• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.37 no.2
• /
• pp.40-63
• /
• 2015

Anthracite exports have special value within the DPRK's economy. In this paper, we focus on what determines the DPRK's anthracite exports to China. We use panel data consisting of cross-section data from 30 provinces in China and quarterly time-series data from 1998 to 2013. Controlling for all other variables that affect anthracite imports, the variable for steel production in China is robust and statistically significant. This is consistent with on-site interviews which indicate that much of North Korean anthracite is consumed by China's steel industry. This implies that the North Korean authorities need to make adjustments to the foreign trade structure, as the import demand for anthracite in China may decline further.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.32 no.2
• /
• pp.93-143
• /
• 2010

This paper estimates the impact of Japan's economic sanction on DPRK trade in the 2000s. It conceptualizes the effects of sanction on DPRK trade, econometrically tests whether such effects exist in case of Japan's sanction using currently available DPRK trade statistics, and measures the size of the effects by correcting and reconfiguring the deficiencies of the currently available DPRK trade statistics. The main findings of the paper are as follows. First, Japan's sanction can have two different effects on DPRK trade: 'Sanction Country Effect' and "Third Country Effect.' The former means that the sanction diminishes DPRK trade with Japan while the latter refers to the effects on DPRK trade with other countries as well. The third country effect can arise not simply because the DPRK changes its trade routes to circumvent the sanction, but because the sanction forces the DPRK to readjust its major trade items and patterns. Second, currently no official DPRK trade statistics are available. Thus, the so-called mirror data referring to DPRK trading partners' statistics should be employed for the analysis of the sanction effects. However, all currently available mirror data suffer from three fundamental problems: 1) they may omit the real trade partners of the DPRK; 2) they may confuse ROK trade with DPRK trade; 3) they cannot distinguish non-commercial trade from commercial trade, whereas only the latter concerns Japan's sanction. Considering those problems, we have to adopt the following method in order to reach a reasonable conclusion about the sanction effect. That is, we should repeat the same analysis using all different mirror data currently available, which include KOTRA, IMF and UN Commodity Trade Statistics, and then discuss only the common results from them. Third, currently available mirror data make the following points. 1) DPRK trade is well explained by the gravity model. 2) Japan's sanction has not only the sanction country effect but also the third country effect on DPRK trade. 3) The third country effect occurs differently on DPRK export and import. In case of export, the mirror statistics reveal positive (+) third country effects on all of the major trade partners of the DPRK, including South Korea, China and Thailand. However, on DPRK import, such third country effects are not statistically significant even for South Korea and China. 4) This suggests that Japan's sanction has greater effects on DPRK import rather than its export. Fourth, as far as DPRK export is concerned, it is possible to resolve the abovementioned fundamental problems of mirror data and thus reconstruct more accurate statistics on DPRK trade. Those reconstructed statistics lead us to following conclusions. 1) Japan's economic sanction diminished DPRK's export to Japan from 2004 to 2006 by 103 million dollars on annual average (Sanction Country Effect). It comprises around 60 percent of DPRK's export to Japan in 2003. 2) However, for the same period, the DPRK diverted its exports to other countries to cope up with Japan's sanction, and as a result its export to other countries increased by 85 million dollars on annual average (Third Country Effect). 3) This means that more than 80 per cent of the sanction country effect was made up for by the third country effect. And the actual size of impact that Japan's sanction made on DPRK export in total was merely 30 million dollars on annual average. 4) The third country effect occurred mostly in inter-Korean trade. In fact, Japan's sanction increased DPRK export to the ROK by 72 million dollars on annual average. In contrast, there was no statistically significant increase in DPRK export to China caused by Japan's sanction. 5) It means that the DPRK confronted Japan's sanction and mitigated its impact primarily by using inter-Korean trade and thus the ROK. Fifth, two things should be noted concerning the fourth results above. 1) The results capture the third country effect caused only by trade transfer. Facing Japan's sanction, the DPRK could transfer its existing trade with Japan to other countries. Also it could change its main export items and increase the export of those new items to other countries as mentioned in the first result. However, the fourth results above reflect only the former, not the latter. 2) Although Japan's sanction did not make a huge impact on DPRK export, it might not be necessarily true for DPRK import. Indeed the currently available mirror statistics suggest that Japan's sanction has greater effects on DPRK import. Hence it would not be wise to argue that Japan's sanction did not have much impact on DPRK trade in general, simply using the fourth result above.

