations of other lightweight ciphers in the VANETs.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.13 no.9
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• pp.4727-4741
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• 2019

The lightweight block cipher Piccolo adopts Generalized Feistel Network structure with 64 bits of block size. Its key supports 80 bits or 128 bits, expressed by Piccolo-80 or Piccolo-128, respectively. In this paper, we exploit the security of reduced version of Piccolo from the first round with the pre-whitening layer, which shows the vulnerability of original Piccolo. As a matter of fact, we first study some linear relations among the round subkeys and the properties of linear layer. Based on them, we evaluate the security of Piccolo-80/128 against the meet-in-the-middle attack. Finally, we attack 13 rounds of Piccolo-80 by applying a 5-round distinguisher, which requires $2^{44}$ chosen plaintexts, $2^{67.39}$ encryptions and $2^{64.91}$ blocks, respectively. Moreover, we also attack 17 rounds of Piccolo-128 by using a 7-round distinguisher, which requires $2^{44}$ chosen plaintexts, $2^{126}$ encryptions and $2^{125.49}$ blocks, respectively. Compared with the previous cryptanalytic results, our results are the currently best ones if considering Piccolo from the first round with the pre-whitening layer.