• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.21 no.2
• /
• pp.269-300
• /
• 2018

In his recent three papers, Joohan Lee defends the following three theses. First, an ordinary term 'believes' is polysemous in that it can refer to three different types of mental attitudes; that is, it can refer to a belief as an involuntary mental disposition, or a pragmatic acceptance as a voluntary mental action, or an epistemic acceptance as a different voluntary mental action. Second, a person's pragmatic acceptance of a proposition is his voluntary mental action which takes it to be true for pragmatic reasons, despite the fact that there is no adequate epistemic evidence for the proposition, whereas a person's epistemic acceptance of a proposition is his voluntary mental action which takes it to be true for epistemic reasons, despite the fact that there is a pragmatic reason to the contrary. Third, mental attitudes to which epistemic norms apply are epistemic acceptances as voluntary mental actions, rather than beliefs as involuntary mental dispositions. If these theses are correct, then they will have important implications for contemporary epistemology. In this paper, however, I argue that Joohan Lee is not successful in defending these theses.