• 사회경제평론
• /
• v.31 no.3
• /
• pp.307-346
• /
• 2018

Gunnar Myrdal has struggled throughout his academic life with the problem of the role of valuations in social sciences. His earlier viewpoint was that valuations should be completely separated from scientific analysis on facts. But he soon fundamentally changed his viewpoint. His later viewpoint was that social scientists should disclose his valuations, for valuations intervene all the processes of scientific researches. Value premises are the valuations coherently reconstructed and manifestly articulated. Myrdal argued that social scientists should disclose value premises and perform his analysis and normative judgement based on the value premises. And the value premises should be derived from the valuations held by the large or significant groups of the society under study, not from the researcher's own valuations. This paper tried to show that Myrdal's later viewpoint must meet the crux, that researcher's own viewpoint must intervene in choosing valuations of particular group among diverse groups in the society under stduy, and in deriving and reconstructing value premises from the valuations of that group. And it argued that the reason why Myrdal met the crux could be explained by that he accepted the emotivism of Axel $H{\ddot{a}}gersr{\ddot{o}}m$. And it proposed some methodological solutions for escaping the crux Myrdal met, while preserving the positive elements of Myrdals' viewpoint.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.123
• /
• pp.1-26
• /
• 2012

Ist der Emotivismus eine $mi{\ss}lungene$ Theorie? Nach der Meinung von Jesse Prinz ist es nicht so. Auf der Humeschen Tradition stehend behauptet er, $da{\ss}$ ein moralisches Urteil ohne das Sentiment von Billigung oder $Mi{\ss}billigung$ nicht zustandekommen kann. Ihm zufolge ist Emotion nicht allein mit moralischen Urteilen verbunden, sondern auch eine notwendige und hinreichende Bedingung $daf{\ddot{u}}r$. Der Grund dessen, warum der Emotivisums nicht ${\ddot{u}}berzeugend$ erschien, liegt darin, $da{\ss}$ $f{\ddot{u}}r$ diesen die Verbindung von Emotion und Moral nur auf den $Gef{\ddot{u}}hlsausdruck$ $beschr{\ddot{a}}nkt$ bleibt. Zwar stellt das moralische Urteil Sentiment dar, aber das bleibt eben nicht als ein $blo{\ss}$ $Gef{\ddot{u}}hlsausdruckendes$. Denn die $Moralit{\ddot{a}}t$ ist nicht die einfache Projektion eines subjektiven Zustandes, vielmehr konstruiert die emotionale Reaktion von Billigung oder $Mi{\ss}billigung$ das moralische Urteil. Daher muss der projektistische Gesichtspunkt des expressionistischen Emotivismus modifiziert werden, so $da{\ss}$ der oft dem Emotivismus kritisch zugeschriebene moralische Nihilismus zu ${\ddot{u}}berwinden$ ist. In diesem Zusammenhang $schl{\ddot{a}}g$ Prinz den konstruktiven Sentimentalismus vor, der als eine hybride Theorie des Moralbegriffs von 'biologiscehn Tatsachen' und 'sozialer Konstruktion' darauf zielt, im moralischen Leben eine Stelle auszumanchen, wo Evolution und Kutur zueinander zusammentreffen $k{\ddot{o}}nnen$.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.137
• /
• pp.57-79
• /
• 2016

The purpose of this paper is to explain MacIntyre's critique of moral pluralism of modern society and reveal the limits of his critique of liberalism. It is a distinctive feature of the social and cultural order that we inhabit that disagreements over central moral issues are peculiarly unsettleable. Debates concerned with the value of human life such as those over abortion and euthanasia, or about distributive justice and property rights, or about war and peace degenerate into confrontations of assertion and counter-assertion because the protagonists of rival positions invoke incommensurable forms of moral assertion against each other. We usually call this situation 'modern moral pluralism' and concede as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under free institution. But in After Virtue, MacIntyre vigorously criticizes modern moral pluralism. The main cause he took which brought about this state of affairs was the failure of 'the Enlightenment project'. According to MacIntyre, the Enlightenment project which has dominated philosophy for the past three hundred years promised a conception of rationality independent of historical and social context, and independent of any specific understanding of man's nature or purpose. But not only has that promise in fact been unfulfilled, the project is itself fundamentally flawed and the promise could never be fulfilled. In consequence, modern moral and political thought are in a state of disarray from which they can be rescued only if we revert to an Aristotelian paradigm, with its essential commitment, and construct an account of practical reason premised on that commitment. But one of the deepest difficulties with the argument of After Virtue is that the very extent of its critique of the modern world seems to cast doubt on the possibility of any realistic revival under the conditions of modernity of the Aristotelianism which MacIntyre advocates. Especially when we consider we are not only the characters found in our narratives but also we ourselves are the author of our own narratives. Moral pluralism is not seen as disaster but rather as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free institutions.