• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.21 no.8
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• pp.1-12
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• 2021

An operation of an organization is currently using a digital environment which opens to potential cyber-attacks. These phenomena become worst as the cyberattack landscape is changing rapidly. The impact of cyber-attacks varies depending on the scope of the organization and the value of assets that need to be protected. It is difficult to assess the damage to an organization from cyberattacks due to a lack of understanding of tools, metrics, and knowledge on the type of attacks and their impacts. Hence, this paper aims to identify domains and sub-domains of cyber-attack taxonomy to facilitate the understanding of cyber-attacks. Four phases are carried in this research: identify existing cyber-attack taxonomy, determine and classify domains and sub-domains of cyber-attack, and construct the enhanced cyber-attack taxonomy. The existing cyber-attack taxonomies are analyzed, domains and sub-domains are selected based on the focus and objectives of the research, and the proposed taxonomy named AVOIDITALS Cyber-attack Taxonomy is constructed. AVOIDITALS consists of 8 domains, 105 sub-domains, 142 sub-sub-domains, and 90 other sub-sub-domains that act as a guideline to assist administrators in determining cyber-attacks through cyber-attacks pattern identification that commonly occurred on digital infrastructure and provide the best prevention method to minimize impact. This research can be further developed in line with the emergence of new types and categories of current cyberattacks and the future.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.52 no.5
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• pp.995-1001
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• 2020

With the development of digital instrumentation and control (I&C) devices, cyber security at nuclear power plants (NPPs) has become a hot issue. The Stuxnet, which destroyed Iran's uranium enrichment facility in 2010, suggests that NPPs could even lead to an accident involving the release of radioactive materials cyber-attacks. However, cyber security research on industrial control systems (ICSs) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems is relatively inadequate compared to information technology (IT) and further it is difficult to study cyber-attack taxonomy for NPPs considering the characteristics of ICSs. The advanced research of cyber-attack taxonomy does not reflect the architectural and inherent characteristics of NPPs and lacks a systematic countermeasure strategy. Therefore, it is necessary to more systematically check the consistency of operators and regulators related to cyber security, as in regulatory guide 5.71 (RG.5.71) and regulatory standard 015 (RS.015). For this reason, this paper attempts to suggest a template for cyber-attack taxonomy based on the characteristics of NPPs and exemplifies a specific cyber-attack case in the template. In addition, this paper proposes a systematic countermeasure strategy by matching the countermeasure with critical digital assets (CDAs). The cyber-attack cases investigated using the proposed cyber-attack taxonomy can be used as data for evaluation and validation of cyber security conformance for digital devices to be applied, and as effective prevention and mitigation for cyber-attacks of NPPs.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.865-889
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• 2019

The need for cyber resilience is increasingly important in our technology-dependent society where computing devices and data have been, and will continue to be, the target of cyber-attackers, particularly advanced persistent threat (APT) and nation-state/sponsored actors. APT and nation-state/sponsored actors tend to be more sophisticated, having access to significantly more resources and time to facilitate their attacks, which in most cases are not financially driven (unlike typical cyber-criminals). For example, such threat actors often utilize a broad range of attack vectors, cyber and/or physical, and constantly evolve their attack tactics. Thus, having up-to-date and detailed information of APT's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) facilitates the design of effective defense strategies as the focus of this paper. Specifically, we posit the importance of taxonomies in categorizing cyber-attacks. Note, however, that existing information about APT attack campaigns is fragmented across practitioner, government (including intelligence/classified), and academic publications, and existing taxonomies generally have a narrow scope (e.g., to a limited number of APT campaigns). Therefore, in this paper, we leverage the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) model to "decompose" any complex attack and identify the relevant characteristics of such attacks. We then comprehensively analyze more than 40 APT campaigns disclosed before 2018 to build our taxonomy. Such taxonomy can facilitate incident response and cyber threat hunting by aiding in understanding of the potential attacks to organizations as well as which attacks may surface. In addition, the taxonomy can allow national security and intelligence agencies and businesses to share their analysis of ongoing, sensitive APT campaigns without the need to disclose detailed information about the campaigns. It can also notify future security policies and mitigation strategy formulation.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2015.05a
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• pp.264-266
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• 2015

Currently as cyber threats grow up targeting nuclear power plants(NPP), licensees must guarantee that computer and information systems of nuclear facilities can be adequately protected against cyber attack. Especially critical system that cause illegal transfer of nuclear material and adverse impact to public safety need protecting. In this paper, we surveying the cyber threat examples targeted at NPP, and taxonomy the method of cyber security for NPPs in korea through analyzing the methodology to identify critical system and address cyber security controls for nuclear facilities.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.329-337
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• 2013

Cyber threats of the ICS(Industrial Control System) has been researched on the level to the threat to the network service as well as a specific system, even if the extent of damage was not intended. Although some range of "security" just include the protection of systems against the deliberate attacks of terrorists or cyber hackers, often more damage is done by carelessness, and equipment failures than by those deliberate attacks. This paper presented a taxonomy for classifying all abnormal behaviors of ICS, including deliberate attacks, inadvertent mistakes, equipment failures, and software problems. The classification criteria of ICS abnormal behaviors was selected to highlight commonalities and important features of deliberate attacks as well as inadvertent actions.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.38B no.8
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• pp.641-653
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• 2013

Recent cyber attacks targeting control systems are getting sophisticated and intelligent notoriously. As the existing signature based detection techniques faced with their limitations, a whitelist model with security techniques is getting attention again. However, techniques that are being developed in a whitelist model used at the application level narrowly and cannot provide specific information about anomalism of various cases. In this paper, we classify abnormal cases that can occur in control systems of enterprises and propose a new whitelist model for detecting abnormal cases.