• 한국철도학회논문집
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• 제9권3호
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• pp.264-270
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• 2006

In this paper we present a safety plan to be applied to the development of the TCS(Train Control System). The safety plan that can be applied to the life cycle of a system, from the conceptual design to the dismantlement, shows the whole process of the paper work in detail through the establishment of a goal, analysis and assessment, the verification. In this paper we study about the making a plan, the preliminary hazard analysis, the hazard identification and analysis to guarantee the safety of the TCS. The process far the verification of the system safety is divided into several steps based on the target system and the approaching method. The guarantee of the system safety and the improvement of the system reliability is fellowed by the recommendation of the international standards.

• 한국전산구조공학회논문집
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• 제36권4호
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• pp.273-282
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• 2023

원자력발전소 지진 확률론적 안전성 평가인 PSA(Probabilistic Safety Assessment)는 오랜 기간에 걸쳐 확고히 구축되어 왔다. 반면에 다양한 공정 기반의 산업시설물의 경우 화재, 폭발, 확산(유출) 재난에 대해 주로 연구되어 왔으며, 지진에 대해서는 상대적으로 연구가 미미하였다. 하지만, 플랜트 설계 당시와 달리 해당 부지가 지진 영향권에 들어갈 경우 지진 PSA 수행은 필수적이다. 지진 PSA를 수행하기 위해서는 확률론적 지진 재해도 해석(Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis), 사건수목 해석(Event Tree Analysis), 고장수목 해석(Fault Tree Analysis), 취약도 곡선 등을 필요로 한다. 원자력 발전소의 경우 노심 손상 방지라는 최우선 목표에 따라 많은 사고 시나리오 분석을 통해 사건수목이 구축되었지만, 산업시설물의 경우 공정의 다양성과 최우선 손상 방지 핵심설비의 부재로 인해 일반적인 사건수목 구축이 어렵다. 따라서, 본 연구에서는 산업시설물 지진 PSA를 수행하기 위해 고장수목을 바탕으로 확률론적 시각도구인 베이지안 네트워크(Bayesian Network, BN)로 변환하여 리스크를 평가하는 방법을 제안한다. 제안된 방법을 이용하여 임의로 생성된 가스플랜트 Plot Plan에 대해 최종 BN을 구축하고, 다양한 사건 경우에 대한 효용성있는 의사결정과정을 보임으로써 그 우수성을 확인하였다.

• 환경영향평가
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• 제18권6호
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• pp.359-366
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• 2009

CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) is considered as the most promising interim solution to deal with the greenhouse gas such as $CO_2$ responsible for global warming. Even though carefully chosen geologic formations are known to contain stored gas for a long time period, there are potential risks of leakage. Up to now, applicable risk assessment procedures for the leakage of $CO_2$ are not available. This study presents a basis for risk analysis applicable to a complex geologic storage system. It starts with the classification of potential leakage pathways. Receptors and the leakage effect on them are identified and quantified. Then, a fault tree is constructed, which yields the minimum cut set (i.e., the most vulnerable leakage pathway) and quantifies the probability of the leakage risk through the cut set. The methodology will provide a tool for risk assessment in a CCS project. The outcomes of the assessment will not only ensure the safety of the CCS system but also offer a reliable and efficient monitoring plan.

• 한국철도학회논문집
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• 제9권4호
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• pp.412-418
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• 2006

In this paper we deal with the APARP theory which has been applied for UK railway system and risk assessment method which has been using in the domestic railway system for the safety demonstration. Both techniques are applied to the ATP wayside equipment for interface. Also, fur the applications of each techniques a analysis of the safety activity and a possibility of the application of ALARP theory are evaluated. Finally, we generate requirements of the safety demonstration for the future domestic railway system by way of the analysis of some assumptions and requirement data which can be applied to the risk assessment of ALARP.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제41권1호
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• pp.91-98
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• 2009

The "3+3 Process" for safety critical software for nuclear power plants' I&C (Instrumentation and Control system) has been developed in this work. The main idea of the "3+3 Process" is both to simplify the software development and safety analysis in three steps to fulfill the requirements of a software safety plan [1]. The "3-Step" software development process consists of formal modeling and simulation, automated code generation and coverage analysis between the model and the generated source codes. The "3-Step" safety analysis consists of HAZOP (hazard and operability analysis), FTA (fault tree analysis), and DV (design validation). Put together, these steps are called the "3+3 Process". This scheme of development and safety analysis minimizes the V&V work while increasing the safety and reliability of the software product. For assessment of this process, validation has been done through prototyping of the SDS (safety shut-down system) #1 for PHWR (Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor).