• Title/Summary/Keyword: Dividend Policy

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An Empirical Study of Two Different Groups of Zero Leverage Firms in Korea: Firms with Financial Constraints and Firms with Debt Avoidance for Future Investment (국내 무부채 기업의 두 종류 기업군에 관한 실증적 연구: 재정적 제약을 갖고 있는 그룹과 재무적 유연성을 추구하는 그룹)

  • Yang, Insun
    • Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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    • v.21 no.11
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    • pp.804-813
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    • 2020
  • This paper finds that Korean zero-leverage firms are not homogeneous. By conducting both univariate and multivariate logit regression analysis, this paper finds that Korean zero-leverage firms have zero leverage as either a consequence of financial constraints or because of a strategic decision to mitigate under-investment incentives and preserve financial flexibility. There are two distinct groups of unlevered firms with different levels of constraints as measured by their dividend policy, namely dividend payers and non-payers. Importantly, this paper finds new evidence that these two groups have different motives for selecting a zero leverage policy. Firms in the first group (non-payers) have zero leverage, mainly due to financial constraints. They rely heavily on their internal funds and consequently invest in fewer growth opportunities than their levered counterparts. Firms in the second group (payers) deliberately avoid debts and preserve financial flexibility to mitigate investment distortions, as predicted by the under-investment and financial flexibility hypotheses.

Fiscal Policy and Redistribution in a Small Open Economy with Aging Population

  • Jung, Yongseung
    • East Asian Economic Review
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    • v.25 no.4
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    • pp.361-401
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    • 2021
  • This paper sets up a two agent small open economy with monopolistically competitive firms and catching up with the Joneses to investigate the labor and capital Laffer curve, taking into account aging population along the line of Auray et al. (2016), Galí and Monacelli (2005), and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). The paper finds that the higher the market power of firms is, the larger the consumption inequality between asset holders and non-asset holders is in the economy with aging population. It also finds that there is room for government to increase the tax revenue by raising tax rates under the economy with higher markup, as households will work more hours to compensate for their loss of labor income to tax hikes. The expected maximum tax revenue is likely to shrink with progressive taxations, since non-asset holders with additional dividend income work less and consume more. The paper finds that the fiscal multiplier decreases with the degree of progressive redistribution.

The Effects of the Previous Corporate Internal Reservation on the Current Dividend Rate - Using LEV as a moderating variable & Verification through DRF & GBM model (법인의 전기 사내유보가 당기 배당률에 미치는 영향 부채비율의 조절변수 효과 및 DRF & GBM 모델을 통한 검증)

  • Yoo, Joon-Soo;Jeong, Jae-Yeon
    • Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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    • v.8 no.10
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    • pp.215-223
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    • 2017
  • This article has tried to analyse the effect of the corporate earning return tax empirically through analysis on the impact of previous internal reservation on the dividends rate of the current year. In addition to this, this article has tried to the effectiveness of government policies with leverage ratio as a moderating variable. Moreover, DRF and GBM model were used to see the effect again. As a result of the actual proof analysis, OCF, ROE, FOR have a significance level of 99% in model1, model2, model3. However, ADV and MSE has appeared not to be meaningful in all models. In the result of DRF and GBM model for convergence was higher than GBM in depth and leaves. However, when it comes to a model explaining capability, GBM high than DRF. The further study will be required to examine the effect of government policy by time series analysis in the period of enforcement of the reflux tax, from 2015 to 2017.

WHICH INFORMATION MOVES PRICES: EVIDENCE FROM DAYS WITH DIVIDEND AND EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS AND INSIDER TRADING

  • Kim, Chan-Wung;Lee, Jae-Ha
    • The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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    • v.3 no.1
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    • pp.233-265
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    • 1996
  • We examine the impact of public and private information on price movements using the thirty DJIA stocks and twenty-one NASDAQ stocks. We find that the standard deviation of daily returns on information days (dividend announcement, earnings announcement, insider purchase, or insider sale) is much higher than on no-information days. Both public information matters at the NYSE, probably due to masked identification of insiders. Earnings announcement has the greatest impact for both DJIA and NASDAQ stocks, and there is some evidence of positive impact of insider asle on return volatility of NASDAQ stocks. There has been considerable debate, e.g., French and Roll (1986), over whether market volatility is due to public information or private information-the latter gathered through costly search and only revealed through trading. Public information is composed of (1) marketwide public information such as regularly scheduled federal economic announcements (e.g., employment, GNP, leading indicators) and (2) company-specific public information such as dividend and earnings announcements. Policy makers and corporate insiders have a better access to marketwide private information (e.g., a new monetary policy decision made in the Federal Reserve Board meeting) and company-specific private information, respectively, compated to the general public. Ederington and Lee (1993) show that marketwide public information accounts for most of the observed volatility patterns in interest rate and foreign exchange futures markets. Company-specific public information is explored by Patell and Wolfson (1984) and Jennings and Starks (1985). They show that dividend and earnings announcements induce higher than normal volatility in equity prices. Kyle (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Barclay, Litzenberger and Warner (1990), Foster and Viswanathan (1990), Back (1992), and Barclay and Warner (1993) show that the private information help by informed traders and revealed through trading influences market volatility. Cornell and Sirri (1992)' and Meulbroek (1992) investigate the actual insider trading activities in a tender offer case and the prosecuted illegal trading cased, respectively. This paper examines the aggregate and individual impact of marketwide information, company-specific public information, and company-specific private information on equity prices. Specifically, we use the thirty common stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and twenty one National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) common stocks to examine how their prices react to information. Marketwide information (public and private) is estimated by the movement in the Standard and Poors (S & P) 500 Index price for the DJIA stocks and the movement in the NASDAQ Composite Index price for the NASDAQ stocks. Divedend and earnings announcements are used as a subset of company-specific public information. The trading activity of corporate insiders (major corporate officers, members of the board of directors, and owners of at least 10 percent of any equity class) with an access to private information can be cannot legally trade on private information. Therefore, most insider transactions are not necessarily based on private information. Nevertheless, we hypothesize that market participants observe how insiders trade in order to infer any information that they cannot possess because insiders tend to buy (sell) when they have good (bad) information about their company. For example, Damodaran and Liu (1993) show that insiders of real estate investment trusts buy (sell) after they receive favorable (unfavorable) appraisal news before the information in these appraisals is released to the public. Price discovery in a competitive multiple-dealership market (NASDAQ) would be different from that in a monopolistic specialist system (NYSE). Consequently, we hypothesize that NASDAQ stocks are affected more by private information (or more precisely, insider trading) than the DJIA stocks. In the next section, we describe our choices of the fifty-one stocks and the public and private information set. We also discuss institutional differences between the NYSE and the NASDAQ market. In Section II, we examine the implications of public and private information for the volatility of daily returns of each stock. In Section III, we turn to the question of the relative importance of individual elements of our information set. Further analysis of the five DJIA stocks and the four NASDAQ stocks that are most sensitive to earnings announcements is given in Section IV, and our results are summarized in Section V.

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Corporate Governance and the Marginal Cash Value for Korean Retail Firms

  • Kim, Sang-Su;Lee, Jeong-Hwan
    • Journal of Distribution Science
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    • v.14 no.5
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    • pp.27-37
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    • 2016
  • Purpose - Prior theories expect a lower marginal value of cash for weak governance firms. To test this hypothesis, we examine the relationship between corporate governance structures and marginal cash values in Korean retail firms. Research design, data, and methodology - We estimate marginal cash values based on the model of Faulkender & Wang (2006). The retail firms listed in Korean Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2013 are analyzed. Corporate governance scores are provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services. Results - We show a higher marginal value of cash for the weak governance retail firms in terms of total governance score. Our analysis on a detailed set of governance scores generally confirms this tendency. Yet, a higher marginal cash value is obtained for the firms with better board structures and dividend policies. Conclusions - Our findings argue against the agency view of cash policy predicting a negative relationship between corporate governance scores and marginal cash values. A low marginal value of cash, widely observed in the sample firms, also supports severe resource diversion problem in Korean corporations.

The Pricing of Corporate Common Stock By OPM (OPM에 의한 주식가치(株式價値) 평가(評價))

  • Jung, Hyung-Chan
    • The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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    • v.1 no.1
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    • pp.133-149
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    • 1985
  • The theory of option pricing has undergone rapid advances in recent years. Simultaneously, organized option markets have developed in the United States and Europe. The closed form solution for pricing options has only recently been developed, but its potential for application to problems in finance is tremendous. Almost all financial assets are really contingent claims. Especially, Black and Scholes(1973) suggest that the equity in a levered firm can be thought of as a call option. When shareholders issue bonds, it is equivalent to selling the assets of the firm to the bond holders in return for cash (the proceeds of the bond issues) and a call option. This paper takes the insight provided by Black and Scholes and shows how it may be applied to many of the traditional issues in corporate finance such as dividend policy, acquisitions and divestitures and capital structure. In this paper a combined capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and option pricing model (OPM) is considered and then applied to the derivation of equity value and its systematic risk. Essentially, this paper is an attempt to gain a clearer focus theoretically on the question of corporate stock risk and how the OPM adds to its understanding.

