• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제36권3호
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• pp.255-276
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• 2014

The dispute between China and Japan regarding $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$ is believed to be quite similar to the controversy surrounding Dokdo in terms of historical and post-war processes except for the point that the phenomena of occupation is different with regard to Dokdo. China's claim to $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$ is based on historical title and continuous use while the basis of Japan's claim is summarized as preoccupancy of ownerless land. Even though Japan acknowledges that China discovered $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$, Japan claims that the act to establish sovereignty over the island from the standpoint of International Law was not taken by China. However, at that time, effective occupation was not an essential prerequisite for the acquisition of a territory. That is to say, from a legal perspective, the legal right for an area could be established based on the discovery of the land, and so it is thought that Japan is applying the current criteria of International Law in a manner that is inappropriate. When we review the post-war process, the San Francisco Peace Treaty does not directly mention $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. But based on the said treaty, we can note that Japan gave up all rights for the southern area that is north of the boundary line that equates to latitude $29^{\circ}$ and that includes the Ryuku Islands and $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. Of course, the provisions for the territory in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and its disposal are not the final factor for the judgment regarding dominium of $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. However, it seems clear that Japan's attitude and interpretation regarding the issues of $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$, the Kuril Islands and Dokdo is problematic.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.