• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.185-211
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• 2003

Initially, the system of outside director of cooperative has the object of consulting an external specialist. Recently, it takes a serious view of monitoring about securing clean management on the operating crisis. Nevertheless, in the field of NFFC(National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives), it is difficult that the system of outside director of cooperative attains that is initial object. And in the field of FC(Fisheries Cooperative), it isn't in force about the outside director of cooperative. Therefore, it is important to make a following system improvement. (1) The ratio of outside directors among the member of board of directors has to be increased. (2) Outside director's term of office has to be amended from lyears to 2years and the current method of selection should be reformed to be a strict one with high standard of requirement and substantial screening for membership. (3) Outside directors' wage system must be actualized by adopting incentive system' etc. A measure of appointing an executive in a similar business line or organizations to ours as an outside director must be considered. FC have to introduce the system of outside director. (4) A recognition of proper management of outside directors and putting in practice is essential.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.7
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• pp.323-331
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• 2021

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structure and level cash holdings in an emerging country, namely, Saudi Arabia, by constructing a corporate governance mechanism (foreign ownership, family ownership, institutional and managerial ownership). This paper uses data from 100 listed firms at Saudi Stock Exchange (TADAWUL) from 2011 to 2019. The firm's decision to hold cash has come to the fore in the last two or three years as a result of the recent global financial crisis, and the impact that this has had on the firms' ability to raise funds from external sources. Using the random-effect generalized least square (GLS) regression model, the findings reveal that foreign and family ownership negatively influences cash holdings, while managerial ownership has a positive association with cash holdings. Further, institutional ownership did not have a direct effect on cash holdings in Saudi Arabia. Our results suggest that ownership structure include foreign ownership, family and managerial ownership is an essential vehicle to promote the performance of cash holding of all the 100 public-listed non-financial firms in Saudi Arabia. We recommend that sound policies should be targeted toward foreign ownership, family, and managerial ownership since they are essential to improve cash holding in Saudi Arabian firms.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.31-40
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• 2023

This paper investigates the effect of independent directorship on the firm performance of Chinese listed companies under the impact of the global COVID-19 epidemic. The study starts by assessing the relationship between independent director-related characteristics and firm performance, then mines independent director characteristics variables, collects variable data, proposes reasonable hypotheses, and constructs a data model. 1597 companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock index, China, from 2020 to 2021 has been selected as the research sample. An empirical study on the relationship between independent directors' characteristics and firm performance was conducted using SPSS25. The results show that under the impact of the global COVID-19 epidemic, the proportion of independent directors on the board of directors, the age of independent directors, the remuneration of independent directors, and the overseas background of independent directors in Chinese listed companies have a negative relationship with the current firm performance, while the proportion of female independent directors and the part-time rate of independent directors do not have a positive effect on firm performance. The findings of this study strongly imply that independent directors' characteristics play a significant role in corporate governance and firm performance in Chinese listed companies and that the external environment has an impact on how well independent directors can carry out their duties.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.