• Maritime Security
• /
• v.3 no.1
• /
• pp.45-72
• /
• 2021

North Korea's cyber capabilities represent a relatively new threat to global financial institutions and foreign governments, particularly the U.S and South Korean governments. Based primarily on publicly available sources, such as journalistic accounts and scholarly publications, this qualitative paper analyzes the ways in which North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has bolstered his country's asymmetric power and advanced his line of byungjin (dual development in the economy and military). Particularly by merging the cyber and maritime domains, North Korean operatives generate more revenue for the regime and helps keep the heavily sanctioned leadership in power. Despite the increased international attention to North Korean hackers, few analysts have examined the important role of cyber in the DPRK's internal political culture, specifically in advancing Kim Jong Un's byungjin line. Cyber fits into the DPRK's longstanding tradition of irregular warfare and guerilla-based armed struggle. Cyber also further advances Kim's personal reputation in the DPRK as an economic innovator and military strategist. This paper pays particular attention to the role of the DPRK's cyber operations in both ideological and maritime contexts. Recently, North Korean hackers have targeted South Korean shipbuilding industries and developed a blockchain scam, known as Marine Chain. North Korean cyber agents have increasingly paid attention to the nexus of cyber and maritime domains in their activities.

• Korea and Global Affairs
• /
• v.1 no.2
• /
• pp.171-208
• /
• 2017

This paper is to analyze the type characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy. To this end, the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction; the concept and type of nuclear strategy; the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the declarative nuclear strategy; the operational characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy; and conclusion. Recently, the deployment of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of nuclear capabilities in North Korea have raised serious problems in our security and military preparedness. Nuclear strategy means military strategy related to the organization, deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. The study of North Korea's nuclear strategy begins with a very realistic assumption that the nuclear arsenal of North Korea has been substantiated. It is a measure based on North Korea's nuclear arsenal that our defense authorities present the concepts of preemptive attack, missile defense, and mass retaliation as countermeasures against the North Korean nuclear issue and are in the process of introducing and deploying them. The declared nuclear declaration strategy of the DPRK is summarized as: (1)Nuclear deterrence and retaliation strategy under the (North Korea's) Nuclear Weapons Act, (2)Nuclear preemptive aggression, (3)The principle of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons in the 7th Congress. And the intentions and operational characteristics of the North Korean nuclear strategy are as follows: (1)Avoiding blame through imitation of existing nuclear state practices, (2)Favoring of nuclear strategy through declarative nuclear strategy, (3)Non-settlement of nuclear strategy due to gap between nuclear capability and nuclear posture. North Korea has declared itself a nuclear-weapon state through the revised Constitution(2012.7), the Line of 'Construction of the Nuclear Armed Forces and the Economy'(2013.3), and the Nuclear Weapons Act(2013.4). However, the status of "nuclear nations" can only be granted by the NPT, which is already a closed system. Realistically, a robust ROK-US alliance and close US-ROK cooperation are crucial to curbing and overcoming the North Korean nuclear threat we face. On this basis, it is essential not only to deter North Korea's nuclear attacks, but also to establish and implement our own short-term, middle-term and long-term political and military countermeasures for North Korea's denuclearization and disarmament.

• Korea journal of population studies
• /
• v.35 no.1
• /
• pp.101-130
• /
• 2012

This study examines mortality change in North Korea and its association with state production and welfare systems. Two main subjects are analyzed. The first theme is to examine the reliability of mortality related data released by North Korea government authorities. Examining inner consistencies among mortality related statistics and comparing with mortality trends in other socialist societies, the study finds that mortality rate was under estimated. Under-estimation of mortality by North Korean authorities is regarded to result not only from political purpose which aims to propagate the regime's superiority but also from enumeration errors of vital statistics based on the residence registration. The second theme is to estimate the change in mortality of North Korean people since the establishment of DPRK, correcting errors of mortality data. Mortality of North Korean people is estimated to have improved largely by the early 1970s, to have been sluggish hereafter, and finally to have increased during the economic hardship period between 1993 and 2008. While large people died during the food crisis in the late 1990s, however the population loss caused by mortality increase was not so great as the proposition of the huge starvation was expected. It is partly because population turbulence occurred not just by mortality increase, rather it has progressed in the joint effects of fertility decline and exodus of North Korean people for food. It is also due to North Korean people's voluntary activities of informal economy. It is also worth noting the high mortality rate of North Korean men. The high mortality of North Korean men is likely due to men's mobilization for long time in army and labor with high risk of accident and their life styles.