• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.55 no.6
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• pp.2034-2046
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• 2023

Industrial control systems in nuclear facilities are facing increasing cyber threats due to the widespread use of information and communication equipment. To implement cyber security programs effectively through the RG 5.71, it is necessary to quantitatively assess cyber risks. However, this can be challenging due to limited historical data on threats and customized Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) in nuclear facilities. Previous works have focused on identifying data flows, the assets where the data is stored and processed, which means that the methods are heavily biased towards information security concerns. Additionally, in nuclear facilities, cyber threats need to be analyzed from a safety perspective. In this study, we use the system theoretic process analysis to identify system-level threat scenarios that could violate safety constraints. Instead of quantifying the likelihood of exploiting vulnerabilities, we quantify Security Control Measures (SCMs) against the identified threat scenarios. We classify the system and CDAs into four consequence-based classes, as presented in NEI 13-10, to analyze the adversary impact on CDAs. This allows for the ranking of identified threat scenarios according to the quantified SCMs. The proposed framework enables stakeholders to more effectively and accurately rank cyber risks, as well as establish security and response strategies.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.51 no.7
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• pp.1791-1798
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• 2019

Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems of nuclear power plants (NPPs) have been continuously digitalized. These systems have a critical role in the operation of nuclear facilities by functioning as the brain of NPPs. In recent years, as cyber security threats to NPP systems have increased, regulatory and policy-related organizations around the world, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC), have emphasized the importance of nuclear cyber security by publishing cyber security guidelines and recommending cyber security requirements for NPP facilities. As described in NRC Regulatory Guide (Reg) 5.71 and KINAC RS015, challenge response authentication should be applied to the critical digital I&C system of NPPs to satisfy the cyber security requirements. There have been no cases in which the most robust response authentication technology like challenge response has been developed and applied to nuclear I&C systems. This paper presents a challenge response authentication mechanism for a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) system used as a control system in the safety system of the Advanced Power Reactor (APR) 1400 NPP.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.888-894
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• 2015

This paper presents a unified model based assessment framework to quantify threats and vulnerabilities associated with control systems, especially in the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system. In the past, this system was primarily utilized as an isolated facility on a local basis, and then it started to be integrated with wide-area networks as the communication technology would make rapid progress. The introduction of smart grid, which is an innovative application of digital processing and communications to the power grid, might lead to more and more cyber threats originated from IT systems. However, an up-to-date power system often requires the real-time operations, which clearly implies that the cyber security would turn out to be a complicated but also crucial issue for the power system. In short, the purpose of this paper is to streamline a comprehensive approach to prioritizing cyber security risks which are expressed by the combination of threats, vulnerabilities, and values in the SCADA components.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.44 no.8
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• pp.919-928
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• 2012

The applications of computers and communication system and network technologies in nuclear power plants have expanded recently. This application of digital technologies to the instrumentation and control systems of nuclear power plants brings with it the cyber security concerns similar to other critical infrastructures. Cyber security risk assessments for digital instrumentation and control systems have become more crucial in the development of new systems and in the operation of existing systems. Although the instrumentation and control systems of nuclear power plants are similar to industrial control systems, the former have specifications that differ from the latter in terms of architecture and function, in order to satisfy nuclear safety requirements, which need different methods for the application of cyber security risk assessment. In this paper, the characteristics of nuclear power plant instrumentation and control systems are described, and the considerations needed when conducting cyber security risk assessments in accordance with the lifecycle process of instrumentation and control systems are discussed. For cyber security risk assessments of instrumentation and control systems, the activities and considerations necessary for assessments during the system design phase or component design and equipment supply phase are presented in the following 6 steps: 1) System Identification and Cyber Security Modeling, 2) Asset and Impact Analysis, 3) Threat Analysis, 4) Vulnerability Analysis, 5) Security Control Design, and 6) Penetration test. The results from an application of the method to a digital reactor protection system are described.

