• Journal of the Korean earth science society
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.221-233
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• 2002

This study investigated preservice science teachers' understandings of philosophical foundations(i.e., ontological and epistemological beliefs) underlying constructivist notions of learning. The teacher education program these subjects participated in explicitly addressed philosophical notions consistent with different views of constructivism. For these preservice science teachers, the program provided them with the opportunity to reflect upon the implications that their ontological and epistemological commitments had for their role as a science teacher. Data from four in-depth interviews were used to explore changes in each preservice science teacher's ontological beliefs, epistemological commitments, and pedagogical preferences. Results indicated that ontological beliefs and epistemological commitments were not necessarily consistent with conceptions of science teaching and learning for these preservice teachers. While some students internalized idealist and relativist perspectives, they did not integrate these relativist epistemological views into their preferred instructional practices. Also, regarding the fallible and tentative nature of knowledge, data in this study indicated that participants' epistemological beliefs about scientific Knowledge did influence how they were thinking about their roles as science teachers. Implications for teacher education programs and research on preservice science teacher's philosophical beliefs are discussed.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.117
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• pp.57-84
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• 2011

As for the methodology of physical science, on the one side, Ludwig Boltzmann was declined to Scientific Realist and at the same time Epistemological Idealist. But on the other. He was neither fully nor consistently either one of them, because of rejecting the causal realism of the former and the belief in absolute certainty of the latter. Is there nevertheless any evidence that he had a coherent world view of his own? Yes. In short, he seems to identify his own position with what is called a mind-matter identity theory. In 1897, he supported that psychological processes are identical with certain processes in the brain(realism). And in 1903, he said : "Physics is not separated from psychology. They are only different sides." But Boltzmann did not explain concretely the possibility of this identity. So I tried to construct one theory of identity which is suitable for understanding problems n the physical world, though whether it would work for a full-scale world view which includes both physical and mental phenomena remains problematic. If light phenomena, for example, tend to be measured in terms of some contexts as if light were a wave and in others as if light were a particle, then one may be able to reasonably suppose that light has whatever characteristics in itself which it must have in order to seem like a wave under some conditions of measurement and like a particle in others. If this theory is provisionally to mental phenomena as well, it would mean that reality has those characteristics in itself which it must have to appear as it does to the various faculties of the mind and as it is measured in different physical situations. This is probably not what Boltzmann meant by his theory of identity, since it is very ontological and metaphysical. But in my opinion it is by far the most reasonable identity theory.

• Journal of the Korean earth science society
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.309-323
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• 2002

This qualitative study investigated preservice teachers' understandings of the ontology and epistemology underlying constructivist notions of learning through four in-depth interviews. Of the sixteen participants in a larger study, five significantly changed ontological and epistemological beliefs and eleven did not. This study focused on these eleven teachers who have hardly changed their philosophical beliefs throughout the teacher education program. Ten teachers who consistently maintained the scientific realist beliefs were presented as a composite case (Young's case). Among the eleven teachers, there was one outlier who had consistently maintained an idealist and relativist epistemological position from the beginning of the study and was subjected to another case analysis (Ben's case). These cases corroborated the assertion that each individual's deeply entrenched ontological and epistemological beliefs are very hard to change. For researchers, this study offers insights into the reasons that preservice teachers give for non-changes in their thinking about learning to teach. The study also examines preservice teachers' perceived constraints in implementing their ideal pedagogies and the influence of the teacher education program on their pedagogical beliefs changes. The benefits and influences of the M.Ed. program's theoretical coursework and the field experiences on these teachers' learning-to-teach experiences are addressed with rich data. The implications for teacher educators as well as for the instructional practices of preservice teacher education programs are discussed. This research emphasize necessity of the field-based teacher education program and the need of empowering experienced school teachers as teacher educators in teacher preparation and professional development.