• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.51-59
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• 2009

The CRT-RSA cryptosystem is very vulnerable to fault insertion attacks in which an attacker can extract the secret prime factors p, q of modulus N by inserting an error during the computational operation on the cryptographic chip. In this paper, after implementing the CRT-RSA cryptosystem, we try to extract the secret key embedded in commercial microcontroller using optical injection tools such as laser beam or camera flash. As a result, we make sure that the commercial microcontroller is very vulnerable to fault insertion attacks using laser beam and camera flash, and can apply the prime factorization attack on CRT-RSA Cryptosystem.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.59-68
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• 2006

Although the cryptographic algorithms in IC chip such as smart card are secure against mathematical analysis attack, they are susceptible to side channel attacks in real implementation. In this paper, we analyze the security of smart card using a developed experimental tool which can perform power analysis attacks and fault insertion attacks. As a result, raw smart card implemented SEED and ARIA without any countermeasure is vulnerable against differential power analysis(DPA) attack. However, in fault attack about voltage and clock on RSA with CRT, the card is secure due to its physical countermeasures.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.135-140
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• 2010

The computation using Chinese Remainder Theorem in RSA cryptosystem is well suited in the digital signature or decryption processing due to its low computational load compared to the case of general RSA without CRT. Since the RSA-CRT algorithm is vulnerable to many fault insertion attacks, some countermeasures against them were proposed. Among several countermeasures, Yen et al. proposed two schemes based on fault propagation method. Unfortunately, a new vulnerability was founded in FDTC 2006 conference. To improve the original schemes, Kim et al. recently proposed a new countermeasure in which they adopt the AND operation for fault propagation. In this paper, we show that the proposed scheme using AND operation without checking procedure is also vulnerable to fault insertion attack with chosen messages.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.155-160
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• 2010

Since the RSA cryptosystem based on Chinese Remainder Theorem is vulnerable to many fault insertion attacks, some countermeasures against them were proposed. Recently, Kim et al. or Ha et al. respectively proposed each countermeasure scheme based on fault propagation method. Unfortunately, Hur et al. insist that these countermeasures are vulnerable to their opcode modification fault attack. In this paper, we show that the proposed attack can not apply to almost CRT-RSA countermeasures which use multi-precision operations in long bit computation. Therefore, the countermeasure against fault attack proposed by Kim et al. or Ha et al. are still secure.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.396-413
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• 2017

Dynamically checking the integrity of software at run-time is always a hot and difficult spot for trusted computing. Control-flow integrity is a basic and important safety property of software integrity. Many classic and emerging security attacks who introduce illegal control-flow to applications can cause unpredictable behaviors of computer-based systems. In this paper, we present a software-based approach to checking violation of control flow integrity at run-time. This paper proposes a high-performance and low-overhead software control flow checking solution, control flow checking at virtual edges (CFCVE). CFCVE assigns a unique signature to each basic block and then inserts a virtual vertex into each edge at compile time. This together with insertion of signature updating instructions and checking instructions into corresponding vertexes and virtual vertexes. Control flow faults can be detected by comparing the run-time signature with the saved one at compile time. Our experimental results show that CFCVE incurs only 10.61% performance overhead on average for several C benchmark programs and the average undetected error rate is only 9.29%. Compared with previous techniques, CFCVE has the characteristics of both high fault coverage and low memory and performance overhead.