• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.11a
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• pp.484-487
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• 2003

With the restructuring of the electric power industry during the past decade, operation and control strategies have undergone a shift in paradigm. Certain activities that were earlier considered as part of the integrated electricity supply(such as voltage and frequency control) are now treated as separate services and often independently managed and accounted for. This paper examines the management of reactive power services in deregulated electricity markets around the world. From the review several diverse methods for handling reactive power within the deregulated market framework emerges. While in many of the markets, proper financial compensation mechanisms exist to compensate the providers for their service, some others continue to handle reactive power through regulatory frameworks and technical operation guidelines.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.6
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• pp.350-357
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• 2004

In a deregulated electricity generation market, the sufficient capacity of transmission lines will promote the competition among generation companies (Gencos). In this paper, we show that Gencos' possession of rights to collect congestion rents may increase the competition effects of the transmission lines. In order for concrete analysis on this effect, a simple symmetric market model is introduced. In this framework, introducing the transmission right to the Gencos has the same strategic effects as increasing the line capacity of the transmission line. Moreover, the amount of effectively increased line capacity is equal to the amount of the line rights. We also show that the asymmetric share of the financial transmission rights may result in an asymmetric equilibrium even for symmetric firms and markets. We also demonstrate these aspects in equal line rights model and single firm line rights model. Finally, a numerical example is provided to show the basic idea of the proposed paper.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.50 no.12
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• pp.568-574
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• 2001

The variations of real time electric power price in competitive electricity markets have influence on electric power demands of the consumers. The effects of the consumers for electric power price can be expressed the price elasticity coefficient of the power demand as a measurement. Residential, commercial, and industrial consumers with different characteristics cause the different price elasticity of the power demand due to changing the pattern of consumption. It is necessary that the effects of electric power demands as a function of elasticity coefficient for each loads should be analyzed in Korea which is processing deregulated electric market. Therefore, this paper calculate the elasticity coefficient of each loads and analysis the effects of electric power demands as a function of elasticity coefficient of inflexible and flexible consumers in competitive electricity market.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.347-353
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• 2003

In models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium(NE). The approaches for finding the NE have had two major bottlenecks: computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multi-player games. This paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks. The proposed method can efficiently find a mixed strategy equilibrium in a multi-player game. The formulation of the m condition for a three-player game is introduced and a basic computation scheme of solving nonlinear equalities and checking inequalities is proposed. In order to relieve the inevitable burden of searching the subspace of payoffs, several techniques are adopted in this paper. Two example application problems arising from electricity markets and involving a Cournot and a Bertrand model, respectively, are investigated for verifying the proposed method.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2002.07a
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• pp.380-382
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• 2002

An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models of imperfect competition of a deregulated electricity system the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, the bimatrix approach for finding Nash equilibria in electricity markets is investigated. This approach determines pure and mixed equilibria using the complementarity pivot algorithm. The mixed equilibrium in the matrix approach has the equal number of non-zero property. This property makes it difficult to reproduce a smooth continuous distribution for the mixed equilibrium. This paper proposes an algorithm for adjusting the quantization value of discretization to reconstruct a continuous distribution from a discrete one.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.1
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• pp.62-67
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• 2003

An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models of imperfect competition of a deregulated electricity system, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, the bimatrix approach for finding Nash equilibria in electricity markets is investigated. This approach determines pure and mixed equilibria using the complementarity pivot algorithim. The mixed equilibrium in the matrix approach has the equal number of non-zero property. This property makes it difficult to reproduce a smooth continuous distribution for the mixed equilibrium. This paper proposes an algorithm for adjusting the quantization value of discretization to reconstruct a continuous distribution from a discrete one.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07a
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• pp.869-871
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• 2005

As deregulated electricity markets are being implemented in different countries, the remuneration of reactive power which contribute to ancillary services is one of the key issues, so it is necessary to evaluate the generator's reactive. In this paper, we focus on the evaluation of reactive power which contributes to reactive power balance. The idea is that the main usages of the reactive power of generator can be divided into two components. First one is physically required amounts for transmitting the real power and the second one is the amounts contributed to support the system, that is, to maintain the voltage profiles. In this paper, the second component is used to evaluate the effective amounts of the reactive power contributed to ancillary service.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.4A no.4
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• pp.262-267
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• 2004

With the advent of electric power systems moving from a vertically integrated structure to a deregulated environment, calculating reactive power service charges has become a new and challenging theme for market operators. This paper examines various methods for reactive power management adopted throughout various deregulated foreign and domestic markets and then proposes an innovative method to calculate reactive power service charges using a reactive power market in a wholesale electricity market. The reactive power market is operated based on bids from the generating sources and it settles on uniform prices by running the reactive OPF programs of the day-ahead electricity market. The proposed method takes into account recovering not only the costs of installed capacity but also the lost opportunity costs incurred by reducing active power output to increase reactive power production. Based on the result of the reactive OPF program, the generators that produce reactive power within the obligatory range do not make payments whereas the generators producing reactive power beyond the obligatory range receive compensation by the price determined in the market. A numerical sample study is carried out to illustrate the processes and appropriateness of the proposed method.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.2 no.4
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• pp.494-499
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• 2007

In this paper, we have investigated how transmission network constraints can be modeled in an electricity market equilibrium model. Under Cournot competition assumption, a game model is set up considering transmission line capacity constraints. Based on locational marginal pricing principle, market clearing is formulated as a total consumers# benefit maximization problem, and then converted to a conventional optimal power flow (OPF) formulation with a linearized transmission model. Using market clearing formulation, best response analysis is formulated and, finally, Nash equilibrium is formulated. In order for illustration, a numerical study for a four node system with two generating firms and two loads are presented.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
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• 2003.05a
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• pp.255-263
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• 2003

A multi-agent system designed to represent newly deregulated electricity markets in the USA is aimed at testing the capability of the multi-agent model to replicate the observed price behavior in the wholesale market and developing a smart business intelligence which quickly searches the optimum offer strategy responding to the change in market environments. Simulation results show that the optimum offer strategy is to withhold expensive generating units and submit relatively low offers when demand is low, regardless of firm size; the optimum offer strategy during a period of high demand is either to withhold capacity or speculate for a large firm, while it is to be a price taker a small firm: all in all, the offer pattern observed in the market is close to the optimum strategy. From the firm's perspective, the demand-side participation as well as the intense competition dramatically reduces the chance of high excess profit.