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The Marginal Value of Cash and Agency Conflicts in Korean Firms

  • Kim, Sang-Su;Lee, Jeong Hwan
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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    • v.3 no.4
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    • pp.5-16
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    • 2016
  • Prior literature expects a lower marginal cash value for weaker governance firms. We test this empirical hypothesis by using the sample of publicly traded Korean firms from 2005 to 2013. To measure the quality of governance structures, we employ the corporate governance scores provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services. The empirical model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) is adopted to estimate the marginal value of cash. Our empirical analysis shows a higher marginal value of cash for the good governance firms in the examination of the total governance score. This finding is consistent to the agency view of cash policy predicting a larger marginal value of cash for the firms with higher governance scores. However, this positive relationship is not robust for a subset of detailed governance scores; a lower marginal cash value is observed for the firms with better qualities of board structure, auditing, dividend policies. Moreover, our empirical analysis verifies a quite low level of marginal cash value for Korean firms, which supports the existence of severe agency conflicts in Korean corporations. Our results verify the significant role of agency conflicts between a manager and shareholders in the determination of marginal cash values in the Korean firms.

Globalization of Technological Development and Opportunities for National Innovation Systems of Developing Countries

  • Dnishev, Farkhat;Alzhanova, Farida
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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    • v.3 no.4
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    • pp.67-79
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    • 2016
  • Prior literature expects a lower marginal cash value for weaker governance firms. We test this empirical hypothesis by using the sample of publicly traded Korean firms from 2005 to 2013. To measure the quality of governance structures, we employ the corporate governance scores provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services. The empirical model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) is adopted to estimate the marginal value of cash. Our empirical analysis shows a higher marginal value of cash for the good governance firms in the examination of the total governance score. This finding is consistent to the agency view of cash policy predicting a larger marginal value of cash for the firms with higher governance scores. However, this positive relationship is not robust for a subset of detailed governance scores; a lower marginal cash value is observed for the firms with better qualities of board structure, auditing, dividend policies. Moreover, our empirical analysis verifies a quite low level of marginal cash value for Korean firms, which supports the existence of severe agency conflicts in Korean corporations. Our results verify the significant role of agency conflicts between a manager and shareholders in the determination of marginal cash values in the Korean firms.

The Nexus Between Social Mobility and Regional Disparity: Empirical Evidence from India

  • SINGH, Anuradha;MUNIYOOR, Krishna
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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    • v.9 no.1
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    • pp.229-240
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    • 2022
  • This article examines the link between regional disparity and social mobility in India. There has been a steady rise in economic inequality in India. The rapid economic growth coupled with a rise in income inequality is a serious concern in India. While the emphasis is on inclusive growth, it appears difficult to tackle the problem without looking at the intricacies of the problem. The Social Mobility Index is an important tool that focuses on bringing long-term equality by identifying priority policy areas in the country. We used a multivariate statistical approach to construct a social mobility index at the regional level by considering several social and economic variables. Our findings show that while the Union Territory of Delhi ranks first in the social mobility index, Chhattisgarh has the least social mobility. From a policy perspective, a comprehensive examination of the determinants of the social mobility index shows that health, education access, and quality, and equity of education are of great importance in improving social mobility. Considering India's potential economic growth resulting from its 'demographic dividend' and improved access, markets, and technology, increasing social mobility through facilitating equal opportunities in society is key to achieving inclusive growth.

Monetary Policy in a Two-Agent Economy with Debt-Constrained Households (가계부채 제약하의 통화정책: 2주체 거시모형(TANK)에서의 정량적 분석)

  • Jung, Yongseung;Song, SungJu
    • Economic Analysis
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    • v.25 no.2
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    • pp.1-53
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    • 2019
  • This paper examines monetary policy quantitatively in a two-agent and small-scale New-Keynesian economy with debt-constrained households that cannot smooth their consumption intertemporally and frictionlessly since highly indebted households are not allowed to borrow above a certain debt ceiling in incomplete financial markets without additional risk premiums due to information asymmetry between savers and borrowers. We find that, in the event of cost shocks, the asymmetric responses of borrowing households without, and saving households with, dividend incomes lead to different labor supplies and consumptions over heterogeneous households, and eventually to an extension of the monetary policy transmission channels. The income effect and low elasticity of the labor supply play key roles in such asymmetric responses over heterogeneous households. We also find that the social welfare in a flexible inflation targeting (FIT) monetary policy, in which both the inflation gap and the output gap are considered in an integrated manner when policy-making, is similar to that of the Ramsey optimal monetary policy (ROP), in which the shares of debt-constrained households, as well as all economic states, including both the inflation gap and output gap, are considered comprehensively for policy-making, and that it is greater than that of simple inflation targeting (SIT) monetary policy, in which only the inflation gap is considered mechanically for policy-making. Such social welfare implies that a FIT policy may still work even in an economy with a sizable number of debt-constrained households. Further, the responses of cost shocks to consumption and labor supply are dying out more slowly under FIT and ROP policies than under an SIT policy.