• IEMEK Journal of Embedded Systems and Applications
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• v.7 no.5
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• pp.255-265
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• 2012

A cyber-physical system(CPS) is a collection of cyber and physical components that interact with each other to achieve a particular application. Here, the CPS is emerged the reliability and security problems. Particularly, the defect of reliability in the data/control transmission under the CPS can lead to serious damage. We discuss the reliability and security problem on CPS architecture. Then we would suggest the considerations of cyber security in industrial control systems built with CPS.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.26 no.8
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• pp.1205-1212
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• 2022

Cyber threat targeting ICS (Industrial Control System) has indicated drastic increases over the past decade and Cyber Incident in Critical Infrastructure such as Energy, Gas Terminal and Petrochemical industries can lead to disaster-level accidents including casualties and large-scale fires. In order to effectively respond to cyber attacks targeting ICS, a multi-layered defense-in-depth strategy considering Control System Architecture is necessary. In particular, the centralized security log system integrating OT (Operational Technology) and IT (Information Technology) plays an important role in the ICS incident response plan. The paper suggests the way of implementing centralized security log system that collects security events and logs using OPC Protocol from Level 0 to Level 5 based on IEC62443 Purdue Model to integrate ICS security logs with SIEM (Security Information Event Management) operated in IT environment.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2014.10a
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• pp.363-365
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• 2014

Internet baking, e-commerce, business processing, etc on smartphone handing could be possible in present days. Ambiguity between cyber and real life has made vulnerability on infrastructure, Gov't Service and National security by cyber terrorism. Especially, Lots of Infrastructure and Gov't Service based on Information Technology were exposed by Cyber terror. Legal system should be improved to keep from these threats. This paper proposed needs of cyber legal system by analyzing proposed cyber related code on Korean National Assembly, issue on Cyber Control Tower, National Cyber Security Industry and Human resource.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.471-478
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• 2013

Industrial control system was designed mainly in the form of analog in early days. However, necessity of digital system engineering is increasing recently because systems become complicated. Consequently, stability of digital systems is improved so most industrial control systems are designed with digital. Because Using digital design of Industrial control system is expanded, various threatening possibilities such as penetration or destruction of systems are increasing enormously. Domestic and overseas researchers accordingly make a multilateral effort into risk analysis and preparing countermeasures. In this paper, this report chooses common security requirement in industrial control system and nuclear control system through relevant guidelines analysis. In addition, this report suggests the development plan of nuclear cyber security system which will be an essential ingredient of planning approvals.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.279-288
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• 2017

Nowadays, nations cyber security capabilities play an important role in a nation's defense. Security-critical infrastructures such as national defenses, public services, and financial services are now exposed to Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) and their resistance to such attacks effects the nations stability. Currently Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is widely used by organizations to mitigate and deter APT for its ability to proactively protect their assets by using evidence-based knowledge. The evidence-based knowledge information can be exchanged among organizations and used by the receiving party to strengthen their cyber security management. This paper will discuss on the business process reengineering of the CTI information exchange management for a nationwide scaled control and governance by the government to better protect their national information security assets.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.51 no.1
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• pp.138-145
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• 2019

With the application of digital technology to safety-critical infrastructures, cyber-attacks have emerged as one of the new dangerous threats. In safety-critical infrastructures such as a nuclear power plant (NPP), a cyber-attack could have serious consequences by initiating dangerous events or rendering important safety systems unavailable. Since a cyber-attack is conducted intentionally, numerous possible cases should be considered for developing a cyber security system, such as the attack paths, methods, and potential target systems. Therefore, prior to developing a risk-informed cyber security strategy, the importance of cyber-attacks and significant critical digital assets (CDAs) should be analyzed. In this work, an importance analysis method for cyber-attacks on an NPP was proposed using the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) method. To develop an importance analysis framework for cyber-attacks, possible cyber-attacks were identified with failure modes, and a PSA model for cyber-attacks was developed. For case studies, the quantitative evaluations of cyber-attack scenarios were performed using the proposed method. By using quantitative importance of cyber-attacks and identifying significant CDAs that must be defended against cyber-attacks, it is possible to develop an efficient and reliable defense strategy against cyber-attacks on NPPs.